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Abstract
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Title: Principles and Practice in Critical Theory: Children's Literature.
In this thesis it is proposed that children's literature criticism may be
discussed in terms of the idea, based on elements of the writings of Michel
Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Philippe Aries, and Jacqueline Rose, that 'childhood'
and the 'child' are not stable ontological concepts, but changing and variable
narratives which operate in conjunction with the hierarchically dominant narratives
of 'adulthood'. Children's fiction criticism is based on an acceptance of, and
reliance on, 'the child as reader', which is portrayed in many different versions for
many different purposes. Rather than offering 'solutions' to the self-defined
problems of children's fiction and children's fiction criticism, this thesis wishes to
explore the operation of purposes within children's literature criticism, and the
way these purposes direct and define the use of texts on, and ideas of, education,
childhood, and children.
In the first four chapters views on children as readers in some of the
writings on education and politics of Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, Cicero, and
Quintilian, and of Vives, Comenius, Erasmus, Luther, Montaigne, J.S. Mill, Locke,
and Rousseau, and the views of some of the commentators on these writings, are
discussed to argue that children's literature criticism is not primarily a field
originating from a split of books for children into 'schoolbooks' and 'children's'
fiction', whereby a criticism developed for the 'fiction' branch, but that children's
fiction and children's fiction criticism are firmly encompassed by, and rooted in,
the narratives of the 'liberal arts' educational ideals and its attendant socio-
political and personal ideologies.
In the fifth chapter the ideas and claims of the children's literature critics
are set out in their own terms, while the sixth, and final, chapter concentrates on







I have been tremendously lucky to have had the benefit of the support and
encouragement of many people and institutions.
I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to the British Council for awarding
me a two-year British Council Fellowship, for 1987-88 and 1988-89, and to the
University of Bristol for awarding me a full Postgraduate Scholarship for 1989-90,
and the Senior Residency of the most ideally located student house of all time for
a final year Ph.D. student: opposite the main library and the computer centre of
the University! Both The British Council and the University of Bristol, and their
staff, gave me not only generous financial, but also much appreciated moral
support.
My thanks also, of course, to my supervisor Dr Fred Inglis for his erudition and
his wonderful enthusiasm. I would also like to thank Dr Richard Todd of the Free
University of Amsterdam who, without being under any official obligation
whatsoever to do so, continues to give me advice and encouragement concerning
all aspects of study.
Finally I would like to give my love and thanks to all my family and friends - who
gave me not only emotional warmth and support, and sustained encouragement,
but also include many learned, talented, and interested people who argued
through the thesis with me, and provided ideas, information, and insights - and to




I hereby declare that this thesis is an original work, written by myself alone, and
not previously submitted for any purpose to any institution. Any information and
ideas from other sources are acknowledged fully in the text and references.








Table of Contents	 5
Introduction	 6
Chapter One.	 Parameters and Perspectives of
Discussion.
	 13
Chapter Two.	 The 'Child' as Reader within Texts on
Liberal Arts Education.	 29
Chapter Three.	 The 'Child' and Hierarchical Systems:
'Looking through the Eyes of the Child'.
	
55
Chapter Four.	 The 'Child' and Forms of Liberty:
The Education-Amusement Divide., 	 83
Chapter Five.	 The 'Norton' Critics: The 'Child' and
the Book.	 116
Chapter Six.	 'Children's' Literature Criticism and














The Russian writer on, and of, children's stories, Kornei Chukovsky, relates how
he once received a letter from a parent, complaining about his writings of
nonsense-verse. The letter writer asked of him:
Why do you distort realistic facts? Children need socially useful
information and not fantastic stories about white bears who cry
cock-a-doodle-doo. This is not what we expect from our children's
authors. We want them to clarify for the child the world that
surrounds him, instead of confusing his brain with all kinds of
nonsense.'
Chukovsky's reaction to this view was to 'feel not only depressed but also stifled'.2
He replies to the accusations in the letter that, on the contrary,
the nonsense that seemed to him [the letterwriter] so harmful not
only does not interfere with the child's orientation to the world that
surrounds him, but ... strengthens in his mind a sense of the real;
and that it is precisely in order to further the education of children
in reality that such nonsense verse should be offered to them.3
In this exchange we find expressed several ideas pertaining to children and
reading: there are the obvious differences of opinion with the letter-writer arguing
for the need for strict (or more strict) realism, and Chukovsky pleading for
nonsense-verse and the use of fantasy. But equally important are the underlying
assumptions shared by Chukovsky and the letter-writer, namely the ascribing of
powerful educational and developmental functions to children's reading, no less
than a 'clarification of the world that surrounds him', a 'strengthening in his mind
[of] the real'.
6
The premises on which the letter-writer and Chukovsky's exchange is based
are still the subject of controversy, not only with regard to children, but also with
regard to adult readers. Though the mechanics of the reading-process have been
explored to an extent (though not fully explained) the psychological and
sociological aspects of reading, especially the reading of fiction, remain subject to
even more differing views and attitudes. The complex interactions between an
individual reader and a text, and their relationships to surrounding social,
historical, and cultural circumstances remain open to many interpretations and
explanations. Depending, firstly, on the reasons for having an interest in books
and reading, and, secondly, on the different underlying assumptions on which the
arguments are based, there are many different views on the nature of reading. In
examining these views one must take account of the motives and aims directing
these views, and this is particularly true in relation to the study of children's books
and children's reading. In the Western industrialised nations ideological, political,
and moral issues assert themselves with concentrated vigour with regard to 'chil-
dren'. The near total dominance of the adult world over children, established, at
its most fundamental level, by chronology, creates an uneasy field of tensions
relating to control, self-control, and the pressures, joys, and uncertainties, of
power. It is a complex hierarchy: in so far as any society and culture are
developing when a child enters them, an inevitable interaction is established and
maintained, as between any novice and some form of establishment. Rousseau, for
instance, comments on this power structure repeatedly in Emile. Regarded as one
of the central figures in developing modern attitudes towards children, he writes:
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There is no subjection so complete as that which preserves the
forms of freedom; it is thus that the will itself is taken captive.4
In the democracies of Europe and Northern America the status of the hierarchy
is expressed, amongst other things, in the adult right to vote. This right is the
expression of the central democratic ideals of the freedom of choice and the right
to have a say in one's own political and personal destiny: these rights do not
extend to children, on a political or ideological level at least, and many decisions
are made for them. The regulating forces (conscious and unconscious, direct and
indirect) exercised by adults over children, whether for their benefit and
protection, or out of malevolent motives, are most obviously visible throughout
our society in the shape of laws concerning the child's place in the family (i.e.
adoption and custody; fostering; laws pertaining to ownership and transfer of
property; laws concerning child abuse), and rules organizing the child's place in
public life (legislation on child education and child labour).
The hierarchical relationship between adulthood and childhood is also
strongly reflected in the frequently cited paradox that children's books are, in fact,
written, published, reviewed, criticised, and, often, selected and bought, by adults.
In this position of responsibility and authority, adults concerned, in whatever way,
with children and reading, have been anxious to explain the nature and function
of children's reading, as we could see in the exchange between Chukovsky and the
letter-writer. There exists a large community of people who have an interest in
considering these problems: (children's) authors, publishers, critics, reviewers,
booksellers, general readers, and, sometimes, in some capacities, teachers and
librarians, psychologists and parents, politicians and philosophers. Their interests
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range from trying to estimate the marketable value of a book, to trying to assess
a text's literary qualities, or evaluating the use of a text for a school curriculum.
At the core of these endeavors however, lie the two basic issues: what happens
when we read a book, and, that as Julia Briggs puts it:
the study and interpretation of fiction for children pose, in an acute
form, the fundamental questions raised by all fiction: who writes, for
whom and why?5
Because, as Juliet Dusinberre expresses it, 'it is parents, not children, who care
about the forming of the child's mind,' 6 the nature of the influence and effects of
reading are a central concern in most children's book studies. A Dutch writer on
children's literature, J. Riemens-Reurslag, formulates this issue as follows:
can the transference of ideas from a book happen in such a way
that it has a deep influence on the life of a child, or is a book only
capable of awakening thoughts already present in the child? And to
what extent can this transference of ideas take place?'
It is clear here that this question forms one small aspect of the larger debates
concerning the role of 'nurture' against 'nature'. As Sara Goodman Zimet puts it:
both personal testimony and empirical research strongly suggest that
while our attitudes, values and behaviours may be influenced by
what we read, when left to our own initiative we read what we are.
In other words, we select our readings to support our
predispositions rather than in order to change them .... Evidence
supporting quite the opposite position [can also be] presented ...
demonstrating, in effect, that we are what we read.8
In so far as these questions remain problematical far beyond even the field
of children's books, it is still difficult to discuss cogently relevant issues such as
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censorship, use of children's books in home and at school, and the literary status
of these books. Julia Briggs writes that 'a responsible and thoughtful criticism is
clearly desirable, but where is it to begin?'9
 In another article, Briggs also
explains why she feels this criticism, in her view, is necessary: 'there is no critical
consensus as to whether children's books are appropriately examined by the same
criteria that are applied to adult literature, or whether they constitute a special
- and different - case.' 1° It is the intention of this thesis, then, to attempt to
examine, and thereby hopefully also contribute to, the terms of reference of these
critical discussions about children's books. 	 .
My own interest in examining these issues arises, on the one hand, from an
observation that many of the conflicts within the field of children's books remain
unresolved on both a theoretical and a practical level, and on the other hand,
from a deep interest in attitudes toward, definitions of, and the relationships
between 'childhood' and 'adulthood'. The adult-child hierarchy involves conscious
and unconscious power over children: it is perhaps only in admitting this, and
examining the complex uses and functions of this power, that, I believe, interested
persons can try and realize ideals for children and adults, and the relationships
between them. Even the specific freedoms of democracies must, initially, be
inculcated and controlled. If this is a possible interpretation on a socio-political
level, parallels can be drawn on the level of personal emotions and desires,
intimately related as they are to the ideals of society and politics. The desire to
foster humanitarian or liberal attitudes and emotions in people , or the capacities
for, for instance, love, compassion, and truthfulness (as we often find reflected in
discussions about children and their reading), are central to ideas about books
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and literature for children, which are attributed with containing emotional values,
and evoking emotional experiences and reactions, to an almost unique extent. We
find clearly reflected in this context the idealism concerning the enlightening and
ennobling functions of art and creativity, which encompasses the complexity of
values and ideals anyone engaged in educating and raising children attempts to
transfer and preserve.
I would argue that many expressions of children's literature's uses and
criticism are related, firstly, to the marginal status of children's books within
literary studies: and, secondly, to the attendant current ambivalent attribution of
functions of children's books with regard to children. As Zohar Shavit points out,
'children's literature, unlike adult literature, [is] regarded as part of both the
educational and the literary systems at one and the same time.' 11 Shavit here
implies not only that this double attribution is a cause of debate and confusion
within children's book criticism and use with respect to the functions it is trying
to fulfil, but also points towards the definitions and uses of terms such as 'adult
literature', which are placed in an area outside children's literature and children's
literature criticism, and in particular relationships to it. Robert Leeson similarly
reflects these issues when he writes that
there is a great disagreement over criteria in children's literature ...
If the criteria are jumbled, it is because children's literature is in a
state of expansion and change greater than at any time in its
history. To bring together these disparate elements will take time
and effort.12
There are underlying assumptions in Leeson's explanation having to do with his
views of the role and status of children's literature, children's book criticism, and
11
'adult' criticism.
It is my intention to examine, therefore, in this thesis, the realm of
discussions about children's books at several levels: both with regard to discussions
as they take place within this realm, and with regard to its relationships - implied,
assumed, or desired - with those wider areas of ideas which allow it to define and
recognize itself, and for it to be defined and recognized by articulating many
kinds of differences and similarities to other fields of thought. It is not so much
my intention, then, to offer 'solutions' to problems within children's book criticism,
as to suggest some ways of thinking about what is involved when interested parties
engage in writing, reading, or talking about 'children's books'.
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Chapter One. Parameters and Perspectives of Discussion.
The origins of assigning certain books specifically to the domain of children's reading
can be found in histories of the development of ideas about children and childhood.
The concepts of 'child' and 'childhood' have been subject to different definitions
throughout history and in varying cultures and social surrounding. There is no ontologically
stable nation of 'the child'; beyond and around the basic biological dependency
of the infant lie social and cultural constructions of the meaning and role of childhood
and the child. Chris Jenks, in examining the sociology of childhood, points out that
the difference between the [child and the adult] indicates
the identity of each; the child cannot be imagined except
in relation to a conception of the adult, but interestingly
it becomes impossible to produce a well defined sense
of the adult without first positing the child.'
Jenks gives some examples of the changing relationships between the 'adult' and
the 'child', arguing that society continues to theorise about
whether to regard children as pure, bestial, innocent,
corrupt or even as we view our adult selves; whether
they think and reason as we do, are immersed in a
receding tide of inadequacy or are possessors of a clarity
of vision which we have through experience lost..., whether
they are constrained and we have achieved freedom,
or we have assumed constraint and they are truly free.2
By way of defining and discussing the nature of children these adults are expressing,
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formulating, and projecting ideals and ideas about themselves and the not-themselves.
Children, in culture and history, have no such voice. In this, and other, respects,
this engagement of the dominant concept of adulthood with that of childhood has
strong parallels with Michel Foucault's interpretation of the role of insanity within
society. In Madness and Civilization he writes that
what is originative is the caesura that establishes the distance between
reason and non-reason; reason's subjugation of non-reason, wresting
from it its truth as madness, crime, or disease, derives explicitly from
this point.3
'Childhood' does not perhaps carry such a heavy load of negative meaning as madness
or insanity (though madness, too, has at times been held to be a privileged state
of contact with the divine, or with unbearable knowledge or ecstasy), but it, too,
functions as an exponent of the 'non-adult' and 'non-reason', and, similarly, childhood
can speak - as 'the man of madness communicates with society ... by the intermediary
of an equally abstract reason which is order, physical and moral constraint, the anonymous
pressure of the group, the requirements of conformity'4 - only through the memories,
observations, or selections and interpretations of adults. Children's books operate
in this realm of interpretive tension: in being assigned to children, these books are
held to be one of the central repositories of what, at different times, in different
places, are considered to be thoughts and emotions either present in, or lacking
from, childhood. Children's books change as the interaction with historical and socio-cultural
needs and ideas relating to childhood change, or different books move into or out
of the category of 'children's books'. The shifts remain dependent on authors' and
critics' notions of what they are and are not: in so far as aspects of both of these
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sides are reflected in views of 'childhood' they are expressions of a wish to use children's
books, either, or both, as a means of educating the 'non-adult' to conform to the
'adult', and/or as a means of articulating what is considered, hoped, or feared to
be the 'non-adult' still in the adult; as a means of maintaining a pathway of contact
and communication between the adult and the child without, or between the adult
and the child within. Jacques Derrida writes:
Man calls himself man only by drawing limits excluding his other
from the play of supplementarity: the purity of nature, of animality,
primitivism, childhood, madness, divinity. The approach to these limits
is at once feared as a threat of death and desired as access to a life
without rlifferance. The history of man calling himself man is the articulation
of al tliffe limits amcng thans21‘es. All carepts detelminirg a rEct-suppernalarity
(nature, animality, primitivism, childhood, madness, divinity, etc.) have
evidently no truth-value... They have meaning only within a closure
of the game.5
In order to understand more clearly these relationships between adults, children's
books, and children, let us begin by looking, firstly, a bit more closely at Philippe
Aries' classic arguments concerning the nature and development of ideas about,
and attitudes towards, children, and then, secondly, go on to elaborate the implications
of these ideas of 'childhood' as being an ontologically unstable concept by reviewing
ideas about developments in specific views of the child as reader. Aries argues that
though 'men and women will always go on loving one another, will always go on
having children, and will always go on guiding the first steps of those children'6,
these processes do not take place constantly in the same ways. He points out that
'the great demographic revolution in the West, from the eighteenth to the twentieth
century, has revealed to us considerable possibilities of change in structures hitherto
believed to be invariable because they were biological'. 7 The use of contraception,
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Aries argues, is one of the crucial factors that has allowed people to influence, quantitatively,
and qualitatively, the nature of family life. The choices which the possibility of contraception,
and, for instance, improving medical care and hygiene, introduced, also required
further reflection on the structures and functions of the family. As Aries says:
For a long time it was believed that the family constituted the ancient
basis of our society, and that, starting in the eighteenth century, the
progress of liberal individualism had shaken and weakened it ... The
study of modern demographic phenomena led me to a completely
contrary conclusion. It seemed to me ... that on the contrary the family
occupied a tremendous place in our industrial societies, and that it
had perhaps never before exercised so much influence over the human
condition ... The idea of the family appeared to be one of the great
forces of our time.8
Aries argues that the modern idea of the family acquires its force from having become
'a value, a theme of expression, an occasion of emotion'.9
And, he adds,
our experience of the modern demographic revolution has revealed
to us the importance of the child's role in this silent history. We know
that there is a connection between the idea of childhood and the idea
of the family ... That is why we are going to study them together'.1°
Some writers have criticized Aries' methods and ideas. Nicholas Tucker, for
instance, argues that
history tends to be male oriented ... and then it ... usually ... [describes]
a remarkable child or ... a particular piece of educational propaganda.
It is not altogether surprising that Aries has sometimes been criticized
for constructing his theory too much around a tiny, unrepresentative
section of French society ... What is not always clear in his argument
... is whether children were once seen as mini-adults by everyone (even
their mothers) or simply by the male adults mostly responsible for
the surviving historical evidence ... mothers would certainly know that
young children were markedly dissimilar from adults in many ways.11
16
Lloyd de Mause, similarly, claims that Aries 'ignores voluminous evidence that medieval
artists could, indeed, paint realistic children' 12, and that 'his etymological argument
for a separate concept of childhood being unknown is also untenable'13.
These criticisms, however, are unfounded: Aries makes quite clear, in contrast to
Tucker's assertions, that he is not writing about 'realities' (whatever they may be
seen to be) of states of childhood dependency or lack of life experience, but that
he is interested in the development of cultural and social ideas of 'family' and 'childhood'
as carriers of social, moral, and ethical, values and motivations. As Aries states right
at the beginning of Centuries of Childhood: 'it is not so much the family as a reality
that is our subject here as the family as an idea'.14
This is also clear in, for instance, Aries' summing up of the historical development
of the notion of childhood:
No doubt the discovery of childhood began in the thirteenth century,
and its progress can be traced in the history of art in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries. But the evidence of its development became
more plentiful and significant from the end of the sixteenth century
and throughout the seventeenth ... In the moralists and pedagogues
of the seventeenth century, we see that fondness for childhood and
its special nature no longer found expression in amusement and 'coddling',
but in psychological interest and moral solicitude.15
Even if de Mause were correct in his more detailed criticisms of Aries' assessments
of pictorial and etymological evidence (and he provides few concrete examples or
proof), surely Aries' point still stands solidly: throughout history the ideas pertaining
to morality and ethics have shifted, and attitudes toward persons at the beginning
of the life-cycle were subject to similar shifts and changes. Aries is nowhere claiming
that young humans were not seen to exist in one capacity or another: as he says,
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'men and women ... will always go on guiding the first steps of those children'.16
What he is trying to do is chart some of the changes in ideas of how and why which
'steps' should be guided, and their contexts:
the point is that ideas entertained about these [family] relations may
be dissimilar at moments separated by lengthy periods of time. It is
the history of the idea of the family which concerns us here, not the
description of manners or the nature of law .... The idea of childhood
is not to be confused with affection for children: it corresponds to
an awareness of the particular nature of childhood, that particular
nature which distinguishes the child from the adult, even the young
adult. In medieval society, this awareness was lacking.17
The story adults tell about a childhood which is largely mute itself determine its
function and meaning within society.
In discussing childhood, then, not as a discovery so much as an invention,
I am not, for the purposes of children's literature criticism, intending to supplant
one definition of it with another. As Gayatri Spivak writes in her introduction to
Jacques Derrida's Of Grammatology,
this [Derrida's discussion of supplementarity] might seem an attractively
truant world of relativism. But the fearful pleasure of a truant world
is the sense of an authority being defied. That absolute ground of
authority Derrida would deny.'
Similarly, in locating the functioning of many of the terms of children's book criticism
within its refutations of the idea of discursive constructions of the concepts of 'childhood',
I am concerned with precisely not suggesting yet other definitions or constitutive
aspects of 'childhood', but in examining the terms of discussion as they operate.
Though my readings of Derrida and like-minded theorists thus supply the theoretical
context and perspective to my examination of 'children' and children's fiction criticism,
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I do not want to claim that this is an effort to 'deconstruct' these ideas in Derridean
terms, however, both because, it seems to me, this defeats Deconstruction and because
I am aware I am not pursuing or formulating this discussion with an eye to fulfilling
what I take to be the ultimate demands of Derridean philosophies. Derrida, and
other philosophers and literary theorists 'write', despite their disavowals of 'writing'
(which in these terms, as Spivak explains, designates 'an entire structure of investigation,
not merely ... graphic notation on tangible material' 19). In writing, in the narrow
sense, Derrida argues, we recognize and repress 'the absence of the "author" and
of the "subject- matter", interpretability, the deployment of a space and a time
that is not "its own"2°, but we ignore the fact, he says, that 'everything else is also
inhabited by this structure of writing in general, that "the thing itself always escapes".21
Thus Derrida is the first to acknowledge he is subject to Nietzsche's 'necessary lie'
of creating a world not of becoming but of being, but this does not deter him from
examining the terms of his own, and every other, 'lying': I am also selectively applying
this perspective, although I am not attempting to pursue the deconstruction of all
the terms of the 'closure of the game' to the full in concentrating on narratives of
'children', 'adults' and 'literature' within the limits of this thesis.
Within the histories of ideas about children and childhood, then, we also
find backgrounds to children's books and children's literature which writers on children's
books seem to rely, and draw, on. These texts are linked to, and by, ideas of differences
between stages of life: differences either of experience, of cognitive processes and
abilities, or of types of consciousness, depending on the contextual notions surrounding
childhood, childrearing, and education. In order for books and literature to be either
developed specifically with children in mind, or to be considered as being somehow
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related to children and childhood, ideas about those differences between adults
and children which might particularly affect the nature and functions of reading
needed to be in existence. The history of this area therefore impinges on, and is
constructed of, aspects of the history of ideas about reading from both literary critical
and psychological perspectives, developments in the ideas about education and childrearing,
and the histories of political and socio-cultural ideals and ideas articulated through
educational efforts and (children's) books. In order to examine the role of each
of these histories with regard to the developments in the discussions surrounding
children's books, it may be useful to separate some of the intertwined strands and
concentrate, as much as possible, on some aspects in turn.
The area in which ideas about the nature of children and reading are most
clearly articulated, as well as the motives for having an interest in children and reading,
is the field of education. Henri-Irenee Marrou, in his discussion of Education in
Antiquity defines 'education': Teducation est la technique collective par laquelle
une societe initie sa jeune generation aux valeurs et aux techniques qui caracterisent
la vie de sa civilisation'. 22 Frederick Beck argues that formal education in Greek
schools or with tutors, which we may take as one of the main origins of Western
educational and cultural traditions, grew out of the oral transmission in early Greek
culture, in poetic form, of the 'history of the great deeds of man'. 23 Children would
be taught the skills necessary to survival, such as hunting, agriculture, spinning, and
cooking, through example and practice, but the process of storytelling became the
means not only to, perhaps, amuse, but also to '[set] the standard of virtue which
the community acknowledged and to which they would wish their children to conform'.24
In so far as humans led a life beyond pure practical survival, but dealt with emotions,
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some kind of self-consciousness, and inter-relationships on that basis, stories are
the means to discuss both experiences of reality and symbolic life: values, morals,
ideals. Ernst Cassirer describes this view of the role of language and storytelling
when he writes that
the functional circle of man is not only quantitatively enlarged; it has
undergone a qualitative change. Man has, as it were, discovered a
new method of adapting himself to his environment. Between the
receptor system and the effector system, which are to be found in
all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe
as a 'symbolic system' ... a new dimension of reality ... No longer
in a merely physical universe, man lives in a symbolic universe. Language,
myth, art, and religion are part of this universe.25
Cassirer also warns that attempts to
connect the fact of symbolism with other well-known and more elementary
facts ... has become the bone of contention between the different
metaphysical systems: between idealism and materialism, spiritualism
and naturalism,26
and we will encounter aspects of these conflicts throughout this thesis; for the time
being, however, we will limit ourselves to using Cassirer's point on the uses of language
as a primary motive for the use of storytelling in child-rearing. Dilthey, by whom
Cassirer is strongly influenced, formulates the idea as follows:
the immense significance of literature for our understanding of spiritual
life and history lies in the fact that the inner life of man finds its complete,
exhaustive, and objectively comprehensible expression only in language.
Hence the art of Verstehen centres on the exegesis or interpretation
of the remains of human existence contained in writing.'
In taking the trouble to educate, in its broadest sense, children at all, the educators
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are, of necessity, drawing on their own ideas and experiences. As Nietzsche wrote:
we have to be stable in our beliefs if we are to prosper, we have made
the 'real' world a world not of change, but one of being ... A world in
a state of becoming could not, in a strict sense, be 'comprehended' or
'known'.28
It is these systems of necessary beliefs which are transferred from generation to
generation.
Poetry is seen as becoming, in ancient times, fundamental to this telling of
stories, because though informally the language of everyday speech is said to have
been used to relate loose events, exploits, or fantasies, poetic forms are represented
as developing in an oral culture as aids to memory iddispersing 'not only the tales
of the gods and famous men but also the words of hymns and prayers and the details
of ritual'29' on a wider scale. Carpenter describes poetry in this sense as 'a specialized
idiom of communication'. 30 Beck quotes Rohde as saying of the Greek Homeric
world that 'if anyone did possess a monopoly of teaching it was, in this age when
all the highest faculties of the spirit found their expression in poetry, the poet and
the singer'. 31 It was those beliefs and practices which were important or of interest
within a culture which were linked to communication through poetry and ritual,
and on the basis of this idea the faith both in the capacity of poetry to educate,
and in the importance of teaching poetry is explained: important or interesting beliefs
and knowledge were encapsulated in poetry; poetry encapsulated important or interesting
knowledge and beliefs. Out of those terms poetry developed its traditional description:
Horace was one of the earlier writers to believe that 'poets aim either to do good
or to give pleasure - or, thirdly, to say things which are both pleasing and serviceable
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for life'.32 Sir Philip Sidney famously restated this view in his 'Defense of Poesy':
...I speak to show that it is not rhyming and versing that maketh a poet -
no more than a long gown maketh an advocate, who though he pleaded
in armour should be an advocate and no soldier. But it is that feigning
notable images of virtues, vices, or what else, with that delightful teaching,
which must be the right describing note to know a poet by, although
indeed the senate of poets hath chosen verse as their fittest raiment
...: not speaking (table talk fashion or like men in a dream) words as
they chanceably fall from the mouth, but peizing each syllable of each
word by just proportion according to the dignity of the subject.33
It is this idea which lies at the heart of the fact that, as James Bowen tells us, 'the
studia humanitatis, for more than two millennia, was dominant in the West, and
it was within such a conceptual framework that all educational issues arose and
solutions or compromises were reached'.34
'would like to argue that, based on a hierarchical model of the adult-child
relationship, the narratives (in their widest sense: 'stories about life') adults attempt
to convey to children are controlled and formed by this didactic impulse - explicitly
or implicitly - and that the roots of allocating books (that is, criticism) to, and producing
them for, children, lie in the efforts to educate. This is in contrast to what we will
see to be a generally accepted use of the view that children's fiction is a category
defined by, and originating from, a move away from didacticism, instruction, or education:
that it is, in this sense, interpreted as being a liberator of children. As concepts of
'childhood' as other to 'adulthood' developed and became increasingly specific and
detailed, however, so needs to comprehend and control this 'other' grew: it is, in
this sense, a paradoxical development of ideas, with both aspects of the paradox
inextricably implicated and involved with each other. As children were beginning
to be 'discovered' (or invented) they were also simultaneously, and perhaps inevitably,
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subjected to more specific attempts to 'conquer' and control them. Jacqueline Rose,
in her book Peter Pan, or the Impossibility of Children's Fiction, argues this point
forcefully with regard to children and reading:
children's fiction rests on the idea that there is a child who is simply
there to be addressed and that speaking to it might be simple. It is an
idea whose innocent generality covers up a multitude of sins .... There
is no child behind the category 'children's fiction', other than the one
which the category itself sets inylace, the one which it needs to believe
is there for its own purposes.3'
Rose suggests that children's fiction finds its roots in adults' attempts to suppress
and restrain the 'child', and specifically its 'bisexual, polymorphous, perverse sexuality',
a strategy based on envy. In this sense, Rose attacks the notion of children's fiction
as being based, consciously or unconsciously, on the adult authors' attempts to draw
the child-readers into the book as an act of sexual seduction. The questions that
are raised by Rose's argument are twofold: In the first place, Rose does not seem,
to me, to fully explore the fact that her argument too is based on yet another ontology
of 'childhood', based on psychoanalytic theory, in that she posits that children's fiction
is based on the seduction and amalgamation of a childhood's 'perverse sexuality'.
How can we distinguish this ontology from any other of the definitions of 'child'
Rose herself claims are set into place by children's fiction 'for its own purposes'?
In the second place Rose's interpretation of children's fiction as based on 'a multitude
of sins', on suppression and seduction for its own purposes, allows no space for
positive aspects of the concepts relating to 'childhood': education as protection and
nurturing.
I would argue that in a society where the ontology of childhood - and its subsequent
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symbolic weight and meaning - are developed and embedded to the current extent,
we cam-lot step outside, or discard, the hierarchical ideology concerning the relationship
between adults and children, either with respect to children's fiction, or the total
perceived necessity to educate and raise children. The raising and educating of children
is inevitably - in a society - a controlling and conforming exercise, in so far as any
narrative operates describing the presiding in any way over the development of
the 'child' into the 'adult'. Chris Jenks writes:
the child is familiar to us and yet strange, ... he is essentially of ourselves
and yet appears to display a different order of being: his serious purpose
and our intentions towards him are meant to resolve that paradox by
transforming him into an adult like ourselves.37
Though this hierarchy or domination of adults over children in Western society has
its very dark sides, such as child abuse and neglect, child exploitation and misuse,
and indoctrination, this structure also, I would argue, provides the only means of
protection and nurturing necessary within a version of a society (whether or not
it would be necessary to 'children' in some form of Utopia): without the benevolent
aspects of adult care over children, the alternatives are children sleeping in cardboard
boxes in streets, or three-year olds living off garbage-heaps, as we can see in some
Third World countries, for instance. As members of a substratum of the structures
of Western industrial society, the adults within the adult-child hierarchy do not have
the option of withdrawing from their positions of power and responsibility with respect
to children: their absence would, in that case, only constitute another form of use
of power (as we saw Rousseau noting, even the freedom we give children is the
product of an exercise of power). We must learn instead, to further examine the
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adult-child hierarchy, and in constantly acknowledging the responsibility of power,
determine what we want to do with it.
I will be attempting to show that, even if books are argued to have developed
within a literary mode of narrative not dominated by the didactic impulse, even
those children's books are subordinated to the efforts of the adult world to assimilate
children to its values and motives by continued attempts to discern and define the
influence of books on children, and to select and direct books for children with
the previously determined aims in mind. Many critics of children's books, we shall
see, have taken either a historical perspective on children's book studies, or have
an interest stemming from a professed love of children's books, but do not tend
to place much overt importance on the study of the ideas concerning education
as a large component and powerful expression of the creation of the category of
'childhood', and thus of 'children's books', as well as an area within which explicit
elements of the conventions of the adult narratives (in their widest sense) of children
developed. This is because any attention that is directed towards the area of education
has the precise aim of distancing children's fiction from it. Attention focuses on
discussing schoolbooks, texts and primers with the primary aim of defining 'children's
books' by contrasting them with, and separating them from, those overtly didactic
texts. In other words, these are examinations concerned with establishing a literary
genre. John Rowe Townsend, for instance, in his historical and critical overview
Written for Children, draws this distinction between what are, as he sees it, purely
moral and didactic treatises and schoolbooks and primers, and books intended also,
or mainly 'to amuse'. 38 F.J. Harvey Darton also writes: 'by "children's books" I mean
printed works produced ostensibly to give children spontaneous pleasure and not
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primarily to teach them, nor solely to make them good, nor to keep them profitably
quiet'.39 Harvey Darton, in connection with this distinction argues that
children's books, written as such, have been in England almost entirely
a product of the largely domesticated middle-class, which began to exist,
free of civil war, not wildly excited about religion nor very needful of
political arts, but increasingly conscious and desirous of freedom, under
the Hannoverian dynasty ... The reading-habit had come into middling
social life, and the English novel was born. The microcosmos of children
was to receive the reflection of this slow great change in the English
character.4°
Children's books, or at least their commercial production, are thus linked to the
rise of the novel. As Harvey Darton adds: 'Children's books did not stand out by
themselves as a clear but subordinate branch of English literature until the middle
of the eighteenth century'41 ' P.J. Buijnsters does include schoolbooks as long as the
texts were originally intended for children or were, in time, read mainly by children.42
We find, thus, two main distinctions being drawn by critics in an attempt to describe
their basis of literary genre traits of modern children's fiction: between books written
for children and for adults, and between books written to 'educate' children and
books considered as being written to 'amuse' children. These distinctions are based
on principles which generate enduring problems within children's book criticism,
for both terms: to 'educate' and to 'amuse', are descriptions of the effects of texts
on readers, and as such are the product of the link made between these texts and
ontological notions of childhood. We are faced with the prevalence of reliance on
the problematic acceptance of varying and changing ontologies of childhood.
In fact, I would argue, the claims of much children's literature criticism that
it finds its origins in this 'adult literary criticism' are part and parcel of its attempts
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to resolve its perceived problems relating to 'children as readers'. This 'adult literary
criticism' is, within this context, a very particularized term, referring not so much
to discussions within 'adult' literary criticism as such, but to a specific ideal 'criticism'
which these children's literature critics aspire to: a criticism which is not an enduring
consideration of the uses and best means, of teaching.
In order, then, to gain a greater understanding of children's books and children's
book criticism, we must start 'before' these critics' 'educate' and 'amuse' divide,
and examine the principles which underlie their ideas pertaining to reading in relation
to ideas of 'childhood'.
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Chapter Two: The 'Child' As Reader Within Texts on Liberal Arts Education.
It is the educational theories and ideals, as told of beginning with the Greeks and
Romans, and then adopted and adapted in part by the medieval Church, that still
form much of the basic vocabulary for discussing Western education and the role
of reading for children within it today as James Bowen explained. I will therefore
continue tracing some of the ideas as they are applied within this overtly educational
framework in relation to children and reading. As Marrou points out, any discussion
starting with a consideration of any aspect of education in Greek culture begins
with Homer: 'son temoignage est la plus ancien document que nous puissions utilement
interroger sur reducation archaique'. 1 In Homer, we are told, we can find both reflections
of views on the need for and nature of, education, as well as considering the role
the Iliad and the Odyssey played in being used to educate. Beck discusses both these
aspects when he writes:
from the evidence of Homer, we may conclude that there were in
times prior to Homer teachers providing some sort of general education
by individual instruction as well as men of specialist knowledge who
taught their speciality to selected pupils. These, together with the
poets and the mythology, constituted the educational background of
the times.2
'The development of character', Beck contends, 'was the chief objective of Epic
education.'3 In the ninth book of the Iliad Phoenix' speech to Achilles illustrates
some of the educational ideals for raising a hero:
the old horseman Peleus sent me out with you on the day when he
sent you from Phthia to join Agamemnon - you were a child, with
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no knowledge yet of levelling war or of debate, where men win distinction.
So he sent me out to teach you all these things, to make you a speaker
of words and a doer of deeds.4
In Homer a picture develops, Beck argues, of character development through the
guidance of an elder, through association with different types of men, and through
travel and experience. The aim of this broad education was to become a fit leader,
a 'speaker of words and a doer of deeds'. These were the attributes which were
sought after in the Homeric aristocratic society of warrior heroes and kings. As
Marrou suggests,
l'education est donc un phenomene secondaire et subordonne par
rapport a celle-ci [la vie de sa civilisation] dont, normalement, elle
represente comme un résumé et une condensation ... Cela suppose
evidemment un certain decalage dans le temps: il faut d'abord qu'une
civilisation atteigne sa propre forme avant de pouvoir engendrer reducation
qui la refletera.5
marrou's emphasis here lies with a formative role of society on education, but he
sees that education also plays a role in shaping society. This circular process continues
to operate in the discussion of education both as a means of producing change within
society and culture and as a conservative force, preserving and passing on established
society and culture. This interactive process also plays a part in the histories of the
child as reader.
Education directed toward the development of character is said to continue
throughout the development of Greek society. Beck lists among 'those aspects which
seem quite essential to a definition of the schools of Athens'6
that 'the education provided was cultural, not technical, directed towards character
training and citizenship, not towards craftsmanship and personal profit'. 7 This educational
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ideal is even more pronounced in Sparta, where boys were taken from home and
trained communally through vigorous physical education. But although Sparta provides
a strong example of the functions of socialization and acculturation through education,
it is, we are told, a side-track in terms of education through reading. Marrou points
out that
Cite avant tout militaire et aristocratique, Sparta n'ira jamais bien
clair dans la voie qui devait aboutir a ce que j'ai appele l'< <education
de scribe > > : elle mettra au contraire son point d'honneur a reste
une ville de semi-illettres.8
The Athenian < <education de scribe> >, Beck argues, was affected in the fifth
and sixth centuries by the demand for training in letters, due to the growth in trade.
He suggests that
the newer, more utilitarian study, that of letters, became affected by
the aristocratic ideals and methods and was taught, not as a technique,
but as a discipline. Letters were taught in conjunction with and by
means of the study of Homer and the other great poets, apart from
the lyrists. The demand for letters thus became engulfed in the current
of general, cultural education instead of promoting the growth of scribe
schools and a scribe class.9
This point is crucial to the views on the development of education with respect to
poetry and literature in general for our purposes: the discipline and study of letters
becomes associated with a cultural education restricted to the aristocratic classes
whO did not need to work or possess only utilitarian skills. Education through the
literary arts, as well as through physical education, music, painting, and rhetoric,
grew in prominence. Likewise, the link made here between social class and type
of education, especially the reservation of the literary arts to a privileged class, is
told of as being a strong influence throughout many histories of children and reading.
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Kenneth Freeman describes the system of primary education in Athens by
this time (from around the beginning of the sixth century) as
consisting of three parts ... The grammatistes taught reading, writing,
and some arithmetic, and made his pupils read and learn by heart
the great poets, Homer and Hesiod and others.1°
The other two parts consisted of the musical and physical aspects of education, with
sometimes the addition of drawing and painting from late on in the fourth century.
Formal education seems to have started around the age of six, and though Freeman
mentions Plato 'recommending the deferral of the learning of letters to the age
of ten'll, the three basic subjects seem to have started at the same time. Quite young
children, then, are said to have been reading the great poets. Plato describes this
in his Protagoras, through the words of Protagoras (c.490-420) (whom Taylor describes
as 'the first professional sophist, i.e. itinerant professor of higher education ... He
aimed to teach upper-class youths how to obtain personal and political success,
putting considerable emphasis on skill in speech and argument'12):
No Socrates, you ought to realize that they [good men] begin when
their children are small, and go on teaching and correcting them as
long as they live. For as soon as a child can understand what is said
to him, his nurse and his mother and his teacher and his father himself
strive to make him as good as possible, teaching and showing him
by every word and deed that this is right, and that wrong, this good
and that bad, this holy and that unholy, 'do this' and 'don't do that'.
If he obeys voluntarily, so much the better; if not, they treat him like
a piece of wood which is getting warped and crooked, and straighten
him out with threats and beatings. And then when they send him to
school they tell the teachers to pay much more attention to the children's
behaviour than to their letters or their music. The teachers do that,
and then when they have learned their letters and are going on to
understand the written word, just as they did with speech before, they
set before them at their desks the works of good poets to read, and
make them learn them by heart; they contain a lot of exhortation,
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and many passages praising and eulogizing good men of the past,
so that the child will be fired with enthusiasm to imitate them, and
filled with the desire to become a man like that ... The people who
are best able to do it I mean, the wealthiest - do this especially...13
It should be noted that this passage occurs within a discussion between Protagoras
and Socrates on the possibility of teaching 'excellence', and what this 'excellence'
is, and the role of this kind of teaching in the existence of the city-state.
However, Plato prescribes his own Laws as the set text for the education
of children in his projected ideal state:
...I haven't got far to look for a model [text]... this discussion of ours
... well, it's come to look, to my eyes, just like a literary composition
... Its these that have impressed me as being the most eminently acceptable
and the most entirely appropriate for the ears of the younger generation
... Its [the Guardian of the Laws in charge of education] first job will
be to compel the teachers to learn this material and speak well of
it .... he should employ only those who endorse his own high opinion.14
Plato had few doubts that texts read in childhood could help to provide the citizens
of his ideal state with the correct frame of mind:
What we have in mind is education from childhood in virtue a training
which produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen who knows
how to rule and be ruled as justice demands. Suppose we should want
to mark off this sort of training from others and reserve the title 'education'
for it alone. A training directed to acquiring money or a robust physique,
or even to some intellectual facility not guided by reason and justice,
we should want to call coarse and illiberal, and say that it had no
claim whatever to be called education.15
Reading the Laws was only part of preparing citizens for his ideal state: Plato also
gives directives on the use of music, dancing and wrestling, and arithmetic and astronomy.
Comedy is spoken of in very disapproving accents, and tragedies may not be performed
unless they comply in their doctrines with those of the state. 16 Though these rules
33
were designed to help construct Plato's ideal state, these, and Plato's comments
in the Protagoras, lead Beck to conclude that literature was, in fact, studied primarily
by young pupils 'as the basis of moral training, as providing examples of noble conduct
to be admired or emulated. Studies of literature as literature were reserved for
older students'.17
Reading the great poets thus seems to have been regarded as part of a moral
education, geared towards educating certain children to be able to play their part
as citizens of the Greek city-state. Davidson reminds us that this later Greek education
was intended only for the few,
for the wealthy and well-born ... The subjects of education were the
sons of full citizens, themselves preparing to be full citizens, and to
exercise all the functions of such. The duties of such persons were
completely summed up under two heads, duties to the family and
duties to the state ... The former included the three relations of husband
to wife, father to children, and master to slaves and property; the
latter, three public functions, legislative, administrative, and judiciary.18
The great poets are seen as having been used to educate the children for this purpose
because they were held to describe high and noble deeds and men in the best suited
form.
The primary writers on Greek education in the Athenian democracy of around
the fourth century B.C., like Plato, can thus be held to reflect concerns with the
role of education in relation to the state in their works, including the specific part
reading could play. Plato's assigning of his Laws as the reading for children in his
state is related to his doubts about the possible effects of some of the sections of
great poetry, as he sets them out in, for instance, Book II of The Republic. In a
discussion between Adeimantus and Socrates, Adeimantus argues that 'Fathers,
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when they address exhortations to their sons, and all those who have others in their
charge, urge the necessity of being just', 19 and he gives examples of Hesiod and
Homer describing the blessings that will accrue to the just person. But, he then
continues to point out:
Consider further, Socrates, another kind of language about justice
and injustice employed by both laymen and poets. All with one accord
reiterate that soberness and righteousness are fair and honourable,
to be sure, but unpleasant and laborious, while licentiousness and
injustice are pleasant and easy to win and are only in opinion and
by convention disgraceful."
Adeimantus asks:
What Socrates, do we suppose is the effect of all such sayings about
the esteem in which men and gods hold virtue and vice upon the souls
that hear them, the souls of young men who are quick-witted and
capable of flitting, as it were, from one expression of opinion to another
and inferring from them all the character and the path whereby a
man would lead the best life?21
The poets are authorities and teachers to the young men, and they may follow their
writings in undesirable ways. 22 Adeimantus uses this presupposition to coax from
Socrates an argument on the inherent superiority of justice, and these lines also
reveal that, in allowing for the poets' work as being a force in education, an authority
and source of moral exempla, it may equally come to be seen as a force detrimental
to the ideals set out by the educators.
In their following discussion, Socrates spells out this ambiguity to Adeimantus
in considering the education of a 'true guardian of the state'23:
under music you include tales, do you not? ... And tales are of two
species, the one true and the other false? ... And education must make
use of both, but first of the false ... Don't you understand ... that we
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begin by telling children fables, and the fable is, taken as a whole,
false, but there is truth in it also.24
Socrates argues that
the beginning in every task is the chief thing, especially for any creature
that is young and tender. For it is then it is best moulded and takes
the impression that one wishes to stamp upon it?5
Plato's point here seems to be that books for children should be censored, so that
mothers and nurses will tell only approved stories to the children 'and so shape
their souls'.26 This is obviously the same attitude displayed in his educational discussion
in the Laws. In The Republic Plato has Socrates particularly criticise those passages
in the poets which deal with the mythology of the gods, because if the gods themselves
are depicted as displaying undesirable traits or behaviour, there is no higher authority
left to convince people of the need for certain types of ideas and actions above
others. This criticism of mythology is a conventional 'topos' throughout writings
in Classical Antiquity. When Adeimantus asks for more details of what virtuous
poems would be like, Socrates replies:
Adeimantus, we are not poets, you and I at present, but founders
of a state. And to founders it pertains to know the patterns on which
poets must compose their fables and from which their poems must
not be allowed to deviate; but the founders are not required themselves
to compose fables.27
As we have seen, Plato does take this step in the Laws. Socrates continues, in The
Republic, by spelling out what ideals for the state should be reflected in poetry,
and what should be barred, but the main argument is more than clear:
whatever opinions are taken into the mind at that age are wont to
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prove indelible and unalterable. For which reasons, maybe, we should
do our utmost that the first stories that they hear should be so composed
as to bring the fairest lessons of virtue to their ears.28
James Bowen adds, however, that Plato believes this learning should not be coerced
because free men should not have to learn under duress, and because 'compulsory
learning never sticks in the mind ... let your children's lessons take the form of play.
You will learn more about their natural abilities that way'.29
Aristotle's writings, like those of Plato and other Greeks discern a large role
for the state and society in the life of man:
it [Supreme Good] must be the object of the most authoritative of
the sciences - some science which is pre-eminently a master-craft.
But such is manifestly the science of Politics; for it is this that ordains
which of the sciences are to exist in states, and what branches of knowledge
the different classes of the citizens are to learn, and up to what point.30
But Aristotle says straight away that this is not a suitable subject of study for the
young, 'for they have no experience of life and conduct, and it is these that supply
the premises and subject matter of this branch of philosophy',
and
moreover they are led by their feelings ... And it makes no difference
whether they are young in years or immature in character: the defect
is not a question of time, it is because their life and its various aims
are guided by feeling.31
Though the science itself, then, is of no use to the young, Aristotle's ideas on education,
and so education through reading also, are shaped by his ideas of Politics and the
attainment of Supreme Good to which this science aspires.
Aristotle, like Plato, places great, though not exclusive, importance in the
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role of the environment in acquiring virtue:
Virtue being ..., of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue
is for the most part both produced and increased by instruction, and
therefore requires experience and time; whereas moral and ethical
virtue is the product of habit .... The virtues therefore are engendered
in us neither by nature nor yet in violation of nature; nature gives
us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is brought to maturity
by habit.32
This view attributes, therefore, an important role to teaching and the subsequent
practice of desirable behaviours:
It is therefore not of small moment whether we are trained from childhood
in one set of habits or another; on the contrary it is of very great,
or rather of supreme, importance.33
But
theory and teaching are not, I fear, equally efficacious in all cases:
the soil must have been previously tilled if it . is to foster the seed,
the mind of the pupil must have been prepared by the cultivation
of
habits?'
The best way to ensure this happens, Aristotle claims, is to have the raising of the
young regulated by law, as well as society in general. He does say, though, that,
lacking a system of public regulation, informal laws will do:
Moreover individual treatment is better than a common system, in
education as in medicine ... But any director can best treat a particular
person if he has a general knowledge of what is good for everybody,
or for other people of the same kind.35
Aristotle argues in the Politics that the aim of education specifically must
be to educate for peace and for leisure. This discussion of Aristotle's explains much
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of the basic reasonings in favour of a 'liberal arts' education over an education primarily
consisting of training in skills or technical matters. As James Bowen points out,
this issue is still of fundamental relevance to modern Western education: 'there
is the rivalry between liberal and technical education with their respective antagonists
considering the former a meaningless and decadent social ideal, the latter an illiberal
and mindless kind of vocational training'.36 Aristotle advocates a liberal arts education
for all free people: in his state the rulers are to be older men, while young people
will be ruled over, rather than there being a select class of rulers from the start:
it is clear that it would be better for the same persons always to be
rulers and subjects once for all; but this is not easy to secure, and
as we do not find anything corresponding to the great difference that
Scylax states to exist between kings and subjects in India, it is clear
that for many reasons it is necessary for all to share alike in ruling
and being ruled in turn.37
Aristotle reasons that this education for all freemen, then, must be directed towards
producing good men, and he proceeds to explain how this should happen. According
to his division of man's soul into the irrational and the rational, Aristotle asserts
'the rational part is better than the irrational'. 38 within this rational part there is
also a hierarchy: practical reason is better than irrational passions amenable to
reason, and theoretic reason is better than practical reason. Aristotle then argues
that
the activities of the part of the soul that is by nature superior must
be preferable ...; since that thing is always most desirable for each
person which is the highest to which it is possible for him to attain.39
He then adds that
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also life as a whole is divided into business and leisure, and war and
peace, and our actions are aimed some of them at things necessary
and useful, others at things noble. In these matters the same principal
of preference that applies to the parts of the soul must apply also
to the activities of those parts: war must be for the sake of peace,
business for the sake of leisure, things necessary and useful for the
purpose of things noble.°
Because of this, Aristotle says, man should 'be capable of engaging in business and
war, but still more capable of living in peace and leisure'41 ' and this forms his educational
aim for both children and adults.
Aristotle supports his arguments by claiming the failure of the Spartan constitution
and education, which were directed towards conquest and war. He then outlines
the virtues necessary to business and to leisure: both must be cultivated, but, again,
those suitable to leisure (love of wisdom, temperance, and justice) more than those
of business:
the young must be taught those useful arts that are indispensably necessary;
but it is clear that they should not be taught all the useful arts, those
pursuits that are liberal being kept distinct from those that are illiberal
and that they must participate in such among the useful arts as will
not render the person who participates in them vulgar. A task and
also an art or a science must be deemed vulgar if it renders the body
or soul or mind of free men useless for the employments and actions
of virtue.42
All activities which deteriorate the condition of the body, or which earn wages are
illiberal, 'for they make the mind preoccupied and degraded'. 43 Even 'liberal' studies
become 'illiberal' if they are studied too devotedly, or simply because of the pressure
from other people, rather than studying them 'for the sake of oneself or one's friends,
or on moral grounds'.44 Aristotle specifies in some detail how lives must be led to
be conducive to virtue through the liberal arts. Amongst many suggestions, he also
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writes that
the question of the kinds of tales and stories that should be told to
children ... must be attended to by the officials called Children's Tutors.
For all such amusements should prepare the way for their later pursuits.45
Reading and writing may be taught, because although they are utilitarian,
some of the useful subjects as well ought to be studied by the young
not only because of their utility, like the study of reading and writing,
but also because they can lead on to many other branches of knowledge.46
In discussing the teaching of music, Aristotle also claims that
one must not make amusement the object of the education of the
young; for amusement does not go with learning - learning is a painful
process47'
but concedes that 'the young owing to their youth cannot endure anything not sweetened
by pleasure'.' 8 Aristotle, like Plato, thus explicitly directs the education of children
according to the virtues they deem essential to the attainments of their respectively
envisaged ideal States. With respect specifically to children and reading, Plato more
strictly censors the poets in relation to detrimental effects they may have on future
citizenship, while Aristotle is less specific, but recommends that the examples stories
form for young children should be controlled, but reading and writing taught as
skills necessary to higher liberal knowledge in later life.
The last of the Greek theorists whom I will discuss is Isocrates (436-338 B.C.),
whose theories are said to have been of great influence, though different to those
of Plato and Aristotle. George Norlin tells us that Dionysius reports Isocrates as
being the most illustrious teacher of his time, and that he made his school the 'image
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of Athens'.49
 Norlin writes that
the ablest young men of Athens and of Hellas came to study under
him ... And few if any of the literary men of his age, whether or not
they were members of his school, were unaffected by his influence.50
Isocrates was most interested in oratory: the aim of his higher education was the
cultivation of the art of discourse, of which Norlin says:
in ... Isocrates ... discourse ... is both the outward and the inward thought;
it is not merely the form of expression, but reason, feeling, and imagination
as well; it is that by which we persuade others and by which we persuade
ourselves; it is that by which we direct public affairs and by which
we set our own house in order ... The art of discourse may, therefore,
be as broad as the whole life of civilised man; and this is just what
Isocrates insisted that it should be.51
In his treatises 'Against the Sophists' and the 'Antidosis' Isocrates sets out
his ideas about education, the role of education, and the roles of reading and
literature. Isocrates places a slightly different emphasis on the importance of education
than do Plato and Aristotle:
For ability, whether in speech or in any other activity, is found in those
who are well endowed by nature and have been schooled by practical
experience. Formal training makes such men more skilful and more
resourceful in discovering the possibilities of a subject ... But it cannot
fully fashion men who are without natural aptitude into good debaters
or writers, although it is capable of leading them on to self-improvement
... In the education of an orator I should answer that natural ability
is paramount and comes before all else.52
Isocrates thus takes greater account of the influence of 'natural aptitude' in shaping
an orator (in the broad sense, indicated by Norlin) in an intellectual sphere as well
as that of character or virtue: 'let no one suppose that I claim that just living can
be taught; for, in a word, I hold that there does not exist an art of the kind which
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can implant sobriety and justice in depraved natures'.53 He does feel, however, that
'the study of political discourse can help more than any other thing to stimulate
and form such qualities of character', 54 and that hard work and application, and
a course of study with a great master, are important. The study of oratory itself
was reserved for young men, not children, but children's education was to prepare
them for this higher study. Isocrates claims that, in this preparation on a secondary
level, 'teachers who are skilled in disputation and ... astronomy and geometry and
studies of that sort do not injure but, on the contrary, benefit their pupils, not so
much as they profess, but more than others give them credit for'. 55 A middle course
is advocated: these disciplines provide 'a gymnastic of the mind and a preparation
for philosophy'56' while, on the primary level 'that which boys in school pursue'57'
the same sort of thing happens: 'for they also when they have laboured through
their lessons in grammar, music [including poetry], and the other branches, are
not a whit advanced in their ability to speak and deliberate on affairs, but they have
increased their aptitude for mastering greater and more serious studies'.58
'Socrates seems not so much concerned with teaching the substance and detail
of virtue, honesty, and general good citizenship, but in studies which develop insight:
it is not in the nature of man to attain a science by the possession
of which we can know positively what we should do or what we should
say ... I hold that man to be wise who is able by his powers of conjecture
to arrive generally at the best course.59
Thus, he claims, the Athenian 'flexibility of mind and love of letters, contribute in
no small degree to the education of the orator'.6°
To Isocrates, in sum, an education, in the earl); years, was based on subjects
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which would be of no use in older life in themselves, but which could prepare the
mind of youngsters to start studying oratory, which would, in turn, help them to
become 'educated' men, by which Isocrates meant not those trained in 'arts, sciences
and specialities', but those who have a character in accord with virtues associated
with good causes and decent behaviour. 61 Tantalisingly, he also mentions that
as to the poetry of Homer and Hesiod and the rest ... I think I could
silence those who chant their verses and prate about these poets in
the Lyceum62'
but this promise is never further explained.
I have presented Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates' ideas on education in some
detail because their concerns and topics are restated throughout, and are attributed
with forming the basis of, the narrative of Western education, including education
and reading. As I argued earlier, the history of education includes the earliest formulations
of ideas about children and reading, and wider attitudes towards the ways and means
of educating children, as well as analyses of why children should be educated, and
to what purpose. To the Greeks I have considered reading poetry is often said to
have been primarily intended as a source of moral and cultural education for young
children. Plato clearly discerns the possible negative influence this reading may have,
and provides for it by advocating censorship. Aristotle indicates that he agrees with
this. Isocrates suggests reading helps to prepare the mind for the study of oratory.
All three display the central concern with the connection between the individual
and the state: above all, man is a citizen, and must be trained to fulfil his role as
a citizen. The virtues of man are those traits which are relevant to the stability and
prosperity of the society of the state: virtues such as justice, concern for the common
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good, honesty, and diplomacy. Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates all regard children
as being born with as yet uncontrolled desires, and therefore a proclivity towards
fulfilling those desires, and gaining pleasure. Education must play its part in teaching
self-control and character, as well as intellectual disciplines. They attribute different
degrees of importance to natural ability or talent, though all three observe that
children come to education with certain diverse characteristics and abilities, and
discuss how this should be approached: by advocating optimal methods of training,
whether through practice, habit, or hard work. In the uses of these terms, the Greeks
are thus seen to establish the parameters for the continuing discussions throughout
the history of the child as reader and children's books: the roles of the state and
society in deciding the aims of education; the definitions of virtue and morality within
society; the nature of the influence of reading; and the methods best suited to the
raising and teaching of children.
The concerns and ideals of the Greeks continued through histories by becoming
a strong influence on, and adapted within, Roman culture. As Marrou points out:
Cas particulier du fait fondamental qui domine tout l'histoire de la
civilisation romaine: une civilisation autonome. proprement italienne
n'a pas eu le temps de se developper parce que Rome et l'Italie se
sont trouvees integrees dans l'air de la civilisation grecque.63
Early Roman education, Gwynn and Bowen suggest, was formed by the community's
originally agricultural roots, and by the traditions of 'patria potestas' and the 'mos
maiorum'. Gwynn quotes Gaius who writes that 'the right of dominion which we
have over our children is peculiar to the citizens of Rome'." A Roman father, it
is pointed out, decided whether a child would be accepted into the family or be
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exposed to die, and held all his son's property during his lifetime. Gwynn, Bonner,
Marrou and Bowen attribute the early Roman habit of educating children within
the family circle to the patriarchal structure and agricultural life: once Rome started
to expand and conquer fathers would be away in military service. In early Rome,
says Gwynn, 'little book- learning was required for ordinary life'. 65 The earliest uses
of reading for children were to learn the Twelve Tables of Roman Law, a civil code
of law 'resting heavily upon the respect for tradition and custom expressed in the
"mos maiorum". 66 Cicero is quoted as reporting the custom that all children had
to learn the Twelve Tables by heart, and, somewhat later in time, Marcus Cato
read them with his son and also took 'the trouble to write out, in large and extremely
legible letters, stories from the early history of Rome, so that the boy may become
familiar from the outset with the ancient traditions of his
country'.67 Reading, as with the Greeks, was a utilitarian skill necessary to administration
and trade, but beyond that became one of the means of passing on the cultural
and moral traditions of the ruling classes of the state. Marrou writes:
Pratiquement, l'education morale du jeune Romain etait, comme
celle du Grec, alirnentee par un choix d'exemples offerts a son admiration;
mais us etaient empruntes a l'histoire nationale, et non a la poesie
heroique, qu'en fait beaucoup de ces exempla fussent legendaires
importe peu: c'est comme historiques qu'ils etaient presentes et revecus.68
some 'poesie heroique' was taught, however, under the influence of the Greeks.
Gwynn writes that the older, pragmatic tradition of Roman education gave way
to the new Graeco-Roman culture:
an ideal of culture which included Greek literature, rhetoric, and philosophy
... The circumstances of the change were due to the influence of half
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a dozen distinguished Greeks who came to Rome during the second
and third centuries B.C.69
Tutors were engaged to teach young aristocrats Greek language and literature, and
one of the earliest known of these was Livius Andronicus (+ 250 B.C.), who translated
the Odyssey into Saturnian verse, and this 'remained a standard textbook in Roman
schools right down to Horace's day'.7°
In many respects, then, Greek and Roman attitudes to education and reading
are claimed to have been very similar. Education, especially a literary education,
was intended for the children of the aristocracy, who were escorted by a slave to
their school. A literary education was designed for those citizens who would play
a role in public life: the 'artes liberales' were closely linked to the 'artes urbanae'
(oratory, rhetoric, and jurisprudence). Cicero, in his De Oratore, argues:
In my opinion, indeed no man can be an orator possessed of every
praiseworthy accomplishment, unless he has attained the knowledge
of everything important, and of all liberal arts, for his language must
be ornate and copious from knowledge, since unless there be beneath
the surface matter understood and felt by the speaker, oratory becomes
an empty and almost puerile flow of words.71
The influence of Isocrates' ideas can be observed here: the education of an orator
prepares him to lead a life concerned with serving public life with integrity, not
just superficial well-spoken words. And, like Isocrates, Cicero regards oratory as
the highest of all arts. Quintilian, named as the other great Roman educationalist,
agreed with Cicero: 'For myself, as I consider that nothing is unnecessary to the
art of oratory, without which it must be confessed that an orator cannot be formed,
and that there is no possibility of arriving at the summit of any thing without previous
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initiatory efforts'. 72 Quintilian undertakes to explain how the education of an orator
should be regulated, because 'I shall not shrink from stooping to those lesser matters,
the neglect of which leaves no place for greater'.73 James Bowen explains that oratory
in Rome, as in Greece, was so highly relevant because: 'Public life in Rome, as
in Athens before it, was essentially verbal and face-to-face; there was little book-learning,
libraries were rudimentary, and, since affairs of state were conducted orally wherever
possible, ability to marshal ideas and present them clearly and persuasively was
a marked advantage'.74
Quintilian, in his Institutio Oratoriae, sets out, as he promised, the education
of an orator from the very beginning. Again education is explicitly moral as well
as intellectual: 'We are to form, then, the perfect orator, who cannot exist unless
as a good man'.75 Isocrates' voice is also heard in Quintilian's statement
that precepts and treatises on art are of no avail without the assistance
of nature; and these instructions, therefore, are not written for him
to whom talent is wanting any more than treatises on agriculture for
barren ground,76
and talent and
other natural aids, as power of voice, a constitution capable of labour,
health, courage, gracefulness ... are of no profit in themselves without
a skilful teacher, persevering study, and great and continued exercise
in writing, reading, and speaking.77
Quintilian, like Plato, argues that 'we are by nature most tenacious of what we have
imbibed in our infant years'78' and, as he believes children learn language and morals
'by imitation', he warns that a child's nurses should
not be ungrammatical ... to their morals, doubtless, attention is first
48
to be paid, but let them also speak with propriety.79
Greek is recommended as the first language to learn, as Quinnlian says Latin learning
is derived fiuin Greek culture, but Latin must be taught soon after, to prevent mispionunciations
and misuse of idiom.8°
Quintlian discusses the age at which learning should begin at length. He acknowledges
the Greek idea that formal learning should begin at the age of seven, but argues
that 'why should not that age be under the influence of learning, which is now confessedly
subject to moral influencer l, and hence he advocates teaching from infancy:
Yet I am not so unacquainted with differences of age, as to think
that we should urge those of tender years severely, or exact a full
complement of work from them; for it will be necessary, above all
things, to take care lest the child should conceive a dislike to the application
which he cannot yet love .... Let his instruction be an amusement to
him; let him be questioned, and praised; and let him never feel pleased
that he does not know a thing; and sometimes, if he is unwilling to
learn, let another be taught before him, of whom he may be envious.
Let him strive for victory now and then, and generally suppose that
he gains it; and let his powers be called forth by rewards, such as
that age prizes.82
Quintilian here shows that he, again, agrees with those Greeks who saw that the
learning of young children must be 'sweetened by pleasure'.
Quintilian also considers the mechanics of learning to read with quite a detailed
theory of cognitive development. He professes to be displeased at the apparently
widespread practice of teaching children 'the names and order of the letters before
they learn their shapes'.83 He asserts that
this method hinders their recognition of them [letters], as, while they
follow their memory that takes the lead, they do not fix their attention
on the forms of the letters .... it will be best for children, therefore,
to be taught the appearances and names of the letters at once, as
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they are taught those of men.84
Approval is also given to providing children with ivory figures of letters to play with,
and with a board with the letters cut out of it, so that the child can learn to write
by tracing the grooves. The next step, in reading, is to teach the syllables, and 'not
to hurry on, in order to make it continuous or quick, until the clear and certain
connexion of the letters become familiar'. 85 Words can then be formed from the
syllables, and phrases from words. Quintilian argues that children must have plenty
of time to perfect these skills, so that the child will feel secure in reading, and have
learned to read aloud while anticipating what follows.
Finally Quintilian discusses reading matter itself. He recommends that children
be taught
not common words ... such as perpetually occur. For he may readily
learn the explanations of obscure terms ... while some other occupation
is before him, and acquire, amidst his first rudiments, a knowledge
of that which would afterwards demand a special time for it.86
It is also desirable that 'even the lines, which are set him for his imitation in writing,
should not contain useless sentences, but such as convey some moral instruction'.87
These moral sayings were regarded as helpful in forming character and Quintilian
recommends children now learning 'the sayings of eminent men, and select passages,
chiefly from the poets (for the reading of poets is more pleasing to the young), in
his play-time'.88 Quintilian here provides a linking of designations of reading-matter
to the young with amusement in saying that the reading of poetry 'is more pleasing
to the young'.89
One of the subjects Quintilian also considers in detail is how to read in the
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sense of 'declamation': this pertains to the reading of poetry. In this section Quintilian
mentions the authors children may read because they are morally good. Reading
begins with Homer and Virgil: 'let the mind of the pupil be exalted with the sublimity
of the heroic verse, conceive ardour from the magnitude of the subjects, and be
imbued with the noblest sentiments'." Tragedies and lyric poets were regarded as
beneficial by Quintilian, though he warns that some lyric poetry is licentious and
should be guarded against. Elegies dealing with love, hendeca-syllables, and poems
with sections of Sotadic verse are to be avoided, as they deal with obscene subjects.91
Comedy is also good 'as it extends to all sorts of characters and passions'.920uintilian
apparently differentiates between writings which 'nourish the mind' 93 and 'enlarge
the thinking powers'94 and those which 'relate merely to erudition' 95. The latter,
he says, can always be read later in life, 'for the love of letters, and the benefit of
reading, are bounded, not by the time spent at school, but by the extent of life'.96
Highly recommended are Ennius, Accius, Pacuvius, Lucilius, Terence and Coecilius:
poets who need to be learned to show the learning of the orators, and to give pleasure
to the hearers, who need relief from 'the want of elegance in forensic pleading'97.
Throughout his comments on reading, Quintilian, like the Greeks, can be seen to
keep a sharp eye on his goal: to train an orator. He consistently points out the oratorical
qualities readings may confer: they may supply a 'copia verborum% 'a weightiness
of thought', or 'elegance' to speakers98- He recommends that boys learn
to relate orally the fables of Aesop, which follow next after the nurse's
stories, in plain language ... and afterwards to express the same simplicity
in writing."
In the same way, he feels beginners should read the best authors at once, but choosing
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those 'clearest in style and most intelligible' l° recommending Livy, for instance,
to be read by boys rather than Sallust, who, however, 'is the greater historian, but
to understand him there is need of some proficiency'. 101 Cicero is also 'agreeable
even to beginners, and sufficiently intelligible'.102
I have quoted Quintilian to a considerable extent not only because his work
is perceived as showing the strong continued influence of Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates,
and Greek thinking in general, and not only because he is said to be a great further
influence in his own right, but also because the very detail of these comments and
theories on reading for children will be seen to be repeated and used up to the
present day. There are shifts in reading materials: subjects approved of in moral
and religious terms change, as do ideas about what (some) children enjoy or learn
more easily, but, mostly, this type of reasoning and assumptions appear in similar
forms in many writings on 'children's books'. Quintilian especially shows how reading
and children in education are in this way discussed with much less reference to political
and social purpose and context than in Plato and Aristotle for instance.
There are many changes pointed out in higher education from the time of
Quintilian onward (first century A.D.). 103 Bowen writes that by the sixth century
Roman education, based previously on inquiry and discussion on the Greek model,
had been reduced to the memorisation of the contents of compendia:
the educational justification advanced by Capella that the liberal arts
are a complete approach to knowledge providing both the means
of organization (the 'trivium' of grammar, rhetoric and philosophy)
and the content into which knowledge is systematically organized (the
'quadrivium' of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music) was largely
lost on those who read it .... In effect, Roman education in the sixth
century had become encyclopedic in nature and content, in the pejorative
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sense of the term. It was to remain so in the West for centuries to
come.104
Christianity, carrying with it part of its Jewish roots, was seen to become the next
powerful educational movement. The place of book-learning took on a central role
in Christian religious education.
The question, however, is if these described tremendous changes in culture
and morality included profoundly changed attitudes toward the learning experience
of the child through books, with those children who were being educated through
reading. The children who received this type of education may be described as having
belonged to different classes within society, the goals of their learning to have changed
in overt content, and children to have been given different set texts to read and
learn, but reading in childhood is considered as having consisted continuously, of
the reading and, primarily, memorization of the same.books used by adult-learners
beyond the acquisition of basic reading skills: the psalms, prayer-books, Latin grammars,
and books of morals and manners were used. Outside formal education in monasteries,
adults and children are portrayed as listening to the same stories. Aries writes:
the Hellenistic paideia presupposed a difference and a transition between
the world of children and that of adults, a transition made by means
of an initiation or an education. Medieval civilization failed to perceive
this difference and therefore lacked this concept of transition. The
great event was therefore the revival, at the beginning of modern
times, of an interest in education. This affected a certain number of
churchmen, lawyers and scholars, few in number in the fifteenth century,
but increasingly numerous and influential in the 16 and 17 centuries.105
It was the time and thought of the Renaissance and Humanism, referring back to
the work of the Greeks and Romans, and of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation
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which is attributed with having prompted the development of 'children's books'
and it is to these texts to which I will turn my attention in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three: The 'Child' and Hierarchical Systems: 'Looking Through the Eyes
of the Child'.
The aims of the Greeks and Romans, as they are described, in using
reading and literature are clear with respect to children and other learners:
literature previously interpreted and evaluated by adults for adults was also given
to children to help to inculcate in them the appropriate ideals and ideas for
citizenship. Children principally memorized sections of texts, and studied the same
texts repeatedly through different stages of their education. This is said to be even
more true of Christian religious education in the Middle Ages, which was much
more concentrated on texts as the central means of education. The bulk of critical
discussion was aimed at defining the morals, ideals, values or doctrine the texts
could or should transfer, within the wider discussions on the structures of the ideal
state, both of society and the individual within it, and the education conducive to
bringing this into existence. Texts remain seen as sources of great authority and
influence. As Alastair Minnis puts it:
No medieval theorist could have decried the 'intentionalist fallacy'
or the 'affective fallacy', since authorial intention and the 'affective'
functions of literature were of the first importance in medieval
literary theory. To a considerable extent, medieval commentators
derived their standards of criticism from the psychological causes of
the text ('intentionalism') and from its psychological results (its
'affective' appeal to the reader). This difference of opinion should
be recognized by the modern theorist and critic!
Minnis' comment is important not only in describing the medieval critics' attitudes,
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but also in pinpointing changes of attitudes and emphasis between different
streams of (modern) literary criticism. The 'New Critics" 'affective fallacy', for
instance, defined by them as the 'confusion of what a poem is with what it does',
is later in turn attacked by Stanley Fish, who argues that the reading process of
interpretation itself falls under this 'affective fallacy', and that it is thus not a
'fallacy'2. In children's literature criticism these shifts in theoretical perspectives
take place in different ways: to a great extent both types of attitude intermingle
within this criticism as I will show in detail in later chapters. On the one hand the
didactic impulse of adults towards children, when concerned with books and
reading, relies on 'intentionalism' and, especially, on the 'affective' appeal to the
reader - as Minnis put it. Moral and emotional education through reading assumes
and relies on, far-reaching effects on the reader. The educationalist Juan Luis
Vives was of the opinion that
poems contain subjects of extraordinary effectiveness, and they
display human passions in a wonderful and vivid manner. This is
called energia. There breathes in them a certain great and lofty
spirit so that the readers are themselves caught into it, and seem to
rise above their own intellect, and even above their own nature.3
There are not many clearer articulations of the power ascribed to literature in the
intellectual, moral, or emotional education of children.
On the other hand, therefore, the development of a 'children's fiction'
demanded, and was part of, a criticism which concerned itself with making claims
for the 'literary' qualities of this fiction. And in allying itself with literature it could
not completely ignore theoretical developments in adult literary criticism:
56
children's fiction derives its legitimacy in part from its claims of various
relationships to the larger world of 'literature' and 'fiction'. Changes in ideas about
children and childhood take place from the sixteenth century onwards which are
linked to the simultaneous interconnected development of the ontological concept
of 'the child', and the notion that these children could be raised and educated in
a better way if the methods used somehow corresponded to, or connected with,
this ontology. Yet, with regards to books, there now emerges a paradox: a need,
it is said, began to be felt for books which somehow connected to this ontology
of 'the child'. But the books must still be of adult judged quality and appropriate
content, as argued by the Greek, Roman and Medieval Church theorists of
education. Vives formulated the paradox as follows:
although in teaching art, the most perfect and absolute parts are
always to be propounded, yet in teaching, those parts of the art
should be presented to the audience, which are most suited to their
capacities.4
With the Greeks, Romans, and Medieval Church teachers the literary or historical
texts judged to articulate and embody the greatest of art were seen to be used to
teach learners what was great and good. But in a movement to adapt this moral
education to the postulated needs and capacities of 'children' - the 'other' to the
'adult' - how could one teach them with material which was simultaneously
selected and created by analogy to these postulated capacities - and thus
supposedly 'other' to adult art and thus, to a great extent, unjudgeable by 'adult'
standards, - and yet comply with the need, borne from the wish to educate in
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certain ways, with certain goals, to judge the material as 'good'? Virginia Haviland
tells us that in 1844 Elizabeth Rigby, whom Haviland calls 'an advanced critic',
wrote that children's books, should be a 'union of the highest art with the simplest
form'.5
 Texts have, in this situation to be 'good' for children and 'good' for adults -
a difficult situation when notions of childhood depend on specific differences
from adulthood. As M.W. Keatinge tells us 6, Mosellanus, Professor of Greek at
Leipzig, wrote about his writing of a Pedology he published in 1517 that
the importance of my occupation [initially] made me disdain this
work, doubtless useful, but humble and almost mean in appearance,
and ..., not being used to it, I found it difficult to play the part
suitably, since I saw that for this kind of comedy a man must
become a child once more.7
Mosellanus seems to be saying that the simplicity, for him, of the contents of the
Pedology, made it more suitable to be written by a child - in this he assumes that
a 'child' would also regard it as simple. Or he is implying that a child should write
it because then it would reflect or convey in turn its own level and type of
understanding accurately - but to do this the child must somehow have a previous
knowledge of the contents of the Pedology. What Mosellanus seems to be
struggling with is that he felt he should try and remember how he learned as a
child in order to, from his current position as adult, clarify or anticipate
difficulties. In other words, he must be his adult and his child self at the same 
time, to successfully tackle the Pedology according to his own idea. Mosellanus'
own formulation is echoed, however, throughout children's book production and
criticism: the necessity and possibility of adults becoming children again is
58
repeatedly touched on, often in terms of 'seeing through the eyes of the child'.
Expressions of needs to thus reinhabit the child - to reclaim it after having
created it - are preceded by views of a lengthy process of separation. As Philippe
Aries argued, a modern notion of an ontologically definable childhood seems to
have emerged significantly from the sixteenth century onwards. Children's books,
and the discussions surrounding children's reading, evolved further alongside, and
became an integral part of the creation of this cultural narrative of childhood. The
story children's book critics and historians tell about the origins of children's books
is that they were intended to amuse children, as opposed to educating them
primarily. I have already quoted critics such as John Rowe Townsend, F.J. Harvey
Darton, and P.J. Buijnsters, as defining children's fiction by distinguishing it from
school texts and primers, or by linking books to a child readership. Central to
theories of the origins of children's fiction is this linking of childhood with 'leisure'
and 'amusement'. 'Childhood' began, in this sense, as, and by, being the repository
for ideas about certain types of freedom. 'Freedom' determined as an absence of
civilizing and restrictive forces. An opposition was set up between 'non-children's'
books, supposedly given to children earlier in history which were said to be
oppressive, dictatorial, and forces of civilization in a negative sense with respect
to children, and 'children's books' which were simply claimed not to be forces: a
part, as it were, of what Rousseau would call a 'negative education', designed, as
Peter Gay comments 'to avoid the mistakes of the past and keep Emile from
absorbing the vices of his culture'. 8 In this respect, the development of childhood
and the roles attributed to children's fiction operate in a boundary area impinging
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on several concepts and aspects of freedom and liberty. John Stuart Mill classically
delineates the aspects pertaining to this boundary when he introduces his essay On
Liberty:
The subject of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so
unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical
Necessity; but Civil or Social Liberty; the nature and limits of the
power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the
individual.9
'Childhood' represents a specialised status with regard to both 'Liberty of Will'
and 'Civil or Social Liberty'. As Mill writes,
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign. It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine
is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their
faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons
below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or
womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken
care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as
well as against external injury .... Despotism is a legitimate mode of
government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their
improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end.
Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things
anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being
improved by free and equal discussion.1°
Children's fiction becomes defined as being part of a liberation movement,
away from didacticism, artificiality, and moralism.. As I have argued earlier,
children's fiction can also be interpreted as creating and being part of other types
of hierarchical relationship between 'adults' and 'children': adults exercising power
over children both in relation to the 'law' and 'social and civil status'. The notion
of 'childhood', as we saw Derrida imply earlier, is thus part of a developing
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interest, placed as occurring from the Renaissance onwards, in 'nature': the child
becomes an expression of that which is 'natural': unfettered, spontaneous, unspoilt,
true. It is no wonder that Rousseau's Emile is seen as a seminal work in relation
to notions of childhood. George Boas, in his study of the Cult of Childhood refers
to Rousseau as having
initiated the idea that childhood is something inherently different
from manhood ... since the child is, so to speak, sui generis
[Rousseau says], it must be recognized that he has his own ways of
seeing, thinking, feeling, and nothing is more foolish than to attempt
a substitution of our ways for his.11
I will return to consider Rousseau in greater detail, but for the time being will
note that interpretations of his type of linking of the child to the natural are
essential to the education-amusement divide which is presented as having
generated children's fiction. Desires to escape from tyranny or restrictive social
mores in this context created a 'childhood' as being everything which was not that
which these 'adults' felt themselves to be.
This emergence of childhood as a 'natural' state, and, alongside this, a
growing formulation and approval of the 'natural' involved the development of a
way for the natural, and, as part of this, the child, to be. In this sense the very
expression used to refer to the 'nature' of something, in the English language,
encapsulates this notion of a defining essence. A Dutch author on children's
literature, Anne De Vries, writes in his Ph.D. thesis on standards by which Dutch
children's fiction has been judged through time, that the division between 'adult'
and 'child' occurred in the second half of the eighteenth century, and that
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because of the increased interest in pedagogical theory, people
slowly started to pay more attention to the needs of the child, and
they started putting more emphasis on the nature of the child. In
relation to this, the name of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) is
often mentioned in the first instance. He explained his pedagogical
ideas in the utopian novel Emile ou de l'education (1762) ... The
Dutch pedagogical theorists of the Enlightenment were, however,
influenced primarily by John Locke's (1632-1704) ideas. He
regarded the child as a 'tabula rasa': not nature but nurture
determines how a person comes to be formed, according to
Locke.12*
(It may be useful to point out at this early point that Locke's 'tabula rasa' idea
is subject to disputed interpretation. John and Jean Yolton, editors of Locke's
educational works, warn:
There is a clear genetic strain in his [Locke's] account of the human
understanding. Quick was easily put off by the tabula rasa metaphor
(as others have been too), taking that as evidence that Locke had
no idea of an organism growing and developing ... this [is an]
obviously false remark ... The tabula rasa doctrine was of course
about ideas and propositions, not about faculties, capacities, or
tempers.13
More on this later.)This 'existence' of childhood, this presence in and of itself, can
be seen in the works of writers on education previous to Rousseau and the (in
children's literature studies) equally quoted John Locke. As De Vries notes, a
closer consideration of methods of education prompted speculation about the
demands of the person to be educated. 'Education', 'freedom', 'nature', and 'the
individual' are closely linked concepts related
* My translation.
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to this period of historical development, and 'the child' is moulded by aspects of
each of those redefined concepts. This is reflected in the writings of sixteenth and
seventeenth theorists such as Rabelais, Vives, Erasmus, Montaigne, Luther, and
Comenius. In these authors we find theories relevant not only to the cognitive and
emotional processes involved in children and education, and children and reading,
but, perhaps still more importantly, we find formulations of the motives and
pressures, articulated in their ideals of society, religion, morals, and values, which
resulted also in the 'child'. Whereas the Greeks, Romans, and Medieval Church
educators, seemed to concentrate on defining the desired results of their
endeavors, there followed a slow shift to a simultaneous consideration of the
material which had to change to fulfil the preset goals. As Rousseau wrote in
The wisest writers devote themselves to what a man ought to know,
without asking what a child is capable of learning. They are always
looking for the man in the child, without considering what he is
before he becomes a man."
Which changes were required, and how were they to be achieved? This question
becomes pertinent to the definition required for the child.
M.W. Keating touches on a number of the elements engaged in the
discussions on education and children when he writes, in the introduction to
Comenius' The Great Didactic:
The day school open to children of every rank; the large class
managed by a single teacher as the only means by which such
schools were economically possible; the introduction of every
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subject of instruction that could free the understanding from
sophistic habits and teach men to look facts squarely in the face -
these were the goals towards which his [Comeniusl efforts strove,
and his historical antecedents are bound up with the great
democratic movement of which the Reformation was the most
striking manifestation, with the names of Luther, Sturm, Calvin, and
Knox. The conscience had been installed by the Reformers as guide,
and its counsellor, the understanding, needed education. Good
schools, and nothing else, could remove monkish ignorance from
the land; and this truth Luther was not slow to enunciate.15
Reading can be said to take up several roles within the different strands of 'the
great democratic movement'. On the one hand nature, and observation and
experience of the natural world and life in practice are described as a moral force
in their own right. The natural was good and true - a prelude to the pastoral and
Romanticism, as well as the Enlightenment philosophers. On the other hand
reading is prescribed as the ideal medium of mass teaching. The greater
availability of books through the invention of the printing press allowed for
reading to be written of as an activity directed towards the acculturation of
individuality: instead of being read aloud to, and repeating sections of text
preinterpreted by teachers, pupils could have the texts more easily available to
themselves, and open to more lengthy and detailed Perusal. Thus 'truth' and the
values and morality of society are advocated as available through the individual's
own perception of nature and books. Individuality and freedom, as ideals, must
be taught in form as well as content of teaching: a complex and self-contradictory
concept.
The ideas of the child and childhood are used by these writers as a central
means of dealing with the inherent paradox of teaching individuality and freedom.
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On the one hand, therefore, man, as child, is described in terms of unreason and
freedom, on the other hand man as adult in terms of reason and freedom. A shift
from an uncontrolled undifferentiated freedom to reasoned specific freedoms
characterises the development postulated for the human being from 'child' to
'adult', and sanctions the education crucial to this process. This is how education
and why education can be allied to 'amusement': this is an attempt to make it
both an efficacious and 'natural' process - a non-forced process. In other words
a true liberal arts education. Children's fiction is presented as being the product
of these ideas. Vives, for instance, writes that
the human mind is wonderfully inclined to freedom. It allows itself
to be set to work, but it will not suffer itself to be compelled. We
may easily gain much by asking, but very little by extortion, arid that
little with difficulty.16
This develops Plato's type of mention of the greater efficiency of non-forced
education. Vives also presents education through reading in terms of a natural,
pleasurable, process:
certain instruments, so to say, also were sought for, with which we
should be more easily and pleasantly led to the paths of reason ...
Music, as a relaxation and recreation of the mind, through the
harmony of sounds. Under this head, comes all poetry, which
consists in the harmony of numbers. Prose oratory, however, has its
rhythms, though they are not fixed by definite and constant law, like
poetry.17
The Greek concept of harmony and balance is one of the components of the traits
of renaissance and Humanist 'nature'. Vives specifies the role of books:
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to books we must refer for knowledge in every subject. For without
them, who could hope that he would attain the knowledge of the
greater things? The direct inspiration of God teaches only very few
... Therefore the man desirous of wisdom must make use of books,
or of those men who take the place of books, viz. teachers.18
Montaigne equally clearly reflects this reinterpretation of education. He
emphasises that 'I wholly condemn all violence in the education of a tender mind,
which one intends to bring up to honour and liberty'. 18
 This statement beautifully
encapsulates the paradox these thinkers are working within. Montaigne, like Vives,
asserts
one can only tempt the appetite and affections; otherwise one only
educates book-laden asses: by blows from rods one gives them a
pocket full of knowledge to keep safe. Whereas if we would
succeed, one must not only lodge it in their minds but espouse and
wed them to it.'
To raise children 'to honour and liberty': Montaigne has, as Vives did,
reformulated Greek thought with new pertinence to the views of these
Reformation and Humanist writers on education and society. Love of learning,
they argue, must be engendered, henceforth, as a basis, and part of, freedom and
choice.
Though concerned with issues of freedom - both redefining the term and
relating it to education - Vives and Montaigne seem primarily concerned, as
Rabelais and Erasmus seem to be, with the education of the 'young gentleman'.
As Keatinge pointed out, Comenius, and Luther before him, were, in some
respects, advocates of different kinds of freedom than those Humanists and,
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hence, addressed educational issues from a different angle. Whereas Vives,
Montaigne, Rabelais, and Erasmus and, later, Locke and Rousseau could be said
to centre their educational theories - implicitly or explicitly - on liberty of Will in
children of ruling social classes, Luther and Comenius, as a consequence of their
religious views, addressed social and civil liberty and its relationship to education.
Both Luther and Comenius advocate mass education, motivated by religious zeal.
Luther's views on education and freedom are important elements of his
Reformation doctrines. Vives and Montaigne illustrate concerns with linking
education to a voluntary process of enjoyment of learning, a core element of
notions around children's fiction, but Luther and Comenius propagate reading and
general literacy as the method of mass religious and moral education: another
idea which persists powerfully in discussions on children's fiction.
Comenius refers back to Luther when he wrftes, in The Great Didactic,
Dr. Luther, in his exhortation to towns of the empire on behalf of
the erection of schools (A.D. 1525), asks for these two things among
others. Firstly, that schools may be founded in all cities, towns, and
villages, for the instruction of all the young of both sexes ..., so that
even peasants and artisans may, for two hours daily, receive
instruction in useful knowledge, in morality, and in religion.
Secondly, that an easier method of instruction may be introduced,
so that students, instead of developing antipathy towards learning,
may be enticed by irresistible attractions, and that, as he says, boys
may gain no less pleasure from study than from spending whole
days in playing ball and amusing themselves. These are the views of
Dr. Luther.21
Comenius' and Luther's interest in moral education on a large scale involves a
close consideration of the nature of interpretation. The Medieval Catholic Church
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is presented as having kept religious texts firmly to itself, for fear of dissent and
divergent interpretation of the holy texts. To advocate literacy on a mass scale as
necessary to open study of religious texts, as Tyndale, Luther, and Comenius do,
and yet have extremely clear views on the right and wrong of religious ideas
indicates particular ideas of readers and reading. .Whereas the overwhelming
emphasis in children's literature discussions seems to rely on views of reading as
amusement, and hence refers to these ideas as they developed in Vives,
Montaigne, Locke, and Rousseau, I would argue, in fact, that Comenius' and
Luther's discussions on the tension between individual readership but controlled
interpretation are equally absolutely crucial to the common use of the concepts
of 'childhood' which differentiate children's literature criticism from some current
adult literary criticism. Whereas, namely, adult literary theory currently, in its
various forms, seems to be concerned with the possibilities of individuality of
interpretation of texts, and the relationship of these interpretations to a common
critical discussion, much children's book criticism relies on the concepts of
childhood to unify and control interpretation: this is one aspect of the
manifestation of the adult-child hierarchy with respect to children's reading.
'Looking through the eyes of the child' is, as I have suggested, in this sense, not
only a metaphor to be interpreted as an expression of concern and understanding,
but also of invasion, domination, and control: 'Looking through the eye of the
child', also implies looking through the 'I' of the child.
Luther and Comenius, as I have read them, are concerned with mass moral
education, and Vives, Montaigne, and Erasmus with the education of the 'young
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gentleman', as it had been described for centuries, in some form, from the Greeks
onward. In fact, Luther and Erasmus wrangled over the issue of religious mass-
education in an exchange of writings concerned with the possibility of free will.22
Obviously these discussions were of great importance to a religious context,
whereas general writings on a gentleman's education were concerned with a
mixture of liberal arts and religious education for religious and civil purposes.
Luther, and Erasmus in the discussion with Luther, are only discussing the
teaching of Scripture, not Classical texts (though Luther mentions some texts of
classical origin with a view to banning them). Luther's writings are pertinent to the
terms of later children's literature criticism in three respects: his advocacy of mass
literacy for the purpose of religious education; his controlling of the 'freedom' this
general literacy introduced; and his discussion of the Father-child relationship
between God and the Christians, which parallels some of the aspects of the
redeveloping hierarchy between earthly adults and children. (Again: with respect
to the two latter issues I am not so much concerned with any 'actual' historical
influence of Luther's ideas as with the fact that they seem to me explicitly
illustrative of the constructions of ideas usually taken for granted in children's
literature criticism).
Firstly, then, Luther, in his rebellion against the corruption of the Papacy
and the Medieval Catholic Church, strongly advocates a return to the word of
God - of the Bible - as a source of authority, rather than the interpretations of the
Pope. In his 'Address to the Nobility', one of the key documents of the
Reformation, Luther writes:
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it is a wickedly devised fable, and they cannot quote a single letter
to confirm it, that it is for the Pope alone to interpret the Scriptures
or to confirm the interpretation of them: they have assumed the
authority of their own selves. And though they say, that this
authority was given to St. Peter when the keys were given to him,
it is plain enough that the keys were not given to St. Peter alone,
but to the whole community.23
This idea is a part of Luther's general ideas of the liberty of Christianity. He
argues Christians are equal and all free to learn the word of God themselves:
above all, in schools of all kinds the chief and most common lesson
should be the Scriptures and for young boys the Gospel ... should
not every Christian be expected by his ninth or tenth year to know
all the holy Gospels, containing as they do his very name and life?24
To Luther, the Gospel and Scriptures will self-evidently reveal the word of God
as he himself sees it. He is dismissive of hermeneutical questions. Having attacked
the Papacy for this misuse of the monopoly of interpretation, he seems to rely on
the righteous Christian not to fall into the same error - and it is the role of the
like-minded members of the community to provide correction. Luther writes
sarcastically of a Leipzig professor's discussion of the sixth chapter of St. John,
concerned with transubstantiation, that
this professor of the Bible must be permitted to prove whatever he
pleases out of any passage of Scripture he pleases. For he is an
Anaxagorean, nay, Aristotelian theologian, to whom names and
words when transposed mean the same things and everything.
Throughout his whole book he so fits together the testimonies of
Scripture ... I pass over the rest, that I may not quite kill you with
the dregs of this most offensive drain.25
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Luther advocates
that no violence ought to be done to the words of God, neither by
man, nor by angel, but that, as far as possible, they ought to be kept
to their simplest meaning, and not to be taken, unless the
circumstances manifestly compel us to do so, out of their
grammatical and proper signification, that we may not give our
adversaries any opportunity of evading the teaching of the whole
scriptures.26
Thus Luther is committed, through his rebellion to what he regards as previous
misinterpretation, to a self-evidence of meaning of the Gospel when studied by all.
In the discussion between Erasmus and Luther, Erasmus questions this
notion, and Luther defends his views. Erasmus addresses the problems of
interpretation:
I confess that it is right that the sole authority of Holy Scripture
should outweigh all the votes of all men. But the authority of the
Scripture is not here in dispute ... Our battle is about the meaning
of Scripture ... if it [Scripture] is so clear, why have so many
outstanding men in so many centuries been blind, and in a matter
of such importance?27
Interpretation is the crucial point in Erasmus' and Luther's dispute, as Erasmus
supports free will, and Luther denies it, both claiming their views on the basis of
Scripture. Erasmus' argument that obscurity in Scripture has led to centuries of
discussion, leads to his view that these problems should not be aired generally:
such matters might allowably have been treated in discussion by the
learned world, or even in the theological schools ..., to debate such
fables before the gaze of a mixed multitude seems to me to be not
merely useless but even pernicious.28
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To Erasmus Luther's resort to opening up to the public judgement and knowledge
of the Scriptures has no basis:
You [Luther] say, 'what has a mitre to do with the understanding
of Holy Scripture?' I [Erasmus] reply, 'What has a sackcloth or a
cowl?' You say, 'What has the knowledge of philosophy to do with
the knowledge of sacred letters?' I reply, 'What has ignorance?'29
Luther defends his views by, again, railing against hermeneutical
disputation:
I am speaking, moreover about the assertion of those things which
have been divinely transmitted to us in the sacred writings.
Elsewhere we have no need either of Erasmus or any other
instructor to teach us that in matters which are doubtful or useless
and unnecessary, assertions, disputings, and wranglings are not only
foolish but impious.3°
Luther accepts, and Erasmus refutes, the acceptance of assertions in religion.
Luther denies that there are obscure passages in Scripture:
that in Scripture there are some things abstruse, and everything is
not plain - this is an idea put about by the ungodly Sophists ...; but
they have never produced, nor can they produce, a single article to
prove this mad notion of theirs ... I admit, of course, that there are
many texts in the Scriptures that are obscure and abstruse ... but
[this is] because of our ignorance of their vocabulary and grammar;
but these texts in no way hinder a knowledge of all the subject
matter of Scripture.31
Finally, Luther blames any remaining obscurity on
the blindness or indolence of those who will not take the trouble to
look at the very clearest truth ... If you speak of the internal clarity,
no man perceives one iota of what is in the Scriptures unless he has
the Spirit of God ... The Spirit is required for the understanding of
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Scripture, both as a whole and in any part of it. If, on the other
hand, you speak of the external clarity, nothing at all is left obscure
or ambiguous, but everything there is in the Scriptures has been
brought out by the word into the most definite light, and published
to all the world.32
Erasmus drily replies to this 'that now every Tom, Dick and Harry claims
credence who testifies that he has the spirit of the gospel'.33
The focus of Luther and Erasmus' discussion is relevant to children's fiction
criticism in several senses. Their differences of opinion involve acknowlea'gemenes
and repression of aspects of need and purpose. Luther and Erasmus are both
operating under the aegis of their absolute God and attempt to resolve the clashes
between their versions of necessary truths and the liberty to express those truths,
and their varying views on the need for their truths to become other persons'
truths. Their God both carries the responsibility for acknowledgement and
repression of purpose: accepting God as an absolute truth makes it possible to
both validate their motivation to have this truth accepted and known, but also
implies the eternity and eventual emergence of that truth. Luther and Erasmus'
discussion reflects the opposition between claims for the possibility of discovering
uniform truth through knowledge (Luther's mass literacy and moral education),
and the ideas of pluriform interpretation and individual meaning with the liberty
of pluriform interpretation becoming part of truth and righteousness under the
limiting safety of the truth of God. Rene Wellek writes that
with Erasmus 'the art of criticism' ('ars critica') is applied to the
Bible as a tool in the service of an ideal of toleration. Among the
later humanists the terms 'critic' and 'criticism' seem, however,
73
limited specifically to the editing and correction of ancient texts.34
In Erasmus this ideal of toleration is limited and determined by the truth of God.
This combining of tolerance and truth (which may be the compromise of 'liberal-
humanism') occurs in the same way in much children's literature criticism: the
critics express tolerance towards, or advocate, plurality of interpretation and use
of texts, but the 'truth' of 'the child' limits and determines the scope and use of
this interpretation for the critic.
Luther's view may also be said to reflect relationships between children's
fiction critics and their child readers, for his notion of the 'Spirit of God' in people
controlling meaning, and validating his purpose in directing meaning, is close to
the role the concept of 'child' plays in controlling the meaning critics assign to
texts for children for children. Even as Luther releases the Scriptures to public
scrutiny, the correct Spirit will limit and control meaning for his purposes:
Let miserable men, therefore, stop imputing with blasphemous
perversity the darkness and obscurity of their own hearts to the
wholly clear Scriptures of God ... All men have a darkened heart,
so that even if they can recite everything in Scripture, and know
how to quote it, yet they apprehend and truly understand nothing
of it [without the Spirit of God].35
Luther corresponds to the role of the children's fiction critic who denies
and represses his hierarchical role, retreating behind the 'amusement' value of
children's fiction to the 'children' and their freedom from overt coercion in
reading and interpretation. Luther, too, ostensibly rejects overt coercion or
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pressure:
I say then, neither Pope, nor Bishop, nor any man whatever has the
right of making one syllable binding on a Christian man, unless it is
done with his own consent. Whatever is done otherwise is done in
a spirit of tyranny; ... no man is bound to receive the traditions of
the pontiff, or to listen to him, except when he teaches the gospel
and Christ; and he himself ought to teach nothing but the freest
faith.36
The concept of the 'Spirit of God' functions as concepts of 'childhood' come to
do within children's literature criticism as revealing to the adult critic, and putting
within the sphere of the adult's vision, understanding, and control, the
interpretation and meaning of texts for the child.
We can see then how Luther, in his discussion, is able to simultaneously
reject the outright manipulation and force he sees as used by the Pope and
advocate a new liberty for the Christian, and yet introduce a factor - the Spirit of
God - which will offer a basis for limiting, directing, or controlling individual
interpretation. The previous situation is described by Luther as an antagonistic
confrontation between, and subordination of one of two forces: the external
coercion of the pontiff against the internal beliefs and anxieties of the individual.
Under Luther's theories, these dual forces become unified and internalised: man
will express his own knowledge and belief, and this will be correct if, and when,
man has within him the Spirit of God. Thus the liberty of the individual and the
important correctness of belief according to Luther's doctrines are reconciled.
Control is now based on innate qualities existing in and of themselves, unless they
are altogether absent, which then justifies the labelling of undesirable
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interpretations as invalid or incorrect.
This type of control needs to assert its rights. As Clifford Geertz points out
when considering the cultural construction of 'common sense',
we [people] are reluctant ... to draw the conclusion that science,
ideology, art, religion, or philosophy, or at least the impulses they
serve, are not the common property of all mankind ... Religion rests
its case on revelation, science on method, ideology on moral
passion, ... common sense rests its on the assertion that it is not a
case at all, just life in a nutshell. The world is its authority.37
These grounds of authority - revelation, method, moral passion, the world,
childhood - are, in this sense, expressions of what Nietzsche calls 'the will to
power'. Alexander Nehamas writes:
Nietzsche's view [is] that ... the will to power is manifested in the
ability to make one's own view of the world and one's own values
the very world and values in which and by which others live ... Both
dogmatism and metaphysics are, like everything else according to
his [Nietzsche's] view, manifestations of the will to power.
[Nietzsche himself writes]: 'we seek a picture of the world in that
philosophy in which we feel freest; i.e. in which our most powerful
drive feels free to function.38
(We might note that of Luther Nietzsche wrote: '...the slandered instincts, too, try
to create a right for themselves (e.g. Luther's Reformation: coarsest form of moral
mendaciousness under the guise of "evangelical freedom")').39
We have considered, then, the terms of Luther's historical influence as one
of the members of the 'democratic movement' in education, and the terms of his
discussion with Erasmus concerning the regulation of liberation of interpretation.
The third term of Luther's ideas which illuminates these aspects of discussions in
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children's literature criticism is his particular use of the common description of the
relationship between God and man as a father-child relationship. This terminology
is one way of attempting to deal with the difficult issues of religious free will and
predetermination. Another analogy used with respect to these problems, related
in many ways to the father-child image is that of the master and servant. These
doctrinal discussions are fundamentally concerned with a problem many children's
literature critics have cancelled out in accepting 'amusement' as a liberation force
for children, functioning within the parameters of an assumed knowledge of the
essence of 'child', namely how freedom functions with respect to the subordinate
partner in a hierarchical relationship. How can man be free with an all-knowing,
all-controlling God? How can the 'child' be free with an all-knowing all-controlling
'adult'? As I have argued earlier, I am claiming the inevitably of the hierarchy, but
I am interested in the terms in which this discussion is conducted, and expresses
permission to a dominant narrative of 'adulthood' to formulate 'children' and
'childhood' as terms operative within the 'will to power'.
Religion has struggled with the problem of free-will, in this sense, for
centuries. As Erasmus points out: 'From the time of the apostles down to the
present day, no writer has yet emerged who has totally taken away the power of
freedom of choice, save only Manichaeus and John Wyclif.' 4° The wish to claim
the possibility of freedom of choice is indeed powerful, and, for religion, demands
a reconciliation with the perfect God. Philip Watson explains Luther's views:
fallen man ... retains his powers of reason and will ... but both his
reasoning and his willing are radically corrupt, being governed from
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the false premises dictated by Satan.... When the will of God runs
counter to his own [man's], it seems to him arbitrary and tyrannical,
and if he does not simply flout it in blind self-assertion, he complies
with it in calculating self-interest, with an eye to escaping
punishment or gaining reward. He acts thus of necessity, in as much
as he has no 'will of his own' over against the Evil Spirit by which
he is inwardly moved; and just for that reason he acts voluntarily,
not under coercion against his will. But he does not act freely, that
is, with the spontaneity of genuine love; ... Freedom, in the full and
proper sense of the term, belongs in Luther's view only to God.41
It is, explains Watson, Luther's view that
it is, however, God's purpose to save man from his evil bondage,
and to this end he works by means of his Word and his Spirit ...
Where and insofar as this happens, man is restored to his true and
natural relationship to God, and thereby enters into the fullest
freedom of which he is capable. This is the liberty of the children
of God, in which men can freely cooperate with God, not for the
achieving of their own salvation, but in the fulfilling of God's
purposes in the world with respect both to its spiritual and temporal
welfare.42
This is also, I would argue, the structure of the liberty of the children of man as
described within much of children's literature criticism: through the adult's word
and spirit (spirit as in: guiding and developing force and consciousness) children
are seen to voluntarily cooperate to enter into their fullest freedom - the
achievement not of their own salvation as children, but the fulfilment of the
adult's purposes in the world with respect to both its spiritual and temporal
welfare. Luther, in his religious conviction, has to formulate man's liberty within
the restrictions created by the absolute premise of the existence and perfection
of a God, and in doing so provides an analogue of the way the liberties of the
constructed subordinate child in relation to the presence of the dominant adult
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may be considered. Luther's theorizing on the structure of the relationship
between God and man shows how the narrative of the relationship between adult
and child, which is, in children's literature criticism, often taken as being the
product of the study of the nature of 'child', in fact existed within parallel contexts
of power hierarchies, before the invention of this 'child'. Compare to this for
instance also Vygotsky's learning theory where the adult is said to lend his
consciousness ('zone of proximal development') to the child as a means of
learning.43
As I noted earlier, Comenius quotes Luther as an authority in discussing
the need for mass education. Comenius is a prominent figure not only within the
wider field of educational theory, but also specifically in connection with children's
books. Comenius' further refinements of educational ideas led him to produce the
Janua Linguarum, an introduction to the study of Latin, in 1631. Though similar
books had appeared before, Comenius' Janua became highly successful. Keatinge
tells us that
it [the Janua] was translated into twelve European languages ..., and
even travelled as far eastward as Asia ... it is an undoubted fact that
in every European country generations of children thumbed the
Janua and no other book until they were sufficiently advanced to
begin Terence or Plautus, and that for years after its publication
Comenius' name was familiar in every school-room."
Comenius published a number of other schoolbooks, the most important being,
with a view to the development of children's fiction, the Orbis Pictus. This was a
shortened and simplified version of the Janua accompanied by illustrations
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matched to the text. Letters, for instance, were presented with pictures of animals
whose cries echoed the pronunciation of the letter. Keatinge says that
the success of this book was even more extraordinary than that of
the Janua Linguarum. It went through numberless editions ... the
Orbis Pictus was the first picturebook ever written for children, and
exercised a softening influence on the harshness with which ..., the
first steps in learning were always associated ... 'Apart from the
Orbis Pictus of Amos Comenius', wrote Goethe, 'no book of this
kind found its way into our hands'.45
Comenius thus, for many children's book critics, is one of the sign posts on
the way to 'amusement' and the 'liberation' of children from teaching with respect
to reading and morality. The connection between children and illustration, by the
way, from here on becomes one of the fixed elements of children's fiction and the
definition of childhood. The establishment of this connection between children and
illustration is an element of attributing to children a separate and special vision
and eye / I. Comenius, like Vives, Montaigne, and Luther is concerned with
developing a method of education which would wed children's minds to learning:
instead of rebellion or resistance there must be engendered a love of learning and
a speedy and voluntary adoption of ideals and concepts as the teacher and society
wishes to convey them. To devise such a method remains a powerful and coveted
tool in spreading one's own beliefs and convictions through a population. Keatinge
informs us that Wolfgang Ratke, one of Comenius' immediate predecessors in
school reform, made as great a mystery of his method as was possible, and hoped,
by judiciously concealing its details and advertising its merits, to sell it for a high
price to some prince or noble. 46 Comenius' own aim in writing his Great Didactic
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is
to seek and to find a method of instruction, by which teachers may
teach less, but learners may learn more; by which schools may be
the scene of less noise, aversion, and useless labour, but of more
leisure, enjoyment, and solid progress; and through which the
Christian community may have less darkness, perplexity and
dissension, but on the other hand more light, orderliness, peace and
rest.47
Again, the engendering of voluntary learning as necessary to the free man - the
linking of 'leisure' and 'enjoyment' with 'solid progress' - requires a postulation of
those aspects of 'child' which have to do with what it may like, love, or prefer a
itself: its will and desires must be 'known' (in both its senses: 'understood' and,
biblically, 'possessed') because these educators have come to feel that, for their
purposes, certain wants and desires cannot be instilled in people at will. And, as
with Luther, Comenius must construct, for the purpose of mass moral and
emotional education, wants and desires which he can claim characterise as large
a group of learners, 'children', as possible.
Comenius describes his methods and aims very clearly, and in so doing
further explicates many of the ground rules assumed not only by later theorists
and philosophers of education, but also by the discussions on children's books.
Comenius, for instance, criticizes previous educational thinkers for having almost
all proceeded by means of unconnected precepts,- gleaned from a superficial
experience, that is to say, a posteriori. 48 Comenius ventures to promise that he,
on the other hand, will produce
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a Great Didactic, that is to say, the whole art of teaching all things
to all men, and indeed of teaching them with certainty, so that the
result cannot fail to follow; further, of teaching them pleasantly, that
is to say, without annoyance or aversion on the part of teacher or
pupil, but rather with the greatest enjoyment for both; further of
teaching them thoroughly, not superficially and showily, but in such
a manner as to lead to true knowledge, to gentle morals, and to the
deepest piety. Lastly, we wish to prove all this a priori, that is to
say, from the unalterable nature of the matter itself ... that we may
lay the foundations of the universal art of founding universal
schools.49
Comenius illustrates how 'amusement' starts it career as a form of claimed love
and commitment to learning. Enjoyment is part of teaching thoroughly, for 'true
knowledge', 'gentle morals' and 'deepest piety'. To prove his method will be able
to teach 'all things to all men' Comenius turns to basing his theories on a priori
logic, on 'the unalterable nature of the matter itself'. The 'unalterable nature of
the child itself' is part of this thinking. We return to the connection between 'child'
and 'nature': knowing the a priori traits of childhood will provide one of the bases
from which to reason how to proceed further. A belief in the universal traits of
'child', in a 'nature of childhood', provides the necessary background for believing
in the possibility of devising a method for teaching 'all things to all men'.
Education to Comenius is Utopian: 'the salvation of the human race is at stake',
he writes, and asks:
What better or what greater service could we perform for the state
than to instruct and to educate the young? Especially at the present
time and in the present condition of morals, when they have sunk
so low."
It is the cry, as we have seen, of educators up till the present day.
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Chapter Four: The 'Child' and Forms of Liberty: the Education-Amusement
Divide.
As I have argued throughout, children's book criticism may be said to have been
formed not, as its commonly assumed, primarily by a legacy of ideas about the
ostensible possibility of liberating children from what comes to be perceived as the
oppression of adults, but by a legacy of intense concern with moral and emotional
education. Both education for freedom and education for and through enjoyment
are subordinate elements of a moral and emotional education and are not, as we
will see is often asserted, independent goals in their own right, a liberation from
moral and emotional teaching. Comenius illustrates this clearly. As he says
himself:
should there be any man who is such a pedant as to think that the
reform of schools has nothing to do with the vocation of a
theologian, let him know that I was myself thoroughly penetrated
with this idea. But I have found that the only way in which I can be
freed from it is to follow God's call, and without digression to
devote myself to that work to which the divine impulse directs me.1
To Comenius children are characterized precisely by their susceptibility to
education. He traces this trait, and its importance, tb the Bible:
'Verily I say unto you, Except ye be converted, and become as little
children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.' (Matthew
XVIII, 3)... Just consider, we elders, who consider that we alone are
wise, and that you lack sense, that we are eloquent, but you
speechless - we, I say, are sent to learn our lessons from you! You
are set over us as masters, you are to be our models and examples.
If any one should wish to deliberate why God prizes children so
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highly, he will find no weightier reason than this, that children are
simpler and more susceptible to the remedy which the mercy of
God grants to the lamentable condition of man. For this reason it
is that Christ commands us elders to become as little children ... to
return to our former condition of simplicity, gentleness, modesty,
purity, and obedience.2
At the same time, however, Comenius asserts the impossibility of adults becoming
children again in this way: 'nothing is harder than to lay aside our habits, ... there
is no more difficult task than for a badly-trained man to return to his former
state'3, and concludes that, therefore, 'if the corruption of the human race is to be
remedied, this must be done by means of the careful education of the young.'4
Many of Comenius' ideas derive from theological themes concerning states of
innocence and sin, redemption and damnation, many of which are traditional
throughout Christian religious writing. We can see how Comenius' ideas about
education and childhood are related to his theology (he was a devout member of
the Moravian Brethren), as with Luther, but that these ideas become redefined
within the context of increased pressures to develop education and literacy, and
become absorbed into the structures through which people increasingly tried to
observe and define 'childhood' as not a theological, but a 'scientific', 'self-evident',
or 'natural' 'reality'.
Childhood as a theological state of innocence, to Comenius, combined with
the liberation of access to Scripture to limit access to texts in general. Increased
literacy, as originally advocated by theologians such as Luther and Comenius as
a means of Reformation, can come under pressure increasingly of forces
advocating, in their turn, restrictions on access and interpretation. We saw how
84
this development was already present in Luther's own arguments. When 'children'
are regarded as 'by nature' susceptible and open to moulding, if the right methods
be found, it can become of increasing importance to regulate their reading.
Whereas previously, in writings on education, the reading material of learners was
recommended to be selected and restricted in line with general ideas concerning
blasphemy and corruption - applicable to both adults and children, if at all - there
emerges in these authors the beginnings of an idea about increased literacy for
adults as a fundamental element of 'free' reading while increased literacy for
children is directed for them to an ever more limited and specific body of reading
matter. Whereas, with regard to reading and the democratic idea of forming one's
own judgements and opinions in individual communion with a written text,
previously most unlettered adults are represented as children under the learned
clerics' or aristocracies' direction and guidance, there is now a shift of this
distinction from socio-economic class to age. Philippe Aries remarks on this
parallel between class and age:
thus the old stories which everyone listened to in the time of
Colbert and Mme. de Sevigne were gradually abandoned, first by
the nobility and then by the bourgeoisie, to the children and
country-dwellers. The latter in their turn abandoned them when the
newspaper took the place of the Bibliotheque Bleue; the children
then became their last public, but not for long, for children's
reading is at present undergoing the same evolution as games and
manners ... It is important to note that the old community of games
was destroyed at one and the same time between children and
adults, between lower class and middle class. This coincidence
enables us to glimpse already a connection between the idea of
childhood and the idea of class.5
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Aries also remarks on a move, at the end of the sixteenth century, to
remove indecent books from the education of children. He suggests that
this was a very important stage, which may be regarded as marking
the beginning of respect for childhood. This attitude was to be
found among both Catholics and Protestants, in France and
England. Until then nobody had hesitated to give children Terence
to read, for he was a classic ... They reveal a new decorum, a desire
to avoid any word or expression which might be considered
offensive or indecent.6
Aries makes this comment with a view to contrasting medieval and (post-)
renaissance attitudes to what we now regard as 'children'. His remark, however,
covers two shifts: firstly a shift in moral views, and then, secondly, the connection
of this morality to 'childhood' in a specific way. 'Childhood' is formed by this
allocation of 'suitable' reading, behaviour, and attitudes, according to age.
Increased literacy, in Luther and Comenius' discussions, creates a
paradoxical situation in this respect: it is a freedom permitted by these theorists
with a specific view in mind, to be limited when it threatens to subvert or engulf
their aims. The centre of control of this freedom is placed alternately with
whoever, in a given position, is seen as holding the moral or ideological higher
ground. He who can deal with knowledge and yet not be corrupted by it, may
teach those who would be corrupted by this selfsame knowledge (this is,
ultimately, a God). Or he is seen as inevitably corrupted, but retaining the ability
of transferring a knowledge without the corruption. It is this paradox of authority
and teaching which, I have suggested, causes Jacques Derrida to disown writing
while writing, or, according to Alexander Nehamas' interpretation, Nietzsche's use
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of ever changing styles in his philosophical writing. They are attempting to both
acknowledge and, simultaneously, disrupt the authority of themselves as writers
and thinkers who are thinking about truth (even as non-truth), and who are,
nevertheless, moved to share their views, to express their will to power. Nehamas
writes 'Nietzsche's effort to create an artwork out of himself, a literary character
who is a philosopher, is then also his effort to offer a positive view without falling
back into the dogmatic tradition he so distrusted and from which he may never
have been sure he escaped.' 7 In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche asks 'what in
us really wants "truth"? ... why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even
ignorance?'8 As Nehamas points out: 'Yet to ask even these questions is inevitably
an effort to get matters right concerning them, and they are therefore themselves
motivated by the very will to truth they call into question.'9
Nietzsche's suggested approach to the issues raised around this will to
truth, Nehamas suggests, occur in Beyond Good and Evil, when Nietzsche argues:
From the beginning we have contrived to retain our ignorance ... in
order to enjoy life! And only on this solid, granite foundation of
ignorance could knowledge rise so far - the will to knowledge on the
foundation of a far more powerful will: the will to ignorance, to the
uncertain, to the untrue! Not as its opposite, but - as its
refinement!19
The central purpose of Beyond Good and Evil, Nehamas argues, is to reject 'the
fundamental faith of the metaphysicians ... the faith in the opposition of values.'11
Childhood is a category which is both one of the products of, and also a concept
sustaining, these issues. The anxiety of ignorance manifests itself in its control by
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the will to truth, by allocating ignorance to 'safe' places of 'truth' and 'reality'.
'Childhood' constitutes such a 'safe' place: limited, controlled, and temporary.
Again, when Nehamas argues that 'Nietzsche writes that truth is created and not
discovered ..., but he still believes that we must think of it as something we
discover in order to go on to create it' 12, the temporal aspect within the notions
of 'discovery' and 'creation' are reflected in the temporality of childhood and its
resolution in adulthood. The concept of a will to truth as a refinement of the will
to ignorance are reflected in the paradoxical views of corrupted adulthood
retaining the knowledge of innocence - knowledge including the knowledge of un-
knowledge-, and childhood as un-knowledge in itself - un-knowledge with no
knowledge of un-knowledge. Aries writes in these terms when he suggests that, in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a 'different and older concept' of
childhood reigned, in which 'ideas of innocence and reason were not opposed to
one another'. He argues that 'the association of childhood with primitivism and
irrationalism or prelogicism .. belongs to twentieth century history'. 13 This
twentieth-century position of childhood is open to both respect and protection, as
being a state of innocence before the fall, of unselfconsciousness before
selfconsciousness, as the ignorance supplying the tRith with tolerance, and (it is
also open) to ridicule, contempt, control, and dismissal, depending on the aims
and needs of the self-proclaimed knowledgeable.
The morality which Aries defines, developing into a protection from
sexuality as part of what was considered 'offensive and indecent', is an element of
'adult' paradoxical knowledge. Sexuality, in its Judeo-Christian tradition, is part of
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knowledge, and an aspect of the problematic nature bf knowledge: adults dealing
with the full load of ambiguous traditions regarding knowledge and sexuality can
redeem themselves, or attempt to, by, as Comenius pointed out, protecting the
next generation from this corruption, and defining their original nature by their
freedom from these corruptions. The unresolvable ideal, within this framework,
is knowledge without corruption for this new generation: 'adults' as 'children' and
'children' as 'adults'. The ideal's paradox can never be resolved because it
dismisses, within it terms, the possibility of thinking of 'children' as part of an
equally constructed, but hierarchically dominant, 'adulthood' which formulates
'childhood', and its needs and uses, by, and of, itself. 'Adult' and 'child' define
each other by separation, and by comparison across the space between them as
'empty' categories, and cannot achieve a resolution of this separation because of
its complicity, and involvement, with all the other ideas which accrue around, and
define by off-setting, the 'empty' categories of 'adult' and 'child': knowledge and
ignorance, sin and innocence, reason and madness, order and chaos, freedom and
limitation or subjection.
Aries' interest in a separation of sexuality from childhood, in games and
texts from the sixteenth century onwards, involves not only a construction of a
childhood used, but also the needs which constructed the childhoods. Jacqueline
Rose, we saw earlier, interprets the use of children's• fiction as an adults' tool for
de seduction and amalgamation of the child to the adult, a subjection of the
polymorphous nature of the child's sexuality as Rose sees it to the controls and
limitations of adult sexuality. However, children's fiction can be seen not only as
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an expression of Rose's adult constriction and regulation of a child for an adults'
sake, but also as an expression of a paradoxical wish to resolve the self-imposed
and self-defined separations: efforts to remain in to .uch with, and deal with, the
anxieties of ignorance and knowledge, of being and becoming, of presence and
absence for their own sake.
'Amusement', then, acquires a functional definition specific to education
and, as a part of moral and emotional education, to children's fiction, as being not
only a force of liberation and pleasure for children but also a concept applied to
'children' and 'adults' as a means for the adult to satisfy a will or need to have the
knowledge and control of the child's desires, will, and consciousness through
voluntary, spontaneous surrender: the child coming within the adult again, but not
only in terms of an annihilation or suppression of 'child', as Rose presents it, but
also as an effort to amplify, sustain, or fulfil, a living presence of, and as, 'adult'.
In so far as children's fiction is discussed in an area created on the 'education' and
'amusement' divide, with its allegiance expressed toward an 'amusement' value,
as defined by itself, there has been less attention paid to the camouflage function
of this 'amusement': hiding both Rose and my type of moves towards (re-)
assimilation of adult and child. Harvey-Darton shows this will towards camouflage
when he writes that the first chapters of his Children's Books in England are
the chronicle of the English people in their capacity as parents,
guardians and educators of children; with this reservation, that in
these pages the child at leisure is to be considered as their
preoccupation, and their care for its routine of intellectual discipline
very largely (though not entirely) set aside. It is in their human
aspect that I wish to see those who wrote children's books; as kind
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people inspired more by love and happiness than by purpose,
though happiness was often enough seen as duty and duty
uncompromisingly said to be happiness.14
The 'amusement' and 'education' divide, which allows for 'adults' as being 'kind
people inspired more by love and happiness than by purpose', chooses to avoid
thinking, as I am doing, of purposes which become visible and discussible when
thinking of an education-amusement divide as another side of the coin of the
specific formulation of amusement as a subsidiary element of the purposeful
movement of 'education'. This is why the education philosophers previous to
Locke and Rousseau - commonly quoted as fathers of 'the child' and therefore,
children's fiction - have formed the basis of this discussion: their interests in the
'natural' and 'a priori' in liberation and liberty, and, in Luther and Comenius, in
a form of democracy related to (religious) liberty, develop an emphasis on a
voluntary educational process, an engendering of an enduring love of learning and
selected knowledge. Education as a guiding and inspiring of spontaneous and
innate growth goes together with ideas about 'the child' and reflections on
imposing - or not - from an 'alien' position, from an 'outside' and on the
possibility of following and allowing a 'natural' growth by knowing it and
anticipating it from the 'inside': by looking through the eye IT of this 'child'.
Locke and Rousseau follow in the footsteps of the gentleman's children
educators. They focus, again, on not purely 'intellectual' education, but on the
education of the whole human as a future citizen and social animal. Their interest
focuses not on mass education, as with Luther and Comenius, but on the teaching
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of the individual. The different consequences of concentrating either on the ideas
of mass education or on one-to-one education have not been much referred to in
children's literature criticism. Ideas about 'the child' are quite different according
to the needs and interests of the educators: as I pointed out earlier the
construction of the 'child' is expressed, partially, in the efforts of educators to
work with concepts of a two-way interaction, rather than a one-way imposition.
Children's literature criticism repeatedly intermingles assumptions and conclusions
from the different methodologies and concepts of 'child', derived from these
different emphases on either individual or mass education. This creates one of the
sources of continual problems in discussions on children and reading, as we will
see.
Comenius, in promising the teaching of all things to all men, proposes a
number of teaching methods and ideas which become incorporated into definitions
of the 'child', and which reoccur in different forms in Locke and Rousseau's
theories of one-to-one education. As Comenius promises that the basis of his ideas
are 'a priori' he is already asserting the inevitability .of his claims: 'Now that the
method of teaching has been reasoned out with unerring accuracy, it will, with the
assistance of God, be impossible that the desired result should not follow's,
Johannes Andreae writes in his introductory letter to Comenius' Great Didactic,
adding, as an impressively admonitory and crucial footnote: 'It is inglorious to
despair of progress, and wrong to despise the counsel of others.' 16 As with Luther,
Comenius' theological convictions are echoed in his educational ideas: the God-
the-father and man-the-child set a precedent for his views on man-as-father and
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'the child', besides the transference of ideas directly as the material which is
actually taught. Again, the paradoxical relationship between adult and child as
'others' to each other, but articulated and devised by 'adults', is established in the
theological relationship between God and man. Comenius contrasts the Greek
saying 'know thyself', and the importance attached to this saying by them, to what
he regards as the greater truth:
For what is the voice from heaven that resounds in the Scriptures
but 'Know thyself, 0 man, and know me.' Me the source of eternity,
of wisdom and of grace; Thyself, My creation, My likeness, My
delight.17
Comenius' vision of man develops the idea of stages of development, and
he is one of the earliest to suggest an importance of, and method of, grading.
(Though Comenius does not 'grade' strictly according to concepts of age and
difficulty of teaching-matter, but primarily according to subjects to be taught at
different ages). Grading is a concept crucial to an ever more detailed delineation
of specific stages of consciousness and types of ability linked to age. Dividing
people into classes on the basis of age is a consequence of the progression of
these ideas. Comenius describes the progress of man through life:
What then is a man in the beginning? Nothing but an informed
mass endowed with vitality ... Later on it begins to move and by a
natural process bursts forth into the world. Gradually the eyes, ears,
and other organs of sense appear. In course of time the internal
sense develops ... then the intellect comes into existence by
cognising the differences between objects; while, finally, the will
assumes the office of a guiding principle by displaying desire for
certain objects and aversion for others. But in all these individual
points of progress we find nothing but succession.18
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This is Comenius' description of the development of earthly man at the beginning
of life, but Comenius also provides references to many notions attendant on this
'child' and 'adult' from a theological context when he explains his definition of
'nature':
By the word nature we mean, not the corruption which has laid
hold of all men since the Fall (on which account we are naturally
called the children of wrath, unable of ourselves to have any good
thoughts), but our first and original conditions, to which, as to a
starting-point, we must be recalled. It was in this sense that
Ludovicus Vives said 'What else is a Christian but a man restored
to his own nature, and, as it were, brought back to the starting-point
from which the devil has thrown him?... In this sense, too, must we
take the words of Seneca ... 'Man is not good but becomes so, as,
mindful of his origin, he strives toward equality with God ....' By the
voice of nature we understand the universal providence of God or
the influence of Divine Goodness which never ceases to work all in
all things; that is to say, which continually develops each creature
for the end to which it has been destined.19
Comenius posits two possible understandings of 'nature': the state of corruption
after the Fall, or the previous state of original good and innocence. These two
concepts of 'nature' relate to different 'children': as corrupted, man is the 'child
of wrath', determined by its parentage, and condemned by it, but there is a
'childhood' which was the 'starting-point' before the Fall - caused by eating the
apple from the tree of Knowledge - a 'first and original condition' of innocence
and good. A Christian - acknowledging a God the father - can be this child again,
a child 'mindful of his origin' striving to become as the Father is. Comenius'
theology also provides him with the basis to assume an innate tendency towards
learning and development in man. The seeds of learning virtue, and piety,
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necessary to going to heaven, are implanted within us, he says.
Comenius also quotes Aristotle's 'tabula rasa' idea, and agrees with it, and,
thus, completely anticipates Locke's use of this idea: virtue and aspects of
character are innate to man, but ideas and concepts are (or can be) engraved on
the 'tabula rasa' mind (As the editors of Locke's educational writings point out,
as I quoted earlier, the 'tabula rasa', as used by Locke, is often misinterpreted as
pertaining to all of man). As long as an initial willingness to learn is seen as
present in man, it can be encouraged and built upon. This idea will become
fundamental to educationists such as Froebel and Montessori: their 'child' has an
innate curiosity and desire to learn which can be either stifled or encouraged and
developed. As Comenius writes:
the seeds of knowledge, of virtue, and of piety are, as we have seen,
naturally implanted in us; but the actual knowledge, virtue, and
piety are not so given. These must be acquired by prayer, by
education, and by action.2°
Comenius, having provided the fundamentals of his reasoning from his
theology, and having gone on to see in his understanding of 'nature' the expression
of divine goodness, goes further by elaborating his theories through drawing,
consistently, parallels between education and the growth of plants and crops, and
the building of a house. He uses these examples, again, to assert his authority by
claiming the self-evidence of his ideas as he shows them to occur in other ares. He
finds and constructs examples to support his claims. It is important to note the
expression of a need to support claims in this way: by claiming their 'naturalness' -
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meaning their inevitability and spontaneous occurrence - Comenius' reasoning
from 'a priori' claims is supported. The 'child', too, becomes a part of this type of
'common sense' - as defined by Geertz. This type of reasoning -the constant push
to establish the child, and thus education, as a discovered and not an invented
'truth' - thus provides the backbone of many writings on children and reading.
Comenius follows this path thoroughly: his principles are stated, the parallels from
the natural world, building, or technology are given, and then 'deviations' from
these principles are shown in education, with suggestions on how to rectify them.
Having thus established the possibility and desirability of mass education,
Comenius applies this idea to his concepts of the child. Typically, unsupported
assertions on the nature of children find a place amongst the 'buttressed'
statements, and this is also true for Comenius' ideas on children's (text)books:
Care must be taken to suit all these books to the children for whom
they are intended; for children like whimsicality and humour, and
detest pedantry and severity. Instruction, therefore, should ever be
combined with amusement, that they may take pleasure in learning
serious things which will be of genuine use to them later on, and
that their dispositions may be, as it were, perpetually enticed to
develop in the manner desired.21
Vives and Montaigne's advocacy of engendering, or developing, a love of learning,
are thus equally part of Comenius' mass education. Comenius' further details on
which books should be given to children to read are, as we have seen in all the
previous theorists, the consequence of his ideals and judgements concerning
morality and virtue: as with Luther, (many) 'pagan' books are to be removed from
schools. Children must learn from the Scriptures. Teachers who use texts by
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Greek or Roman authors are advocating 'a terrible abuse of Christian liberty. 922
Children, in accordance with their eventual highest destination, must be educated
to become 'citizens of heaven.'23 The Greeks I discussed sought to educate the
child into becoming the citizen, partaker of the liberty of democracy, while
Comenius and Luther seek to educate the child to become a citizen of heaven,
partaker of the liberty of Christianity.
If I turn, finally, to Locke and Rousseau, we may see that they follow these
patterns exactly: the 'child' is defined for their purposes, asserted as existing
according to inevitable principles, and then principles of intellectual, physical,
moral and emotional education are propounded as having been reasoned from a
basis of knowledge of 'the child', and developed in order to produce the adult
according to their preferred values or ideals. Within much of children's literature
criticism little attention has been paid to Locke and Rousseau's wider moral
claims and purposes and much more to their ostensible discovery of 'the child' and
their specific references to reading for this child. As with the previous theorists,
Locke and Rousseau's (reading) 'child' cannot, and, 'I am arguing, should not be
abstracted and isolated from the broader moral views and beliefs of which it is the
product. John and Jean Yolton for instance, argue that 'Locke's political work,
Two Treatises of Government, contains a move parallel to the child's transition
from innocence to knowledge' 24, or from childhood to adulthood:
the move from pre-civil to civil society. There are in that work two
components of this social maturation: [The latter being] from the
state of nature or the community of mankind to the civil society.
This latter component is especially important for an understanding
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of Locke's views on education. His objective in Two Treatises was
in part to explain political power, its nature, jurisdiction, and origin.
For an understanding of its origin we must, Locke says, 'consider
what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a State of perfect
Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions,
and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of
Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any
other Man.'25
The Yoltons relate these political concerns to what they see to be Locke's
concerns in education:
The skill and knowledge needed to order our actions in accordance
with the law of nature, to treat our possessions and persons
responsibly, and to avoid coming under the absolute control of
others (a particularly frightening state for Locke in its threat to 
personal freedom) are major objectives for education.*
Finally the Yoltons add:
The particularity of Locke's metaphysics is echoed in his strong
emphasis upon individual liberty in his political philosophy, but
liberty for him is always correlative with law and order, the law and
order of God's laws, of God's will ... The child born into this world
has all the equipment and potential to become a member of the
community of mankind ... Training for membership is conducted by
the family; the rearing of children is guided by that objective.27
It can be seen, thus, how Locke's wider understanding of, and strong interest in,
human liberty under God may be argued to anticipate and produce his concept
of the liberty of child under adult, as with Luther.
Both Locke and Rousseau warn against over- generalizations from their
* My emphasis.
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work, and are aware of writing within specific contexts. These statements have
been all but ignored by children's literature critics in their interest in assimilating
elements of Locke's and Rousseau's ideas on education into their a priori claims
of the nature of childhood necessary to their expressed interest in divining an
absolute, specific relationship between the child and the book. With respect to
children and reading there are within either Locke's writings on education or in
The Essay Concerning Human Understanding, or Rousseau's Emile, few grounds
for claiming an insight into specific, characteristic traits of children's reading in
terms of moral and emotional response, other than their assertions concerning
certain characteristics of a 'child' or 'children' as they postulate them for their
specific purposes and uses. Locke and Rousseau, within children's fiction criticism,
are often referred to, as I have pointed out earlier, in terms of introducing the
discovery of the child, and childhood, and in terms of initiating an education-
amusement divide for the benefit of the child, and the adult who would eventually
develop from that child. I have already quoted De Vries as an example of referral,
within writing on children's fiction, to Locke and Rousseau in this way. Other
writers and critics echo this primary view of Locke and Rousseau as initiators of
recognition for the free and natural 'real child' to whom specific books should and
could be given which would amuse and entice the child to knowledge: Donna
Norton, for instance, writes that
in sixteenth and seventeenth-century England [children] were
expected to assume adult roles early in life, [so] teaching and books
were designed accordingly. Even in behavior, there was little
consideration for child development, special educational needs, or
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literature written especially for children's interest. Much of the
enlightenment that considered the child as a person has been
credited to the philosophy and writings of John Locke ... Locke
believed that children who could read should be provided with easy,
pleasant books suited to their capacities ... Locke's philosophy did
provide the first glimmer of hope that children should go through
a period of childhood ... this was a beginning of the realization that
they might benefit from books written to encourage their reading.28
Rousseau's recommendation of Robinson Crusoe as the only reading matter
initially suited to Emile's education is mentioned by Norton and many others.29
But, with respect to the child and reading, both Locke and Rousseau's
writing may be discussed in terms of developing further a continuing concept of
amusement as education. 'Amusement' and 'pleasure', within their writings,
achieve a high educational status as exponents of value systems dedicated to
varying forms of liberty, social structure, or individuality. It is in examining these
ostensible 'discoverers' of childhood as participating in the invention of childhoods
that their writings can be incorporated in a consideration of the ways elements of
their inventions are used within children's literature critics' systems of discussing
what they call 'children's fiction'.
Locke started Some Thoughts Concerning Education in 1684 as an
informal letter of advice to a friend, Edward Clarke, on the education of his young
son.3° In the last of what became a regular flow of letters Locke wrote that
there are a thousand other things that may need consideration,
especially if one should take in the various tempers, different
inclinations, and in particular defaults that are to be found in
children, and prescribe proper remedies to each of them. But in this
tumultuary draft I have made for your son, I have considered him
barely as white paper, as a piece of wax, to be moulded and
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fashioned, and therefore have only touched those heads which I
judged necessary to the breeding of a young gentleman of his
condition in genera1.31
Locke's views of what this 'young gentleman' should be are as important to his
work in defining the state of the 'pre-young gentleman', and in defining the
methods to effect the transformation, as any remarks on inherent attributes of
childhood. He concludes the final version of the published essay:
Each man's mind has some peculiarity, as well as his Face, that
distinguishes him from all others; and there are possibly scarce two
Children, who can be conducted by exactly the same method.
Besides that I think a Prince, a Nobleman, and an ordinary
Gentleman's Son, should have different ways of Breeding.32
James Axtell, in his introduction to his edition of Locke's educational writings,
argues Locke's views, though developed for the 'young gentleman', are, in fact,
universal rules for raising children. He is able to argue this because he takes
certain views on children as definitive and self-evident: in agreeing with Locke's
proposals he takes the step Locke avoids, namely of generalizing Locke's ideas to
a universal 'childhood', despite noting that Locke advocates 'the wisdom of paying
close attention to their different temperaments and rhythms of development, and
thereby accommodating the educational program to the child, not the child to the
program'33, and despite acknowledging Locke's statements on different 'Breeding'
for different social roles. Axtell has to discount these statements in order to allow
for the 'discovery' of the universal child in Locke's work. Axtell's argument for
extending Locke's claims to the universal also on the basis of seeing his work in
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the Essay Concerning Human Understanding as an attempt to understand the
grounds of universal man's understanding, are contradicted in this respect by John
and Jean Yolton, in their introductory essay to their edition of Some thoughts
Concerning Education. The Yoltons, in contrast to Axtell, write:
There is one concept fundamental to Locke's general thought which
as found in the Essay and in Some Thoughts: the concept of
particulars. Locke accepted the principle that 'all that exists is
particular'. What this expression meant within his general system
was that there are no natural classes ... Locke's commitment to
particularity has many forms, including the disavowal of talk of a
common human nature shared by all men ... The centrality given by
Locke to particulars in his metaphysical system is reflected in his
account of persons and his work on education. Each child is to be
dealt with individually ...34
For the purposes of discussing children's fiction studies the differences of
emphasis in Axtell and Yoltons' interpretations of Locke lie in revealing the
important consequences for their interpretation of their underlying commitments
to, for instance, ideas of 'child' as essential classifying 'truths'.
Axtell also overlooks the implications of his discussion of what made Locke
exceptional as a writer on education. He quotes from Locke's The Conduct of the
Understanding:
The business of education ... is therefore to give them this freedom,
that I think they should be made to look into all sorts of knowledge
... But I do not propose it as a variety and stock of knowledge, but
a variety and freedom of thinking, as an increase of the powers and
activity of the mind, not as an enlargement of its possession.35
Axtell sees this as Locke's innovation, that,
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the emphasis of education ceased to be placed on brainstuffing and
was firmly transferred to the process for the formation of character,
of habits - a word always on his tongue - of mind and body.36
We find these ideas in the previously discussed educators, notably Montaigne,
Erasmus, and Vives, those other 'young gentleman's' educators. Axtell, in this
context, refers only to Vives, in a footnote. 37 And, as with those educators, Axtell
acknowledges that Locke's interest in educating to 'prepare the child's mental,
moral, and physical capabilities to meet any situation', is 'also the hallmark of
a liberal education, and we are indebted to Locke for helping to carry that
ancient, yet self-renewing tradition across the centuries from its home in classical
Greece.'39 From acknowledging Locke's link to this 'liberal education' Axtell can
go on to comment that 'for long periods of time society only vaguely remembers
that education means deliberately moulding human character in accordance with
an ideal of human nature that changes as the values current within society
change.'40 Having said this Axtell promptly seems not to apply this idea to his own
views, but assumes that somewhere beyond the changes of value there was a
constant 'child' waiting to be discovered (In other words: educational purposes are
seen to be changeable, but the child not). Axtell mentions the renaissance
humanist educators as deriving their ideal of human character from early
Christianity and the classical period of Greece, and grounding it 'not upon a close
or sophisticated analysis of the human understanding ... but ... on a firm common-
sense understanding of human nature and the various ways it develops from
childhood.'41 Axtell's 'common-sense' is to be understood in relation to Geertz'
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discussion of it, as I mentioned it earlier: it is an assertion of a self-evident truth
discovery. To Axtell, Locke has discovered the truth about the child, education,
and a universal human nature, 'based on a systematic, empirically sound
philosophy of knowledge, ... on an awareness of the gradual evolution of
rationality and self-discipline in a growing child'. 42 To Axtell 'history ends' for 'the
child' with Locke in this respect: in an evolutionary view of scientific progress
towards unchangeable truth Axtell can assign to Locke the discovery of the true
child because, Axtell claims, Locke had the 'capacity for the detailed and quiet
scrutiny of the whole human understanding, ... [the] belief in the necessity of the
task ... Locke secured an insight into human nature that was denied more
impatient reformers.'43 It is Axtell's type of interpretation of Locke's child that
operates most powerfully within children's fiction criticism: though there may be
varying emphases on 'children as individuals', the critics' definition of these texts
as 'children's fiction' marks the limits of the 'individuality' or non-categorization
of 'child'.
Axtell's argument therefore indicates how many writers in children's
literature studies must, for their own purpose, respond to Locke and also to
Rousseau: in attributing to them the origins of ideas about the 'child', and specific
reading in relation to it, that they hold to be true, they extend Locke and
Rousseau's own claims, and, even while acknowledging a dependence of
educational ideals on changing value systems, combine selected claims of
knowledge of particular aspects of human development - rational, moral,
emotional - into one amalgamated 'child'. These critics are, thus, transferring
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historical writings on children's fiction, which refer to Locke and Rousseau's
influence on specific writers of what come to be called 'children's books', or on
specific educationists - Harvey Darton argues that John Newbery 'was probably
acquainted with the actual texts of Locke's Thoughts Concerning Education ... It
might also ... be argued plausibly that he admired and was familiar with
Rousseau's writing,'" and notes that 'in the period immediately after Newbery's
death, the works of Rousseau had a very direct effect upon English books for
children. Many writers acknowledged their debt to Emile,' 45 - to a system of
determinist psychology in which Locke and Rousseau provide the 'truth' about the
total child, and thus the development of the idea of a 'correct' education for it,
from which children's fiction can extrapolate its 'truth' in relation to 'the child'.
These jumps - from the acknowledgement by many post-Lockean and post-
Rousseauan writers on childhood, children's fiction and education, of the
dependence of concepts of childhood and education on contextual or changeable
social values and morals on the one hand (that is to say: there is an
acknowledgement of 'history' as formulations of changing of narratives of value
and meaning through time), to an almost simultaneous assertion of the use of
principles based on a knowledge of a 'real', 'true', 'eternal' 'child', as, it is claimed,
introduced by Locke and Rousseau - are encountered repeatedly.
An 'invented' child in Locke fulfils different functions than a discovered
Lockean child as portrayed by children's literature critics. Locke, in formulating
an image of man without, or before, civilization, and education, postulates a 'non-
man', which he refers to in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding as
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'Children and Ideots (sic)'*. Locke hence supports his idea of man born without
knowledge of innate truths by providing images of non-man determined by an
absence of those traits or that knowledge that he wishes to define and discuss.
This 'non-man' use is analogous to Foucault's and Derrida's linking of madness
and childhood, amongst other concepts, in being determinative of non-
supplementarity: instead of functioning as providers of initial presence, Locke's
'Children and Ideots (sic)' constitute an absence of presence (non-innate ideas and
concepts) whereby absence and presence determine each other, but are subjected
to the need to determine a presence for the sake of the argument Locke wishes
to put forward. Removed from the defined and defining presence of Locke's
'human understanding', Locke's 'child' can only lead an independent life as a
category-concept, which can be linked to any other writer's postulated arguments
and purposes. 'Children's fiction' is based on a denial of 'childhood' as not only
an 'empty' category in Locke, and every other writer we have looked at who
involved this notion in discussions, but as a space outlined by purpose at every
level. This is inevitable in its hierarchical involvement with the 'adulthood' which
it helps to determine, and which determines it. To discuss children's fiction as the
refinement of a 'non-force' from the force of education - that is, as the eventual
'amusement' split off from the education Locke wanted it to be part of - Locke's
child needs to be presented as a presence in and of itself, which would exist,
which could 'be', independent of context. Only as a presence as such can it
*My emphasis.
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function as the free and unforced (and, within the concept, even individualized)
consumer of children's fiction: a child amused for itself, not a child for whom
'amusement' is a force in its own right (inevitable or not).
Locke wrote, then, of the inappropriateness of giving books to children to
read which demanded a knowledge of the concepts and facts which, he is arguing,
need to be acquired because they are not innate. • He also, in his model of a
development of human understanding, argues against books for children which
would require a fluency of reading skills. Locke seems to have been familiar with
Comenius' Janua or Orbis Sensualium Pictus, and hence with the idea of
translating ideas about specific states of consciousness, or cognitive and
developmental interests, into books. He elaborates on this idea, and advocates the
further development of these books. To Locke, as to the other educators
discussed, whether primarily interested with the gentleman's liberal arts education,
or democratic mass education for literacy, 'amusement' is in the service of the
promotion of cognitive and moral education. Thus, 'amusement', as less force, is
employed by Locke in reaction to his perception of existing duress and loss of
liberty in the teaching and learning situation. Therefore, as with the other
educators discussed, it is the attempt to resolve 'education as force' (teaching as
limiting liberty) in its clash with liberty and virtue that Locke discusses amusement
and education. Locke's amusement cannot be separated from his education, as
children's fiction tends to assume. It is necessary to hold them together to allow
for the statement, that, ultimately, causes much liberal debate: that 'liberty' is
right.
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Locke's education and amusement are as constitutive of each other as his
'child and idiot' and 'man': alleviating an oppression of children in education,
removing discipline and force, constitutes an education which Locke advocates as
being gentle towards the child, and respectful. Locke's concern, in this way, with
/
cognitive and intellectual, and moral and emotional education involves him in the
attempt to present an education which benefits from the child he postulates. To
children's fiction, however much many critics believe in, and admit their belief in,
its capacity to engender knowledge or value in the child, the presence of the child
which it claims was uncovered or revealed by Locke and Rousseau helps to limit
its fears for its own powers: children's fiction seen as a means tot the, maximum
facilitation of cognitive and intellectual development with minimum use of overt
force, or seen as a reflection and expression of a maximum understanding on the
part of the adult author and critic of the child as child - of the liberty of child as
self-constituted presence - both are views determined by concerns for maintaining
narratives of altruistic relations with the non-self.
To Locke 'Vertue ... [is] the first and most necessary of those Endowments,
that belong to a Man or a Gentleman.' 47 Children's fiction writers agree, and
allocate a role to reading in establishing this 'vertue'. Michele Landsberg writes
that
the books I read as a child transformed me, gave meaning and
perspective to my experiences, and helped to mold whatever
imaginative, intellectual, or creative strengths I can lay claim to
now. No doll or game had that impact on me; no pair of new jeans
ever changed my life.48
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Another kind of 'vertue' is required in relation to children's texts by the Austrian
writer Maria Lypp. She regards children's fiction as a form of communication
depending on an 'asymmetrical' relationship between adult author and child
reader. The adaptations the adult author introduces for the child-reader form,
Lypp says, the 'code of children's fiction'. 49 But, she argues, there is an 'ideal of
symmetrical communication.' 50 To Lypp 'symmetrical communication' implies
'wahre Verstândigung' (true understanding) 51 between author and reader: this
concept now becomes a prescriptive criterion for 'good children's fiction'. Maria
Lypp wants to see a striving toward 'symmetrical communication' expressed in the
children's text to make it 'good' or 'literature'. She argues for the appreciation of
'the child's vision' as something inherently valuable and worth preserving and
using. Hence, in Locke, Landsberg, and Lypp, and many other writers on
children's literature, their ideals of personal and social 'vertue' operate strongly
to determine their arguments concerning the relationships - as they see them -
between 'adult' author and 'child' reader. The 'vertue' they advocate may be an
exponent of theological, social, political or cultural narratives of value.
Children's fiction, then, operates within the parameters of discussion of the
writers on liberal arts education, or moral education as part of this. To
educationists such as Locke, Montaigne, Vives, and Luther, moral virtue must be
instilled in the child through and through, and yet they attempt to combine this
with their strong interests in forms of human liberty. Rousseau discusses this same
process, in his terms, in Emile. As with Locke, Rousseau's 'child' (particularised
as Emile) is defined in the areas of interaction between concepts of innocence and
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sin, knowledge and ignorance, reason and chaos, freedom and nature, and nature
and civilization. In Rousseau, even more strongly than in Locke, we see how the
'child' is the product of the paradox of teaching liberty. Peter Gay writes that
Rousseau 'like his favorite philosopher, Plato, ... sought to discover and produce
the moral man who would make the moral society, and a moral society that would
foster the moral man'.52 And, Gay adds,
Rousseau often insisted on the critical importance of education.
Throughout Emile he scatters hints that education and life and, in
particular, education and politics, belong together ... [Rousseau] lays
it down that 'we must study society through individuals, and
individuals through society: those who want to treat politics and
morals separately will never understand anything of either' ....
Occasional diversions apart, Rousseau's work stands under the sign
of civil education - paideia.53
Gay also argues that
Rousseau was not a totalitarian; he was not even a collectivist. If he
was anything, he was, with his fervor for freedom, what his earliest
readers called him: an individualist. But, then, none of these names
reach the heart of Rousseau, for looking beyond politics Rousseau
was above all a moralist, and, as a moralist, an educator.54
Rousseau himself said of all his writings, late in life, that within them he saw
the development of his great principle that nature has made man
happy and sood but that society depraves him and makes him
miserable. Emile in particular, that book that has been so much
read, so little understood, and so poorly appreciated, is nothing but
a treatise on the original goodness of man.55
Emile Rousseau stressed, was a theoretical treatise of this original goodness of
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man, and is strongly linked to his political ideas as he developed them in his Social
Contract.56 As with Luther, Rousseau's child-adult hierarchy, with the child being
allocated a freedom beneath, or within, adult culture and society, is the result of
his views of the general possibilities for a liberty within restriction, as
commensurate with his ideas in the Social Contract. Rousseau is, in moral and
political terms, concerned with resolving the conflicts between his intense interest
in freedom, and his concern for a better society. Gay writes that Rousseau's
'solution is modern, and inextricably intertwined with his educational program.
The society that makes obedience lawful, and lawful obedience practicable, is a
society of Emiles'. 57 Rousseau formulates the problem as follows .. 'To fiaci a tom.
of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the
person and goods of each associate, and in which each, uniting himself with all,
may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.'58 Rousseau's solution,
Gay sums up, 'is the social contract, by which each surrenders all his powers to
the general will; but since each is the general will, he has lost nothing essential
and rather gained what he needs most: civic freedom'.59
It is within the context of the paradox of civil freedom to which Rousseau
suggests a solution, that Emile's education is formulated. Emile is in this sense, as
with Locke's educational and cognitive studies, not devoted to a simple advocacy,
as children's literature criticism would have it, of giving children amusement, or
of making their education amusing: both Locke and Rousseau's 'child' is the
product of their views on the attributes of 'adults" cognitive processes or moral
rights and wrongs of society 'negatived' or 'subtracted', and, as with the humanist
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and 'democratic' educators, functions as part of their suggested solutions to
resolving the conflict between liberty and the demands of a just society or just
God. In Emile Rousseau considers intensely the possibility of liberty for the child.
Liberty does not, to Rousseau, mean leaving the child totally to its own devices,
just as he does not advocate the return of man to the savage, but argues for this
development to a higher civilization in order to become free. Rousseau asks: 'Do
you know the surest way to make your child miserable? Let him have everything
he wants; for as his wants increase in proportion to the ease with which they are
satisfied, you will be compelled, sooner or later, to refuse his demands, and this
unlooked-for refusal will hurt him more than the lack of what he wants.'6°
Rousseau realises that the adult-child hierarchy is inevitable within the
construction of society: adults cannot withdraw from it even by withdrawing
themselves or their rules from the presence of the child; even that constitutes a
presence or rule, and sooner or later the child encounters limits (Rousseau's
comment in this respect also anticipates the perceived failure, within Western
society, of the nineteen-sixties so-called 'anti-authoritarian' methods of raising
children). Rousseau asks: 'Do you not see how cruel it is to increase this servitude
by obedience to our caprices, by depriving them of such liberty as they have? A
liberty which they can scarcely abuse, a liberty the loss of which will do so little
good to them or us.'61 The child's liberty is a specialized liberty, particular to
childhood, part of Rousseau's argument for the specialized concept of 'child' as
a whole. It is a liberty without power that Rousseau sees for the child:
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So there is only one of the child's desires which should never be
complied with, the desire for power. Hence, whenever they ask for
anything we must pay special attention to their motive in asking. As
far as possible give them everything they ask for, provided it can
really give them pleasure; refuse everything they demand from mere
caprice or love of power.62
Rousseau's reference here to understanding the child's motives points to his
invention in Emile, simultaneous to his invention of Emile the child, of the teacher
(or 'adult', or himself as teacher) who has an insight, understanding, and
anticipation of Emile's thoughts, feelings, motives, will, and development, and,
through this far-reaching understanding and insight, a control of those thoughts,
feelings, motives, will, and development. A reading of Emile reveals the dominant
presence, not of the child Emile, but of the teacher Rousseau. Emile has a child's
liberty 'such as they have'; the teacher has the power. To Rousseau, disagreeing
with Locke, the child is strongly defined by its lack of reason and judgement, and
therefore
Use force with children and reasoning with men; this is the natural
order; the wise man needs no laws. Treat your scholar according to
his age. Put him in his place from the first, and keep him in it, so
that he no longer tries to leave it. Then before he knows what
goodness is, he will be practising its chief lesson ... Let him only
know that he is weak and you are strong, that his condition and
yours puts him at your mercy.63
An education for Rousseau's purposes consists of 'well-regulated liberty.'" And,
like Locke, Rousseau clearly states that
there is another point to be considered which confirms the
suitability of this method: it is the child's individual bent, which must
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be thoroughly known before we can choose the fittest moral
training. Every mind has its own form, in accordance with which it
must be controlled ... Oh, wise man, take time to observe nature
65
•••
In line with this, Rousseau wishes that 'some trustworthy person would give us a
treatise on the art of child-study. This art is well worth studying, but neither
parents nor teachers have mastered its elements." Rousseau's child is firmly
wholly within the hierarchy, even as a free individual, as his adult is a free
individual within Rousseau's society. As Rousseau sums up:
Take the opposite course with your pupil: lei him always think he
is master while you are really master. There is no subjection so
complete as that which preserves the forms of freedom; it is thus
that the will itself is taken captive. Is not this poor child, without
knowledge, strength, or wisdom, entirely at your mercy? Are you
not master of his whole environment so far as its affects him?
Cannot you make of him what you please? His work and play, his
pleasure and pain, are they not unknown to him, under your
control? ... He ought to do nothing but what you want him to do.
He should never take a step you have not foreseen, nor utter a
word you could not foretell.°
Children's literature criticism and production, in almost wholly ignoring this
context, and isolating from it loose elements of 'child' and a postulated origin of
an 'education-amusement' divide of which children's fiction is supposed to be the
product, does not identify any need to examine Or resolve the problems of
freedom within restriction - the possibility of moral and emotional liberty of
response for any actual child-reader (as opposed to all the 'child' readers
constructed by adults). It is this ignored issue - drowned by the claims that
children's fiction is simply the ultimate liberator of the fantasy and emotional lives
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of children, that reoccurs, in various guises, again and again in discussions on
children's books. It is these claims of children's literature studies as they stand that
we will review in detail in the next chapter.
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Chapter Five. The 'Norton' Critics: The 'Child' and the Book.
In the previous chapters I have frequently referred forward to a discussion of the
terms of debate within children's literature criticism. Having examined some 'pre-
texts' and 'contexts' for, and established the parameters of, the discussions of
children, education, and reading, and having called into doubt several ideas I have
put forward as being fundamental to children's literature criticism as it stands, in
its several guises, I would now like to examine the details of children's literature
criticism in its own terms, in the light of the ideas explored in the previous
chapters.
As I have repeatedly indicated, children's literature criticism exists by virtue
of claimed differences between adults' and children's cognitive, emotional, and
moral responses to reading, and the attendant allocation of specific books to
adults and children. As a preliminary introduction to the way in which these claims
operate within children's literature criticism it may be illuminating to consider an
article by an adult literary theorist, Karlheinz Stierle, on 'The Reading of Fictional
Texts.' 1 Stierle is interested in examining the relationships, as he sees them,
between 'fictional' texts, 'pragmatic referential' texts, illusion, and reality. Stierle
reveals his vested interest in literary theory unobtrusively: toward the middle of
the article he argues that
the popular novel, in particular, is a form of fiction that
presupposes a quasi-pragmatic reception. Here the act of reading
is only a means to an end: illusion building.2
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Stierle does not approve of this 'illusion building', which he describes also as 'an
act of non-reading'. 3 He claims that
Competent reading of fiction has to pass from quasi-pragmatic
reception to higher forms of reception, which alone can do justice
to the specific status of fiction. Only if the reader is aware of the
great variety of activities entailed in 'reading' does he have a chance
to perform the skills demanded by the text, and to approach it with
the right attitude.4*
To Stierle 'such a reading can only be achieved if the act of reading is
accompanied by theoretical reflection's, and
thus literary theory can provide us with new ways of reading which,
in turn, could give reading a new place in society ... The
communicative function of literature is to be preserved.'
This theory will transcend collections of historical and sociological accounts of how
specific actual readers read specific texts, for 'the fixed accounts of how a specific
literary work has been read are always merely partial accounts whose particularity
never entirely reflects the complex experience of reception. They are marked by
contemporary concepts, conventions, and prejudices, as well as by the particular
interests of the critic.'7
Stierle's concern with the problems of accounting for variable responses to
texts, his interest in promulgating theories which will encourage a high-level and
complex reading of fiction, and his attempts to transcend considerations of
* Emphases are mine.
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historical and sociological accounts of individual readers' responses, collapse,
however, temporarily, early on in his article, under the weight of a brief discussion
of the child as reader. Stierle's somewhat derogatory reference to the 'quasi-
pragmatic' reading of 'trivial literature', which leads to 'illusion building', receives
one exception:
the reading of fiction in terms of mimetic illusion is an elementary
form of reception that has a relative right of its own. Depending on
the vividness of the illusion, the reader may be compelled to
identify with fictional roles. Take, for example, the child's
experience of the imaginary, which is the purest and least restricted
form of this type of reception.8
What is regarded as an unsatisfactory, low-level, 'wrong' way of reading for
Stierle's 'adult' reader becomes, allocated to a Postulated child-reader, 'the purest
and least restricted form of this type of reception.'9 The choice of the positively
connotated terms 'purest' and 'least restricted' indicate a temporary approval of
such reading - 'naive reading' Stierle also calls it - which must, however, be
transcended through maturity. 19 For the child, Stierle further asserts (with
remarkably little concordance, by the way, with even contemporary theories of
child-development) 'the imaginary world of the fairy tale is real presence, its
verbal mediation is skill unperceived. That is why the imaginary, though fixed in
language, may have such a powerful impact on the child? Also, 'the child's
pleasure in repetition reveals his desire to gain control over ... preconceptual
forms of experience like fear, hope, happiness, unhappiness, wonder, and
horror.'12
 Stierle refers, in this context, to Sartre's The Words, which 'strikingly
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illustrates how he, as a child, experienced without reservation an imaginary world
verbally created and how, at the same time, by experiencing this illusory world, he
acquired a consciousness of language and its power to produce illusion:13 Finally,
though the child can still ignore this relationship between illusion
and conceptual coherence, its recognition is a prerequisite to
aesthetic experience once the referential illusion has seriously been
questioned. Only illusion that is sustained by fiction can turn into
aesthetic experience that lasts and does not spend itself with
illusion.14
Stierle's child-reader, so positively identified and characterized, but, in fact, only
one of many conflicting versions, is necessary to conceal the intense prescriptive
morality of his argument: his child-reader has allocated to it those modes of
reading Stierle perceives, and disapproves of, in adults. In the child it is 'pure', in
the adult it pertains to 'trivial literature'. The path to developing the correct ways
of reading includes the experience, but subsequent discarding of 'naive reading'.
Allocated to childhood the type of reading Stierle has constructed as being not the
type of reading he believes would function within his view of society, helping to
create and sustain his view of society, can be relegated to the realms of both
nostalgic reminiscence and temporary primitivism.
In Stierle's criticism the child-reader becomes a safe carrier of aspects of
reading Stierle feels he must acknowledge as operating between readers and texts,
but wishes to confine and contain. This projection of certain types of reading away
from the critic's choice of reading-process may similarly occur on to servants,
different social classes, levels of education - or lack of it -, and cultural
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background. The rejected reading-process is necessary to parts of the description
and definition of the correct or desirable ways of reading. In this way 'illusion
building', 'naive reading', and 'quasi-pragmatic' reading, for instance, are
simultaneously introduced as ways of reading identified by Stierle, and labelled
and marginalised as belonging to 'trivial literature' on 'children'. Stierle's child-
reader is characterized by a trait often identified with a child-reader by adult
critics and authors of children's literature: a child's claimed ability to submerge
into a fantasy world, unaware of textual mediation or the claimed separation
between 'fact' and 'fiction', or 'text' and 'reality'. It is a trait which these 'adults',
as they are represented in Stierle's article and similarly elsewhere, regard with
ambivalence: it is often described as a longed-for capacity, one adults are unable
to recapture, and yet often simultaneously derided as 'naive' or as resulting in an
undesirable 'illusion'.
Claims that child-readers have an ability to, or can only, submerge
themselves in fiction, are part of the larger claims made within children's literature
criticism and discussion concerning the supposedly powerful educational and
developmental functions of children's literature, which are in turn dependent on
a continued separation of 'text' and 'reality'. Masha Rudman, for instance, writes
in her book Children's Literature. An Issues Approach, that 'Books are important
influences on their reader's minds. They can either help or hinder us when we
attempt to construct suitable bases for attitudes and behaviours' 15, and, therefore,
books need to 'be analyzed for their effectiveness as well as for their intent'16.
These claims, echoing the educational theorists I have discussed, from the Greeks
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onward, manifested themselves from early on within children's literary criticism.
Edward Salmon, in his 1890 article "Should Children Have a Special Literature?',
writes:
[Mr. G.A. Henty's] stories lend themselves especially to the
satisfaction of the literary requirements of the multitude. His
'Facing Death' - a story of the coal miners - is as fascinating a work
as I know, and would have a clarion effect on the sympathies and
the better nature of boys and girls.17
Similarly Bernard Lonsdale and Helen Mackintosh argue that they 'are convinced
that literature experiences can make a significant contribution to personality
development and the enrichment of children's lives'. 18 Donna Norton, in her book,
tellingly entitled Through the Eyes of a Child, explains her 'model for evaluating
and selecting books based upon literary and artistic characteristics which readers
can then use themselves. The importance of child development in this process is
also stressed'.19 I have already quoted Nicholas Tucker's idea that 'children ...
sometimes need stimulation in their literature to help them to move away from
certain lazy, immature ways of thinking'.' Michele Landsberg argues that
good books can do so much for children. At their best, they expand
horizons and instill in children a sense of the wonderful complexity
of life ... No other pastime available to children is so conducive to
empathy and the enlargement of human sympathies. No other
pleasure can so richly furnish a child's mind with the symbols,
patterns, depths, and possibilities of civilisation.21
I will review Donna Norton's Through the Eyes of a Child in more detail
here, as it is a strongly representative example of the methods of child-reader and
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child-reading construction of these particular types of critics. These critics, as with
James Axtell, in his discussion of Locke, link their invention of the child-reader
to ideas of a scientific and empirical 'discovery' of the nature of child. Norton (in
the same way as the critics mentioned earlier, and, for instance, Charlotte Huck
in Children's Literature in the Elementary Schoo1 22, Myra and David Sadker in
Now Upon A Time, and James Smith and Dorothy Park in Word Music and
Word Magic', to name just a few examples) explains why she claims that
'literature and literature-related activities nurture child development', based on
'discuss[ing] how appropriate children's literature can promote language
development, cognitive development, personality development, and social
development'26, based on
research in child development [which] has shown that there are
recognizable stages in language and social development. Children
do not progress through these stages at the same rate, but there is
an order through which they mature. The characteristics of children
demonstrated during each stage provide clues that can be used in
selecting appropriate literature; this literature can benefit them
during that stage of development, helping them progress to the next
stage.27
By then discussing several researches into child language development, cognitive
development, and personality development, Norton draws conclusions for the
implications for children's reading. If Martin Braine's recordings of preschool
children's speech show 'a rapid expansion of speech in a short time', then,
Norton, says,
Literature and literature-related experiences can encourage
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language development in these pre-school children. Book
experiences in the home, library, and/or nursery school can help
them use language to discover their world, to identify and name
actions and objects, to gain more complex speech, and to enjoy the
wonder of language .... the add new words to their vocabulary ....
picture books help them give meaning to their expanding
vocabularies .... [provide] practice in naming common objects ....
many excellent books .... allow children to listen to the sounds of
language and experiment with these sounds.29
For elementary-age children, Norton uses Walter Loban's
most extensive, longitudinal study of language development in
school-age children, examining the language development of the
same group of over two-hundred children from the age of five to
eighteen. He found that children's power over language increases
through successive control over forms of language, including the
ability to handle pronouns, verb tenses, and connectors .... Loban
identified several major differences between children ranking high
in language proficiency and those ranking low .... Loban concluded
that greater attention should be given to the development and
instruction of oral language. Due to the fact that literature provides
both a model for language and stimulation for oral and written
activities, it excels in developing language.3°
And, Norton explains, literature stimulates oral and written activities because
'children can relate to [a literary character's] experience and use it to stimulate
their own wild experiences ... Children enjoy using their imagination and turning
the common occurrences of their streets into creative experiences.'31
With regard to cognitive development, Norton refers to Mussen, Conger,
and Kagan, in defining cognition as being the processes involved in
perception ... memory ... reasoning ... reflection .... and insight .... All
these processes are extremely important and are essential for
success during both school and adult life. Each is closely related to
understanding and enjoying literature: without visual and auditory
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perception, literature could not be read or heard; without memory,
there would be no way to see the relationships. among literary works
and to recognize new relationships as experiences are extended.
The cognitive processes can be stimulated by carefully selecting
literature ... that can encourage the oral exchanges of ideas and the
development of thought processes.32
This premise is supported by Norton's mention of research which she says shows
that
early stimulation is also necessary if cognitive development is to
occur; it appears to be so important that children who grow up in
isolated areas without a variety of experiences may be three to five
years behind other children in developing the mental strategies that
aid recal1.33
Norton then discusses 'personality development':
progressing through the stages of personality development is part
of the maturing process; books can play a very important role in
this development. Bibliotherapy, an interaction between reader and
literature in which the ideas inherent in the reading materials can
have a therapeutic effect upon the reader, is frequently suggested
as a means of helping children through various times of stress ....
books in various areas of childhood adjustment such as
hospitalization, loss of a friend, and parents' divorce .... [literature]
can be used to help children understand their feelings, identify with
characters who experience similar feelings, and gain new insights
into how others have coped with those same problems ... It shows
children that many of their feelings are also common to other
children and that they are both normal and natural ... literature
explores the feeling from several viewpoints, giving a fuller picture
and providing the basis for naming that emotion ... actions of
various characters show options for ways to deal with particular
emotions ... it makes clear that one person experiences many
emotions, and that these sometimes conflict.14
Finally, Norton discusses children's social development, or 'socialization':
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socialization refers to the process by which children acquire
behaviour, beliefs, standards and motives valued by their families
and their cultural groups. Socialization is said to occur when
children learn the ways of their groups so that they can function
acceptably within them .... Three processes have been identified as
being the most influential for socialization. • First ... reward and
punishment; ... Second, children acquire many of their responses,
behaviours, and beliefs by observing others. They imitate the
behaviour ... The third process [is] identification [which] requires
emotional ties with the model; children believe they are like these
models and their thoughts, feelings, and characteristics become
similar to them.35
Furthermore Norton writes that
Piaget suggests that between the ages of eight and eleven
considerable changes occur in children's moral development. They
start to develop a sense of equality ... become more flexible ... the
peer-group begins to influence their conduct .... literature ... can aid
in the development of these relationships by encouraging children
to become sensitive to the feelings of others .... One of the greatest
contributions made by literature and literature-related discussions
is the realization that both boys and girls can achieve in a wide
range of roles. Books that emphasize non-stereotyped sex roles and
achievement are excellent models and stimuli for discussion ... An
important part of socialization is to become aware of different
views, and literature is an excellent way of accomplishing this.36
A close examination of these ideas of Donna Norton's leads me to
summarize the implications of her central points for children and their reading as
follows: (with reference to theories of language development) 1) Literature helps
children to progress from one developmental stage to the next, 2) Literature
encourages language development in pre-school children, 3) Literature provides
a model for language, and stimulates oral and written activity, because, 4) children
can relate to a literary character's experience and enjoy using their imagination;
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(with reference to theories of cognitive development) 1) cognitive processes are
necessary to understanding literature, 2) cognitive processes can be stimulated by
carefully selected literature which 3) can encourage the oral exchanges of ideas
and the development of thought processes; (with reference to personality
development) 1) Books can play an important part in children's personality
development, 2) Books can have a therapeutic effect (bibliotherapy), 3) literature
can help to understand feelings, 4) (because) children can identify with characters
in a book who experience similar feelings; (with reference to socialization) 1)
Literature can help children to become sensitive to the feelings of others, 2)
Literature can contribute to children's realization that both boys and girls can
achieve in a wide range of roles, 3) Non-sexist books provide models and stimuli
for discussion, 4) Literature makes children aware of different views.
Donna Norton, and others like her, it should be noted, do not actually
provide any kind of real connection between the empirical research or scientific
theories and the assertions such as those described above. For though they quote
theories such as those of Piaget, and various other researches, relying on their
'factual' or 'reality' value for authority, they almost invariably provide no
explanation for why literature (there is often no reason provided for the use of the
term 'literature' as opposed to 'books' other than the inference that 'literature'
encompasses their 'appropriate' books) and the process of reading literature,
should cause certain educational or developmental goals to be attained. Not only
are they making such broad claims that they are actually saying very little, but
there seems to be no consideration of the question (in books such as Norton's):
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if reading a certain book would cause their 'child' to, for instance, adopt one
opinion rather than another, or to feel an emotion, or to understand an unknown
view; how does reading this literature accomplish this?
These questions are directly involved in debates on the influence of books
and literature on the readers, and the dynamics of reading. It is clear that views
such as Donna Norton's are based on specific assertions concerning the nature of
(children's) reading and thinking. Almost every writer in the area of children's
books makes statements concerning the nature of the effects and influences of
literature and books. The various assumptions are, however, not even self-evident
or unproblematic within the terms of reference of these writers as they sometimes
seem to consider them to be, just as the general premises concerning reading,
learning, reading-influence, and reading-effect are not self-evident or
unproblematic. Jerome Bruner (Actual Minds, Possible Worlds) argues that
we may ... wish to discover how and in what ways text affects the
reader and, indeed, what produces such effects on the reader as do
occur...Can a "psychology" of literature describe systematically what
happens when a reader enters the Dublin of Stephen Daedalus
through the text of 'Portrait'? The usual way of approaching such
issues is to invoke psychological processes ' or mechanisms that
operate in 'real life'.
'But', Bruner concludes, 'such proposals explain so much that they explain very
little. They fail to tell why some stories succeed and some fail to engage the
reader ... And above all, they fail to provide an account of the processes of
reading and of entering a story.'37
Within these terms of special reading-processes which may or may not
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engage a reader, some literary critics have tried to account, in several ways, for
psychological processes of what they describe as 'entering a text'. Several of the
ways in which the readers are said to negotiate a text are mentioned in children's
literary criticism. 'Identification' is a frequently used term describing the way, it
is argued, a child-reader relates to characters in a text: a child may, it is asserted,
recognize these characters as being somehow similar to itself, and be therefore
moved by the character's adventures and feelings as a kind of (re-)experiencing
of its own thoughts and emotions. Judith Thompson and Gloria Woodard use
'identification' in attempting to grasp the dynamics of reading:
One limitation to most of these books, however, is their emphasis
on, identification with, and relevance only to middle class children.
For too many black children, they depict an environment removed
from their immediate experience ... Identification for the young
black reader rests in the central character's intimate knowledge of
the black subculture.38
Dorothy Broderick adds that 'reading [has] to do with the readers' search
for self-identification and their need to learn about persons different from
themselves.'39
 Robert Leeson partially agrees with Thompson and Woodard and
Broderick when he concludes that
it is argued that the working-class child does not want 'only to read
about itself and likes to escape into a different world in its reading.
This is true, but only half the truth. For a full range of reading
experience, the reader needs to identify, to recognise himself or
herself, as well as to escape and have vicarious pleasure or thrills.°
Margaret and Michael Rustin also write: 'Good writing for children both describes
complex mental life, and invites its readers to share in it by identification, the
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narratives themselves providing material for reflection.'41
Gloria Mattera, in discussing possible dynamics of bibliotherapy, identifies
three processes in reading: 'identification' (which she defines, from Russell and
Shrodes, as 'real or imagined affiliation of one's self with a character or group in
the story read', 42); 'catharsis' (defined by Mattera from Spache as the Aristotelian
'feeling of purgation following identification with a character's motivations and
conflicts',43); and 'insight' (defined by Mattera from Spache as 'achieving
awareness of one's own motivations, needs and problems, and considering a
course of action, which, like that of the book character, may lead to successful
solutions:44). It can be noted that all three of Mattera's aspects of reading are
based on, or derived from, initial 'identification'. The duality of functions reading
fulfils in relation to the child, as far as these writers are concerned, is again
reflected in these statements: it is a learning experience as well as emotionally
rewarding and enjoyable in itself. The process of reading is regarded as having to
do with a specific mode of recognition of 'the self' in 'the other', as well as with
learning about that which is different from 'the self'. Epstein suggests that
the appreciation of literature resembles the process of growing up
in that they both involve the discovery of distinctions between the
self and the world: the aim of both is differentiation, concreteness
and the development of a character of one's own. This is why
literature is exciting and why it is, finally, inseparable from life.45
A consideration of what 'identification' is actually meant to be in reading,
and why this term is so extensively used in children's literary criticism, reveals that
the supposed ability of the child to recognise itself in the text, and the child's
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dependence on this ability to, supposedly, understand and emotionally respond to
a text, both explain to the adult critics the nature of children's reading, and some
of the differences between adult literature and children's literature. Children's
literature is legitimized as being necessarily somehow 'different' from adult books,
if children's reading is indeed based primarily on 'identification': for then the
children's books need to provide the grounds for 'identification' by providing the
discovered 'essential' child - or at least a child-image which will offer possibilities
for 'identification' to as many 'real' child-readers as possible. Jacqueline Rose,
again, disputes even the most basic possibility of this when she argues that 'the
idea that "children's literature's" main quality is that it speaks to children -all
children -ignores the socio-economic, political and cultural divisions in which all
of society, including children and language, are caught.' 46 J.R.R. Tolkien agrees
with Rose: 'Children as a class - except in a common lack of experience they are
not [a class].'47
But even the very notion of 'identification' itself is discussed as being
inherently problematic, besides leading critics back to the problem of lack of
consensus on the 'essential child', for: what does it actually mean to these critics
to 'identify' with a character in, or part of, a book? Anthony Storr writes that
reading which produces an emotional effect rather than conveying
information does not put things into the mind, but rather objectifies
contents which are already present. If this were not so, we should
be unable to react emotionally to a book at all. There has to be a
lock within us which the key of the book can fit, and if it does not
fit, the book is meaningless to us.'8
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If 'identification' thus refers to that key fitting into that lock, that moment of
understanding in which the reader supposedly must then feel or think something
like: 'yes! I have felt/thought/seen/heard that myself and so I know what this
means or feel as this feels', the 'identification' is nothing other than a cover-term
for the possibility any reader has of comprehending any text (or an other person,
or culture) from within the confines of his own experience. And, as Bruner
pointed out, this can be said to explain so much that it explains very little. It does
not explain how people, as readers or in general, can then ever come to
understand anything different or new, or how and why persons look for and
recognise themselves in what is not-themselves.
'Identification', in adult literary criticism, is as problematic a term as in
children's literary criticism, as Bruner's criticisms of the concept indicate. The
notion of 'identification' as the basis for the dynamics of reading seems to offer
little illumination of the problems the children's literature critics try to discuss,
limiting them, as it does, exclusively to some sort of image of the child (or any
reader) perpetually reading 'itself. D.W. Harding, similarly, wrote: 'Popular
borrowings from psychology have made great play with the ideas of identification
and vicarious satisfaction as basic processes in the reader's response ... if they are
not taken literally -and in this context they never are - they are nothing but fancy
labels for much more familiar and ordinary processes, chiefly for imaginative
insight into what another person may be feeling, and the contemplation of
possible human experiences which we are not at the moment going through
ourselves.'" Harding, instead, argues that 'what is spoken of as "identification"
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with a character in a novel or play is a high degree of empathy with his supposed
experience and an intensely interested contemplation of the events he takes part
in.'" Harding goes on to reformulate other terms conventionally used to describe
the dynamics of reading. He rejects, for instance, the notion of 'wish-fulfilment'
in reading: 'No wish is literally fulfilled ... More accurately, [the readers] and the
author are engaged in wish formulation or definition ... one variety of the
technique by which in everyday social intercourse we invite each other to
contemplate, and to evaluate, possible events and outcomes.' 51 Harding also feels
that any 'imaginative sharing' of the reader of experiences with characters in a
novel provides 'a hopelessly incomplete account of what goes on between reader
and novel .... Even for naive readers this is much less than the whole process', and
he suggests that besides empathising with the characters, we also evaluate what
they do, and, in some measure, accept and reject values implied by the interests
and attitudes of the author.52
Sara Goodman Zimet examines the discussion concerning the 'effects' and
'influences' of reading. Zimet starts out by listing what is involved in these ideas
about reading, and we find on this list many of the beliefs that writers on
children's books, such as Donna Norton, seem to adhere to:
Most people believe that reading is essential if we wish to function
even at a minimal level in today's technological society .... Print, in
[religion and social reformers through history], was believed to be
the catalyst for social reform and eternal happiness in this life ....
Inspired by the belief that what is read does indeed influence the
reader ... they believe, therefore, that the printed message is an
instrument of socialization .... Maslow (1954) and Bernard (1961)
have suggested that books have a favourable influence on children's
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personality development ... Singh (1973) and Howe (1971) contend
that gross stereotypes, subtle distortions and omissions in references
to females, racial, ethnic and social class groups in children's
literature and textbooks play a direct part in forming children's
attitudes towards themselves and towards others .... But,
Zimet asks, 'what do we actually know about what reading does for us or to us?'53
She then goes on to discuss research in the area of reading and reading-influence.
Zimet locates the reason for the lack of extensive research in the problem of the
complexity of unravelling the effects of reading from the many other possible
sources of influence:
... there are so many other factors operating at the same time. Peer
pressure, family and community values, religious beliefs and so on -
all impinge on the individual to create his or her particular value
system.54
Zimet mentions personal testimony as one proof of the influence of books, and
singles out Smith's research (1948) 55, in which over five-hundred fourth-, fifth- and
sixth-grade students were asked how they were influenced by reading, and
Shirley's (1969) 56 study of a group of 240 secondary pupils concerning this same
question. Lind (1936) and Weingarten (1954) 57 asked college students how they
were influenced by reading. Zimet reports that
all four groups indicated that their attitudes, ideas and behaviour
were affected [but] the similarity within groups and between groups
ended here. On the one hand, there was tremendous variability
among individuals as to how they thought their attitudes, values and
behaviour were influenced. On the other hand, not all books
affected all individuals in the same way. Thus, the intent of an
author either to persuade, to inform or to entertain may produce
a response in the reader that had not been anticipated.58
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In discussing research into the effects of reading in children on attitudes towards
minority groups, Zimet goes on to relate that
all four investigators [Jackson, 1944; Fisher, 1965; Tauran, 1965;
Litcher and Johnson, 1967] reported significant changes. When
characters belonging to minority groups were presented in a
favourable light the attitudes of the readers moved in a positive
direction..., when characters belonging to minority groups were
presented in an unfavourable light, attitudes of readers moved in a
negative direction.59
But Zimet emphasizes that the studies do not make clear whether the students
were not simply conforming to the wishes of the teacher, rather than responding
to their reading, and 'there is therefore some room for doubt about the extent to
which attitudes were genuinely influenced.'60
 In any case, she adds, Jackson's study
found possible changes of attitude to have become undetectable only two weeks
after the initial experiment.61
Other studies Zimet discusses (Fisher, 1965; Biskin and Hoskinsson, 1975)62
demonstrated that in examining the difference between the effects of reading
alone and reading combined with discussion, it appeared that reading combined
with discussion had greater effects than reading on its own, and that in Biskin and
Hoskinsson's work 'discussion was demonstrated to be a crucial factor in
determining the impact of the reading experience.' 63 A similar result was obtained
from studies on bibliotherapy (Russell and Shrodes, 1950) 64, suggesting that
therapeutic goals 'are not accomplished simply by reading the printed page,
however. Discussions of the reading material with a therapist are considered
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crucial to the success of such a programme.' 65 Dianne Monson and Bette Peltola
mention researches with similar conclusions (Hayes, 1969; Lancaster, 1971;
Mattera, 1961)66 in their annotated bibliography of research in children's
literature. Gloria Mattera, in her research Bibliotherapy in a Sixth Grade, felt
unable to allocate responsibility for positively judged changes to reading without
admitting that the results might be attributed equally to teachers' attitudes,
increased or different teacher involvement with pupils in her experimental
(bibliotherapy) group, or combinations of factors. She concluded that
one of the strongest sources of evidence for support of the
hypothesis was the observation of the investigator. No assertion is
made that books alone produced a change in behaviour, or that
these changes were permanent, but day-to-day observation of the
children produced evidence that the b6oks used in individual and
group bibliotherapy were helping children to solve their personal
problems.°
However, Mattera adds,
[this] main hypothesis was not supported by the results of the
California Test of Personality. According to these results, the
children in the experimental group were less well-adjusted than they
were at the beginning of the study. The control group made no
significant change.68
Mattera tries to explain this discrepancy, and substantiate her claims for reading-
influence, by speculating that the experimental group had acquired a 'broader and
deeper insight into their own and others' problems... Thus, the California Test of
Personality was less valid...' 69 Some researches seemed to demonstrate some
effects of reading (on its own) as bibliotherapy or in changing attitudes of racial
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prejudice, but these also seemed to be open to interpretation in the light of
Zimet's caveat concerning pupils' possible efforts to comply with teachers, (such
as supplying responses deemed desired to questionnaires; Appleberry, 1969) 70,
and/or concerned specific small groups (one class of pupils from an 'academic'
highschool; Frankel, 1972)71. Only Lewis (1966) • is reported as measuring
significant effects of reading (on its own) 72. All researchers seem to agree
concerning the difference of the impact of reading combined with discussion to
reading on its own, and the difficulty of ascertaining any decisive influence of
reading above, for instance, improved teacher-pupil or parent-child interaction as
a result of the introduction of experiments with reading and books.
Even with researches using the same terminology of a 'real' child and
reading-influence, then, it seems that assertions such as those of Norton were
difficult to validate. This may not invalidate such 'educators" works either, though,
since most teacher's and librarian's guides, such as those of Norton, Sadker and
Sadker, Glazer and Williams, and Lonsdale and Mackintosh, are very much
concerned with the totality of what they call 'experiencing' literature. As teachers'
guides they often consider children's books in the context of classroom discussions,
drama, or play, and as such attempt to guide teachers' ideological and emotional
ideals and commitments, and, subjugated to these directives, acquaint them with
children's books seen in those terms. They do not discuss or acknowledge
discussions concerning specific differences between possible effects of reading on
its own, and reading and discussion, or the dependence of their educational goals
on uniform interpretations of the text by all readers, or the implications of
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continued and consistent reinforcement in all areas (not only reading) of
'desirable' ideas and ideologies. And in failing to address these issues, they still
help to obscure the discussions on children, children's books, and children's
literature (in this field where all works on children's literature are still very much
taken together), allowing the assumptions and assertions about children and
reading to operate as 'truth' and 'reality', unquestioned and unconsidered.
Aside from discussions within empirical reserch, however, there are also
other theoretical models and ideas within the fact/fiction model that point to
different assumptions from those of these critics. As Gordon Bower and Ernest
Hilgard warn in their Theories of Learning:
To move from [learning] theory to [educational] practice is not all
that easy. The naive view is that the basic researcher stocks a kind
of medicine cabinet with aids to solve the problems of the teacher.
When a problem arises, the teacher can take a psychological
principle from the cabinet and apply it like a bandage or ointment
to solve the educational problem.73
Barry Wadsworth, for instance, also examines the implications of the much-quoted
Piaget for children's reading, in his Piaget for the Classroom Teacher. He
concludes that texts must be meaningful to children in order to be comprehended
in the wider sense, and that 'who knows what words are meaningful to the
individual child? The child knows!' 74 From this premise, Wadsworth goes on to
emphasize that teachers should
ensure that any written language experience is meaningful to the
individual child. This does not mean selecting an appropriate grade-
level reading book ... There is no reason to believe that the words
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and sentences in these texts will be meaningful to the individual
child.75
He acknowledges that this type of 'matching' of each individual child to a book
is time-consuming for the teachers, but repeats that this is what should happen.
The difficulty perceived in ascertaining the reading needs of the pupils,
whether by generalized ability or issues (such as with the educators), or in the
individual child, is addressed by Jeneva Lewis' research into A Comparison of
Kindergarten Teachers' Perceptions of Children's Preferences in Books with the 
Children's Actual Preferences. 76 Lewis' conclusion was that teachers were only
able to predict pupils' tastes in two of six possible categories of books (with
'children in general' and 'history and science', but not with 'children in ghetto
areas', 'Negro heritage', 'animals', and 'fantasy').77 Carleton Washburne and Mabel
Vogel argued that strong differentiations in their results concerning children's
reported enjoyment of books read were 'due to the difference between books
freely selected and those required ..., there are certain factors that apparently
influence a particular child to read a book which usually is interesting only to
children of much higher or lower degrees of reading ability. These factors
outweigh those which result in the book's being classified as belonging to a certain
grade.'78 Wadsworth also draws the conclusion from Piaget's theories that
reading does not become an agent in the child's thinking - an
operative instead of a figurative activity - until formal operations
are established...Furth (1970) states that propositional thinking does
not typically develop until the ages of eleven or twelve, not
permitting the joining of reading and thinking until that time. It is
during the period of formal operations that reading can play a part
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in expanding the intellect of the child and can become a challenging
operative activity.79
'Eleven or twelve', it should be noted, is considerably older than the ages at which
the children's literature criticism mentioned above starts to emphasize the
beneficial effects of children's reading (from babyhood onwards), while they also
claim to base themselves on Piaget, or theories derived from Piaget's stages of
cognitive development. Part of the reason, also perhaps, that such divergent claims
can be made for children's reading on the grounds of one theoreticians' work,
under the pressures of intent and purpose, may be because, as Wadsworth points
out, Piaget himself did very little research into reading as such, and when asked
at a conference once about reading, apparently replied he had no opinion on it.8°
In the discussions represented up to this point children's literature critics
and writers on children and reading reflect different views on reading and its place
in the 'child world' they assume. These discussions are determined by hopes and
wishes for the effects or non-effects of reading on 'children' and 'adults', produced
by socio-political, cultural, and personal needs and ideals, analogous to the
representation of the formulations of values and ideals by the educators discussed
in previous chapters. We can find further analogies to the educators' arguments
and purposes throughout children's fiction criticism and its views concerning
'children', 'adults', and books.
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Chapter Six. 'Children's' Literature Criticism and 'Adult' Literature Criticism.
The influence and effects of children's literature, as asserted by children's
literature critics such as Donna Norton, Michele Landsberg, the Sadkers, Masha
Rudman, Edward Salmon, and many others, are not- only questioned by rivalling
interpretations and arguments concerning the reading-process, and the
consequences of literacy, but in further ways by other types of children's literature
critic. These differences are also expressed with reference to varying concepts of
child-readers, and their reading, at cognitive, emotional, and ideological (socio-
political) levels, just as the varied theoretical and empirical arguments mentioned
earlier address themselves to these issues with differing results. The most crucial
difference between the critics like Norton, who assume recognizable unified
influences from reading, and a second category of critics, hinges on generalization
and individualization: that is to say, the 'Norton' type critics are ideologically
committed to attempting to ascertain a predictability and uniformity of response
of children to (certain) books (comparable to Luther), while another group of
critics are ideologically committed to the individuality and non-predictability of
children's response to books and literature (comparable to Erasmus). I shall thus
henceforth refer to the 'Norton-critics', on the one hand, and to the second group
of critics as the 'pluralists', with reference to their central interest in allowing for
a plurality in the interpretations and uses individual children, they say, attach to
books. The pluralists are mostly opposed to, and critical of, the Norton critics'
critical attempts to discuss children, reading, and books, but have largely found it
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impossible to deal with the presence of some concept of 'child' in connection with
the field of children's books. The pluralists, too, assign powerful functions and
influence to reading for 'children', but now with varying and unpredictable
responses and results.
The pluralists' disagreements with the Norten critics spring from two main
points: firstly, the pluralists observe not only that, in their view, individual children
seem to make significantly different uses and interpretations of books, but also,
secondly, that the Norton critics disagree amongst themselves, not about the claim
that books influence children, but concerning the actual influences these books
may have. This second point, the actual varying interpretations made by the
Norton critics of books on behalf of children,, is unsolvable: assuming different
child-readers leads to different interpretations. Effectively, this undermines the
Norton critics' critical efforts to a great extent. Important social issues such as
racism, for instance, have lead Norton critics with the same anti-racist orientation
to differ utterly in their judgement of a book: Bob Dixon praises Paula Fox's The
Slave Dancer as being 'a novel of great horror and as great humanity ...
[approaching] perfection as a work of art", while Sharon Bell Mathis calls it 'an
insult to black children' 2, and Binnie Tate claims it 'perpetuates racism ... [with]
constantly repeated racist implications and negative illusions [sic]'3. Donna Norton
mentions Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn, amongst others, as being at the centre
of a similar controversy4. The assumption of the books' influencing children makes
these issues crucial: does, or can, The Slave Dancer perpetuate racism or does it
counteract it?
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If we examine some of the pluralists' views in detail we will see how this
individualization of response, whether of the critic herself, or of the critic on
behalf of a postulated child-reader, is central to their clashes with the Norton
critics. That the clash of opinions leads to heated debates becomes apparent not
only in Dixon, Mathis and Tate's opposing views, but also, for instance, if we look
at the author Jan Needle's critiques of Michele Landsberg's Reading For the Love 
of It. Landsberg, as we saw earlier, is a classic Norton critic, who believes
passionately in the importance of the pleasure she feels books provide children
with, and in their enrichment of the child's emotional and intellectual capacities.
She does not advocate censorship or restriction of children's bookchoices, but
feels that
adult responsibility ... is not to deny, but to add, enrich, stimulate,
amplify. To turn away with an indifferent shrug from helping
children to choose books is not good enough. If anything goes,
nothing matters. And children's literature does matter ... intensely.6
With this view in mind Landsberg sets out to show in her book, 'step by step, how
any adult can become a skilled and confident chooser of the best books for the
particular child.'7
 Jan Needle criticizes Landsberg's book for its 'total lack of
doubt' in its correctness in picking books for children, according to what he calls
their 'respectability factor'. Needle adds that 'the fact that Landsberg's book is
now being used in colleges of Education in Canada filled me with despair.' Jan
Needle argues that 'adult' critics cannot predict the uses to which a child will put
a book. Like Needle, the author Nina Bawden protests against many reviewers'
142
and critics' habit of treating 'children' as 'an object. in a sociological survey, an
unformed creature without will or thought of his own, to be tamed, educated,
never learned from - forced into their way of thinldng.'8
Another article discussing unpredictability and individuality of this 'child's'
involvement with reading is Elaine Moss' 'The "Peppermint" lesson'. 9 In this
article, Moss explains how her daughter, Alison, became attached to a book
(Peppermint) about an initially unwanted kitten, that is finally given to a little girl,
who loves it, and wins first prize in the Cat show with it. Moss describes the book:
Like the words, the pictures are totally without distinction. Comic-
style kids and cats, blobby colours, accentuated sashes and splashes.
Totally expendable, one would have thought: a watered-down,
vulgarized 'Ugly Duckling'.10
She then goes on to explain what later occurred to her as being the reason for
Alison's attachment to the book: 'Alison is an adopted child ... she was taken
home, like Peppermint, to be loved and cared for and treasured.' 11 Elaine Moss
adds that a 'technically efficient and typographically superior' 12 book explaining
adoption to pre-school children, which she had provided her daughter with, did
not seem to inspire the same reaction as Peppermint. Moss concludes that this
type of 'artistically worthless book - hack-written and poorly illustrated 213 may
therefore 'be more important to that child's development than all the Kate
Greenaway Medal-winning books put together.'14
Gillian Avery amplifies on these views, writing that
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what occurs to me amid the welter of theory that has always gone
on about what a child should read is the encouraging thought that
you never know what he is going to make of the material with
which you confront him. He has his own defence against what he
doesn't like or doesn't understand in the book that is put in front
of him. He ignores it, subconsciously perhaps, or he makes
something different from it ... they extract what they want from a
book and no more.15
Peter Dickinson in his 'Defence of Rubbish' 16 argues, like Elaine Moss, that it may
sometimes be those books that he defines as 'rubbish ... all forms of reading
matter which contain to the adult eye no visible value either aesthetic or
educational' 17, which a child, or children, may put to some use, or enjoy. Briefly,
Dickinson suggests children might use 'rubbish' to learn about aspects of a culture;
to feel they are part of a group; to discover for themselves what they enjoy
reading or might come to prefer; because 'easy' reading might provide a
psychological sense of security, comfort, or reassurance; because people in general
might be better off with a mixture of 'good' and 'bad' reading (Dickinson feels this
is a 'more nebulous' point); and because, finally, 'children' may perceive qualities
or values in something 'adults' would automatically dismiss. 18 D.W. Harding
supports this kind of idea when he speculates that
children have to make delayed discoveries of what they have in
some sense known a long time - whether about Santa Claus or sex
or religion. From this angle there may be a thoroughly valid defence
of novels that offer an improbably sweetened taste of experience.19
What is typical, however, is that in both Dickinson's and Harding's statements we
again see expressed defining views of 'children' and their reading: even in pleading
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for the freedom to choose to read 'rubbish' Dickinson and Harding use arguments
based on the 'good of "the child". Their assertions, thus, are not in such direct
opposition to the Norton critics' views as they may seem. They only actually differ
in defining what books are 'appropriate' to their 'child's' development. Dickinson
includes 'rubbish', and Harding 'improbably sweetened' novels, as 'appropriate' in
the sense of fulfilling constructive functions in children's growth. The result of
views such as those of Needle, Moss, or Avery, or those of Dickinson and
Harding, are the same: they attempt to subvert the self-assigned role of the
Norton critic as the selector of books for children in accordance with an assigned
predictable response, whether it is because the pluralists claim that 'an adult'
cannot predict for 'a child' what a book will mean or be to her, or whether it is
because, as Dickinson claims, all books may have some function for the child-
reader.
The pluralists' views clash with the Norton critics' views on the nature of
the influence of books only at this particular level: if, as the pluralists claim, the
child-reader can, or does, filter out what it cannot comprehend, absorbs mainly
only what it is capable of dealing with, or transforms the books according to its
personal emotional (or other) needs and desires, then the books cannot function,
as the Norton critics assume they do, purely as a kind of critic-fed supply-line of
new data for the entirely - emotionally and cognitively, unlike in Locke - 'tabula
rasa' child. However, most critics, 'Norton' or pluralist, both equally discern an
important role for reading with respect to children. It is, essentially, the role of the
critic, and, attendant upon that, the type of 'freedom' to be allocated to the child-
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readers, that the critics disagree on.
Other attempts by critics to develop critical approaches to children's books
which break away from the Norton critics' methods, also prove similarly
problematic. Lillian Smith, for instance, in her book The Unreluctant Years, first
states her intention of 'consider[ing] children's books as literature, and
discover[ing] some of the standards by which they can be so judged ... They are
a portion of universal literature and must be subjected to the same standards of
criticism.'20 Here are some of the typical comments Smith then makes: 'children
may not consciously recognize their search for lasting truth in their indiscriminate
reading of fairy tales ... and all the variety of literature that brings delight and
rouses a warm response in their minds'21 ; and:
there is much in Gulliver's Travels that children cannot understand.
They take what they like from it; and what they like best is the
inexhaustible imagination that pictured and peopled the Lilliputian
world ... To them it is a story as alive today as when it first
appeared in 1726.22
Another such self-styled 'literary' critic is Dorothy Neal White, who writes that
adults out of touch with children's books frequently infer that the
bad book can have only two vices, immorality and bad grammar. If
a book is not littered with split infinitives, and does not incite its
reader to arson or robbery with violence, it is assumed to be
harmless ... The worst fault in present-day children's books is not
any flagrant departure from formal grammar, but the colourless,
dull, passionless use of language which ultimately ruins for a child
his sense of the resources and vitality of the English tongue.23
Just a few lines down, Dorothy White is condemning books on the grounds of
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'snobbery'24 and the 'mishandling of personal relationships.' 25 These 'literary'
critics are still reading on behalf of their vision of the child-reader; they are still
inhabiting their 'child' mind.
The assumed nature of the education-amusement divide as the
establishment of children's fiction as an educational non-force, as I discussed in
previous chapters, leads to these repeated attempts to establish 'literary' criteria
for children's fiction which are asserted to function in the same way as 'adult
literary criticism' (which adult literary criticism?!): an 'affective' fallacy seems to
be duly accounted for, and yet, as we saw with Lillian Smith and Dorothy White,
the 'child-readers" supposed feelings, responses, preferences, and needs, pervade
their criticism. Thus children's literary criticism overwhelmingly cannot rid itself
of all these 'child-readers', as it seems to want to do by referring to 'literary'
criteria, by which they seem to mean some absolute, child-independent qualities
of text. Functioning, without fully realising it, however, as the last moral out-post
of the liberal arts educational ideals, the children's literature criticism remains
directed and controlled by an unacknowledged power: the fundamental
assumption that 'appropriate' or 'good' literature (as opposed to 'books' as a
whole) will influence, or affect, and, with a bit of luck, influence in desirable ways.
This is the case with 'Norton', 'pluralist', and 'literary' critics. Joan Glazer and
Gurney Williams find themselves, as a consequence of both trying to account for
variability in child-reader response, and for the 'adult' critics' 'child-reader'
response, writing that: 'good' children's books have to do with 'strong materials -
good plots, rich settings, well-developed characters, important themes, and artistic
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styles ... bold and imaginative language' 26, and that this 'freshness ... comes from
the author. And in the author it begins with an understanding of who the child
is.'27; but even if children do not like these 'good' books, they may still be
good literature ... built of strong materials ... the likes and dislikes
of children do not determine the quality of literature ... Books must
be judged as literature on their own merits. And children should be
given excellent literature.28
The paradox of these statements hinges on the question of whether the attraction
of a book, for their child-readers, does indeed lie in some essential truth about
'the child' being grasped by a children's book author. If this would be the case
then these children would love books these critics claim are good because of their
identification of this essential child in the works. It should be noted that, if this is
the case, then the critics are assuming they do indeed have the capacity to identify
this crucial 'essential child' within the books on behalf of children (in practice this
is, of course, the assumption most critics are working on anyway). If children don't
feel attracted to books which critics claim contain the 'essential child', then the
adult critics cease to have any function for their child reader: on what other basis
can they link the child to the book?
Bernard Lonsdale and Helen Mackintosh, like Glazer and Williams, seem
to want to establish a distinction between 'literary' qualities and child-reader
suitability, which they then also almost simultaneously undermine by referring back
to the child as a measure of these 'literary' qualities. They advocate that teachers
guide children through literature by, firstly, knowing what children 'are like at
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[various] years of age; what their reading interests are; what [their] reading skills;
what their attitudes are towards reading' 29, and, secondly, by knowing 'what
literature is - what makes a book a good book; what authors and illustrators are
contributing to a rich body of literature for boys and girls; how are the stories
geared to the needs, interests, and abilities of children.' 30 Donna Norton, similarly,
writes that
the criteria usually used to evaluate children's fiction include
elements of plot, characterization, setting, theme, style, and point
of view. Also, it is necessary to be concerned with other
characteristics: relevance, suitability, potential popularity, and the
development of nonstereotypes in the literature.31
Michele Landsberg defines literary 'merit' as deriving from the following issues:
Is the language original, fresh, and interesting? Are the characters
wooden, or do they live and breathe on the page? Do they speak in
individual voices, so you can tell who's talking just by the characteristic
speech patterns? ... If it's a fantasy, does the author create a
believable world, no matter how strange, and abide by the rules of
that world so that your belief in it is never shaken, or do you come
thudding back to the banal commonplace with maddening regularity?
If the story is an adventure, does it convince you?32,
and Landsberg adds that 'the point of developing such [critical expertise] ... is that
good books can do so much for children.'33
Nicolas Tucker, as already discussed, also suggested that attaining a type of
psychological accuracy or truth concerning the nature of 'the child' is precisely a
part of 'literary' quality in a children's book. We have already examined the
problematic aspects of the acceptance of these assumptions with reference to
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children's reading. Supposed possibilities for 'identification', taken as the primary
basis of referral for examining and explaining children's reading and children's
literature lead us back to the attempts to define the 'essence' of 'child' as the
measure of children's book quality and characteristics, and an acceptance of the
predictability and uniformity of children's reading-response. All these ideas point
us back to attempting to determine 'the truth' about 'the child', and ascertaining
which book captures this in the 'best' way, and require us to claim that both the
essential attraction for children of 'good' books, and the very defining
characteristic of 'good' books, lies in the capturing of these 'truths' about
childhood. Tucker and other Norton critics feel able to sustain this line of
argument by relying on assumptions concerning the dynamics of reading, and, for
instance, their interpretation of Piaget's theories (or on any other theory or image
they approve of) as supplying sufficient measure of 'the truth' about 'the child' to
determine the quality of the books they evaluate. .
Whether these Norton critics concentrate on psychology or pedagogy, they
also, clearly, feel the necessity of referring to this elusive 'literary' side of texts.
They all somehow express the idea that though books may contain desirable (to
them) psychological, psychoanalytical, moral, ethical, or social 'messages' (relying
on assumptions of uniform interpretation), they have to take into account how
these 'messages' are put into words. Donna Norton argues: 'Children need to
listen to and read fine literature and appreciate that authors not only have
something to say but also that they say it extremely well'. We can thus see that
the attempted separation of self-defined 'child-based' and 'literary' judgements is
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not sustained: the critics' conclusion comes down to the claim that the 'literary'
quality of children's books depends on either the authors', or the critics',
knowledge of the 'truth' about 'the child'. Other examples of this type of claim are
the writings of critics and authors such as Elisabeth Nesbitt: 'The best writers of
children's books ... permitted children to dance and to dream, to laugh and to cry,
... they protected and nourished the capacity for wonder in children' 35; E.B. White:
You have to write up, not down. Children are demanding .... they
accept, almost without question, anything you present them with, as
long as it is presented honestly, fearlessly and clearly ... they love
words that give them a hard time 36,
Leon Garfield: 'One writes so that children can understand, which means writing
as clearly, vividly and truthfully as possible ... words, must live for children, so
must people'37; and Joan Aiken:
Children have a strong natural resistance to phoney morality. They
can see through the adult with some moral axe to grind almost before
he opens his mouth.38
'Real child readers', as we have seen, are now entities excluded from this 'literary'
or 'educational' discussion: as Glazer and Williams put it, 'the likes and dislikes
of children do not determine the quality of literature'39.
Some children's literature criticism, however, in its moral conviction of
acting for the good of the child, has tried to acknowledge the inconsistencies,
variations and paradoxes in its constant struggle to preserve the image of being
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able to take into account, in one blow, both a book's predicted appeal to child-
readers, and the adult's critical evaluations. There are studies which perceive
unbridgeable gaps between books that, it is claimed, children seem to want to
read, and the books the adults claim they want them to love to read. Donna
Norton quotes Carolyn Bauer and LaVonne Sanbome's research, which identified,
on a list of 193 books which had won reader's choice awards, (only) 39 books
which were also winners of literary merit awards. 4° Carleton Washbume and
Mabel Vogel, authors of What Children Like to Read (the Winnetka graded book
list), also ran into the difficulty of simultaneously recognizing and reconciling their
view of what children seemed to prefer to read, with the adult critics' choices: 'On
the basis of [collected] data this graded book list has been prepared ... Books that
were [however] definitely trashy or unsuitable for children, even though widely
read, have not been included in this list.'41 They then go on to admit that there
was, for instance, one series of books that was reported read by nine hundred
children, and reported as enjoyed by 98 percent of them, but which was left off
the list because all the adult critics rated the series as 'trashy'.42 Alternatively, they
also left books off the list which the adult critics had highly recommended (such
as Thackeray's The Rose and the Ring, and Grahames The Wind in the Willows),
because, they write, the children would not read them, even after having been
specifically asked to do so in order to provide an opinion for the graded book
list.43
The inherent paradoxes of these systems of children's literature criticism
also emerge in the actual critical judgements of specific books, as I have implied
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throughout: differently constructed child-readers, based on the needs, desires, and
opinions of the critics, lead to different critical views and recommendations. We
already noted the clash of opinions on Paula Fox's The Slave Dancer, and Jan
Needle's condemnation of Michele Landsberg's recommended booklist as being
composed according to a 'respectability factor'. The, in itself unending, argument
of which books actually can be defined as 'children's books' or 'children's
literature' also reflect the various views on what in books constitutes this quality
of 'child', and hence is regarded as defining the literary quality of the book, as we
have seen. The definition of 'books written by adults for children' is inadequate,
relying as it does almost exclusively on existing statements of conscious authorial
intent, and so excluding the shifts of books in and out of the category of
'children's books'. If, by analogy to approximate differentiations made between
'books' and 'literature' in general terms ('approximate', because, after all, the
question of what defines literature can hardly be said to have been unanimously
resolved), we take 'children's literature' to be used as referring to a select group
of 'children's books', constituting a canon, or supposedly qualitatively distinguished
selection of books, then problems of definition occur especially toward the 'upper
end' of this canon. The ubiquitously quoted Alice's Adventures in Wonderland,
for instance, is quite happily discussed by many 'adult' literary critics, and
considered part of the adult literary canon.
Some critics simply consider the 'best' children's books (in Britain these may
be Charles Kingsley's The Water Babies, Lewis Carroll's 'Alices', Kenneth
Grahame's The Wind in the Willows, J.R.R. Tolkien's Lord of the Rings trilogy,
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or Richard Adams' Watership Down) to be 'adult' books, leaving as 'children's
books' those negatively defined as being 'any book with some connection with
children not considered as being good enough for the (adult) literary canon'. This
attitude, and definition, is consistent with the low level of prestige children's books
and children's book criticism, are considered to have within literary circles, where
children's books seem to be regarded as predominantly a form of popular or
trivial book, or as educational tools, as Zohar Shavit pointed out. John Rowe
Townsend agrees with Zohar Shavit when he declares that
surveys of children's books are numerous, and so are aids to book
selection, but discussion at any length of the work of individual
contemporary writers is scarce. Such discussions may be thought
unnecessary. I know from conversations over a period of years that
there are intelligent and even bookish people to whom children's
literature by definition is a childish thing which adults have put away
...[they] regard such an interest [in children's fiction] as an oddity, an
amiable weakness.44
Julia Briggs supports this view, and argues, as Shavit also does, that 'the study and
criticism of children's books ... is largely neglected in British universities ...
children's books are commonly relegated to education departments, which regard
their study as an aspect of teacher training rather than an end in itself.'45
Children's books have been studied from sociological and psychological
points of view much as popular fiction has, with books such as the Winnetka
Graded Book List; A.J. Jenkinson's What do Boys and Girls Readr6; Jean
Kujoth's Reading Interests of Children and Young Adults47; George Norvell's The
Reading Interests of Young People; and the School Council's Children and their
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Books49, providing statistical analyses, graphs, and charts, of reading ages, abilities,
interests, and preferences, in various groups of children. But it is seen as inherent
to the status of 'children's' fiction that it is not a central study object of 'literary
criticism', other than, occasionally, for re-evaluative or comparative purposes.
There have been linguistic studies of popular fiction and children's books, but
'adult' literary criticism is self-defining in its attention to what it considers 'literary'.
A 'skimming-off' of the 'best' children's books to the adult canon is regarded as
refusing children's books as a whole any recourse to these methods of literary
criticism. But it is part of the basing of all children's fiction criticism on 'the child'
as separate from 'the adult'.
The specific attempts to provide definitions of 'children's fiction' obviously
reflect the entire effort to invest 'the child' and 'the adult' with constitutive and
distinctive essences. Again: within the attempts to formulate a definition various
critics emphasize problems to a greater or lesser extdrit, but the limitations of the
debate coincide with Nicholas Tucker's statement that 'although most people
would agree that there are obvious differences between adult and children's
literature, when pressed they may find it quite difficult to establish what exactly
such differences amount to.' 59 Natalie Babbitt echoes this view:
...Someone must have the child in mind even if the author doesn't.
Someone, editor or critic, must head a story in the right direction ...
Everyone can tell a child's book from one for adults ... The difficulty
lies in trying to define the essential nature of the difference.51
Peter Hunt sets out the discussion in its broadest terms when he sums up the
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issue: '"children's books" is a very curious classification, a chaotic collection of
texts that have in common nothing more than some undefined relationship to
children:52 These critics acknowledge problems in formulating a defining essence
for their understanding of 'children's fiction', but their relationship to assumed
'children' is a constant in these views.
Some critics have attempted to further list traits. of 'children's fiction'. Glazer
and Williams list
a handful of obvious differences that set children's books apart. They
tend to be shorter than adult novels. Illustrations are far more
important... Plots are simpler. There may be more emphasis on the
actions than on the musings of the main characters. And the main
characters tend to be children...53
Fred Inglis reflects this listing when he argues that
it is simply ignorant not to admit that children's novelists have
developed a set of conventions for their work. Such development is
a natural extension of the elaborate and implicit system of rules,
orthodoxies, improvisations, customs, forms and adjustments which
characterize the way any adult tells stories or simply talks at length to
children.54
It is clear again from Inglis' comment how references to the child inevitably
implicate an assumed 'adult'. Natalie Babbitt wonders further about the
characteristics distinguished by, for instance, Glazer and Williams. Babbitt asks,
in an article in which she sets out to question what she presents as conventional
views of children's fiction,: 'there is ... no such thing as an exclusively adult
emotion, and children's literature deals with them all ... [Does] a children's book
use simple vocabulary geared to an untrained mind [?]: compare a little Kipling
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to a little Hemingway and think again.' 55 It can be noted that Babbitt's comment
can be read as if she is writing of children writing these books: author and reader
are united in her remarks.
Finally, Inglis and Townsend both offer pragmatic definitions of children's
fiction necessary to indicate the realm of their subsequent critical discussions in
their books The Promise of Happiness 56 and Written for Children57 respectively.
Both seek to locate responsibility for the categorization of children's fictions in the
publisher's listings and marketing. Townsend writes that
in the short run it appears that, for better or worse, the publisher
decides. If he puts a book on the children's list, it will be read by
children (or young people), if it is read at all... 58.
Fred Inglis suggests that, for his purposes, 'it is more help to think of an overlap
of readership and author's intentions, heavily shaded where the main lists of
Puffins and Armada Lions fall, paler as the circle of readership overlaps less with
the author's intentions' 59. These discussions about classification are necessary for
establishing and upholding the field of criticism within its own limits, and they are
thus as much the product of the purposes the critics wish to express toward
'children'. As John Dewey argues: 'the tendency to forget the office of distinctions
and classifications, and to take them as marking things in themselves is the current
fallacy of scientific specialism ... our lists are only classifications for a purpose'69.
The overall purpose of children's book criticism has, then, mainly been to
endeavour to identify books which would embody their 'good' for their 'child'.
'Good' books are either books which are regarded as containing and transferring
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correct moral values and ideas, or books which, by way of an abstract 'literary'
power, defined in varying ways by critics, inspire children with 'higher' aims and
virtues. The liberal arts tradition of education and literary criticism which
identifies 'literary' qualities with a capacity to ennoble character and mind is the
cornerstone of this policy, as we have seen. The development of ideas of a special
and essential 'child' consciousness and vision required a critical language largely
devoted to asserting and constructing links between particular aspects of textuality,
reading, and that 'child' consciousness: this both validates differences perceived
between adult and children's books, and supports the idea that children's books,
in the main, have an autonomous, particular claim on, and therefore attraction
for, children.
Considering the criticisms of children's fiction, and the discussions
surrounding them, as involving not 'discovered' but 'invented' 'children' implies
consequences for views of 'literature' as defining a privileged mode of experience.
Gayatri Spivak, for instance, writes that 'everyone reads life and the world like a
book ... The world actually writes itself with the many-levelled, unfixable intricacy
and openness of a work of literature' 61 . The invented child, in this view, functions
as texts reinvented and reinterpreted by each reader. If the pluralist children's
literature critic tried to allow for individual children's interpretations and uses of
their books, critics such as Derrida and Spivak attempt to resolve the separation
between 'text' and 'reality', and, therefore, subvert the 'real' child most children's
literature critics rely on. Releasing children's fiction criticism from the 'child' as
extra-textual 'reality' involves this field in the larger debates surrounding the issues
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of textuality and reading. We saw already in Karlheinz Stierle's writing how the
'child' has been used to give children-as-readers special status within his type of
reader-response criticism. In order to understand the involvement of children's
literature criticism with different ideas in adult literary criticism - instead of
maintaining its isolation from them through the 'real child' barrier - let us look
more closely at the writings of children's literature critics who, in line with Lillian
Smith and Dorothy White, claim to be following 'adult literary criticism's' ideas
and methods.
Some of the 'Norton' and 'pluralist' critics found themselves disassociating
their 'literary' judgements from what they perceived to be 'children's' tastes or
preferences, despite ultimately referring the origin of this literary quality back to
essential child versions. However, there are critics whO elaborate the disassociation
between their judgements of the 'literary' values of children's books and 'the
child'. We saw in Lillian Smith and Dorothy White's writing an effort to transfer
(part of) their faith from 'children's literature' to 'literature'. Their views of
children-as-readers still provided the basis for their views. Some critics attempt to
move further away still from 'the child' and transfer their faith not only to
'literature', but also to the 'adults' as readers. These critics' defence to a
Landsberg-type criticism of their supposed 'child-neglect' returns to the claim,
shared by Norton and pluralist critics, that an absolute 'literary' value provides
benefit to children. In other words, while these critics attempt to dispel the
separate 'child-reader' as providing the standard for critical evaluation and
judgement, they still maintain the extra-textual child reading as their ultimate goal
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and reference-point.
John Rowe Townsend is one of these critics who emphasize 'literary' values.
He writes:
I believe that children's books must be judged as part of literature in
general, and therefore by much the same standards as 'adult' books.
A good children's book must not only be pleasing to children it must
be a good book in its own right.62
This is in accordance with Townsend's view that 'children are not a separate form
of life from people; no more than children's books are a separate form of
literature from just books'.63 There are other supporters of this argument that
'children reading' should be considered as part of 'people reading', and 'children's
books' as part of 'books in general', and that, among these 'books in general' they
may qualify for inclusion amongst a qualitatively based selection of 'good books'
or 'literature'. Meindert DeJong, for instance, argues that 'creative books for
children are the nearest thing to that purest of all literary forms, the lyric poem.'64
C.S. Lewis remarked that 'no book is really worth reading at the age of ten which
is not equally (and often far more) worth reading at the age of 50. 65 Paula Fox,
like Townsend, DeJong, and Lewis, a children's book author, writes that 'what
applies to good writing is, I think, absolute, whether for children or grown-ups or
the blind or the deaf or the thin or the fat.'"
This type of criticism relies on the view that 'literature' provides a privileged
mode of 'meaning', 'learning' or 'experience'. And this is inevitable in so far that
the entire thrust of their undertaking operates - in its various ways - to secure 'the
160
good for the child'. The emotive quality of much children's literature criticism we
have considered reveals its high moral and emotional stakes: to these critics
children's fiction matters. Therefore these critics use a Richards-ian type of view
on literature and its functions in educating and engaging emotions and aesthetic
sensitivities. The liberal arts tradition that I have discussed thus provides not only
many of the assumptions children's literature criticism relies on, but also links
children's literature criticism to those 'adult' literary critical views which also base
themselves on the liberal arts terminology. I.A. Richards sums up this basis when
he writes that
the arts, if rightly approached, supply the best data available for
deciding what experiences are more valuable than others ... The
enlargement of the mind, the widening of the sphere of human
sensibility, is brought about through poetry ... the age-long controversy
as to whether the business of poetry is to please or to instruct shows
this well ... [but] neither term is appropriate to the greater forms of
art ... Tragedy is still the form under which the mind may most clearly
and freely contemplate the human situation, its issues unclouded, its
possibilities revealed.°
Children's literature criticism on behalf of the 'child' is bound to Richards' critical
motivation and terms of discussion - note Richards' reference to the issue of
separating 'pleasure' from 'instruction' - through their joint commitment to the
basic tenets of the liberal arts education. Frequently, however, it is also Richardian
critics and terms which exclude children's fiction from the literary canon it is
attempting to gain access to in the terms of the children's literature critics such
as Townsend, Fox, and De Jong.
Thus, children's literature critics such as Townsend (I shall refer to them
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henceforth as 'Townsendian' critics) are involved in a number of problematic
areas: they are attempting to work with what they take to be the terms of an
'adult' literary criticism which excludes their field, and they present this 'adult'
literary criticism as a unified, stable critical methodology, when, in fact, it is itself
a compilation of different theoretical and practical perspectives, some of which
are critical of each other. Finally, the Townsendians must also still account for
their extra-textual 'child'.
We can see these topics reflected in Robert Leeson's response to
Townsend's suggestions for criticism:
Townsend's critical system would be book-centred rather than child-
centred ... Well, let's agree ... Let's further agree that there is great
disagreement over criteria in children's literature ... If the criteria are
jumbled, it is because children's literature is in a state of expansion
and change greater than at any time in its history. To bring together
these disparate elements into a comprehensive (let alone unified)
critical theory will take time and effort ... It will happen, I think,
through a process of synthesis, not by the rejection of non-literary
criteria ... Even less will it be done by a retreat into an aestheticism
developed in the field of adult literature ... How pure are the purists?
How influenced by non-literary criteria in a world where the events of
the 1940's and 1950's upset the stable judgments of the 1920's and
1930's? ... 68
Leeson thus apparently presupposes a 'comprehensive' critical theory in 'adult'
'book-centred' literary criticism, formed by 'literary criteria' which have prompted
'a retreat into aestheticism' by 'purists'. In suggesting aims for a children's
literature criticism Leeson includes a critique of an adult literary criticism as he
perceives it.
In emphasizing the 'literary' aspects of some children's fiction these 'book-
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centred' critics are in effect relying on a reformulation of Northrop Frye's ideas
about readers, texts, and reading. Leeson certainly seems to be referring to a
Frye-type of New Criticism, or 'close reading', in his sketch of an 'adult' literary
theory. In Townsend and L,eeson's terms children's literature criticism in the
1970's was, and largely still is, in the position that Frye was formulating in his
Anatomy of Criticism69 when he wrote that his essays were a contribution to
remedying the problem he discerned, namely that, in his view, 'there is as yet no
way of distinguishing what is genuine criticism, and therefore progresses toward
making the whole of literature intelligible, from what belongs only to the history
of taste, and therefore follows the vacillations of fashionable prejudice ... We have
no real standards to distinguish a verbal structure that is literary from one that is
not.'" The consequence of this, Frye argued, was that a 'determinist fallacy' -
which he defined as the attempt 'not to find a conceptual framework for criticism
within literature, but to attach criticism to one of a miscellany of frameworks
outside it ... whether Marxist, Thomist, liberal-humanist, neo-classical, Freudian,
Jungian, or existentialist' 71 - operated. Frye wanted critics 'to make an inductive
survey of [their] own field and let [their] critical principles shape themselves solely
out of [their] knowledge of that field.' 72 Consider in relation to this Townsend's
similarly oriented description of his ideal children's book critic:
He should, I believe, approach a book with an open mind and
respond to it as freshly and honestly as he is able; then he should go
away, let his thoughts and feelings about it mature, turn them over
from time to time, consider the book in relation to others by the same
author and by the author's predecessors and contemporaries. If the
book is for children he should not let his mind be dominated by the
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fact; but neither, I think, should he attempt to ignore it.73
And, echoing Frye's definition of the 'determinist fallacy', Townsend argues that
it is perfectly possible to judge books for children by non-literary
standards. It is legitimate to consider the social or moral or
psychological or educational impact of a book; to consider how many
children, and what kind of children, will like it. But it is dangerous to
do this and call it criticism.74
Frye and Townsend, on the basis of their 'liberal arts' beliefs also comment
similarly of the need for 'good' criticism. Besides viewing this criticism, as Leavis
does, as the result of the critics' engagement with, and judgement of, literature,
Townsend quotes Henry S. Canby: 'Unless there is somewhere an intelligent
critical attitude against which the writer can measure himself ... one of the chief
requirements for good literature is wanting ... the author degenerates:75 Frye, in
the same terms, argues that the literary critic is
for better or worse, the pioneer of education and the shaper of
cultural tradition. Whatever popularity Shakespeare and Keats have
now is equally the result of the publicity of criticism 76,
and 'a public that tries to do without criticism, and asserts that it knows what it
wants or likes, brutalizes the arts and loses its cultural memory.' 77 The
Townsendians, in service of the 'child', are asking for attention for this
'literariness' of some children's fiction beyond a strictly 'determinist' interest in
educational, psychological, or sociological aspects of children's reading and
childhood, within a context where the division is sustained between textual and
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non-textual narrative, or, as Frank Lentricchia puts it, between that 'romantic
mystique of a unique literary discourse and unique literary values' and an
'objectively knowable lump of thereness .... reality.'78
Wayne Booth summarizes some of the terminology critics have used to
discuss 'unique literary values' within this 'unique literary discourse'. Their terms
of discussion, like that of many of the child- and book-centred children's fiction
critics, having based themselves upon a distinction between literary discourse and
extra-textual 'reality' or 'life', involve references to the interrelationships between
these two 'worlds'. Booth writes, in considering 'general qualities on the basis of
which critics since Flaubert have judged fiction'79, that
some critics would require the novel to do justice to reality, to be true
to life, to be natural, or real, or intensely alive. Others would cleanse
it of impurities, of the inartistic, of the all-too-human. On the one
hand, the request is for 'dramatic vividness', 'conviction', 'sincerity',
'genuineness', 'an air of reality', 'a full realization of the subject',
'intensity of illusion'; on the other, for 'dispassionateness',
'impersonality', 'poetic purity', 'pure form'.8°
We have seen all of these kinds of terms used by various children's literary critics
with respect to their perception of the reality - correspondence of the 'literary'
child with, or deviation from, the 'real' child. To give one more example of this
cross-referral as it operates: Roger Duvoisin explains that 'one of the reasons for
making a page which is well designed is to tell the story with more simplicity,
more verve, clarity, and impact; to give importance to what is important; to
eliminate what destroys the freshness, the originality of the page; in other words,
to make a page which will be more easily read by the child.'81
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The 'book-centred' Townsendian critics are knocking on the door of a
Leavisite 'literature' of which Leavis wrote that 'we accept the field [of literature]
to be more or less strictly delimited in accordance with the conception of
literature as a matter of memorable works.' 82 Children's fiction, excluding some
'up-graded' books such as the 'Alice's', were usually not included in this canon.
Frances Mulhern describes the 'adult' reader and critic prevalent in the criticism
of F.R. Leavis:
the values implicit in 'literary criticism' were drawn from [Leavis']
'sense' of a community that he and his collaborators could neither
identify in the real nor define in thought - except as part of a circle
of meanings whose interdependence was exclusive and absolute. The
perimeter of the circle marked the limits of persuasion: what
'Scrutiny's' audience did not 'know already' it could not be told.83
Children's literature criticism such as Townsend advocates tries to envisage such
a community of 'adult' critics and readers for children's books, which will gain the
books an entrance to literary prestige and canonization. In a way this is parallel
to Elaine Showalter's suggestion that feminist criticism is concerned 'with the way
in which the hypothesis of a female reader changes our apprehension of a given
text, awakening us to the significance of its sexual codes.' 84 Her interest, in other
words, lies in analyzing the assumptions guiding accepted interpretations of texts
based on a 'male' reader. Townsendian critics are postulating an 'adult' reader to
take the place of their 'child' reader, in order to reveal their 'literary' aspects. In
this context, the Townsendian previous 'child' reader is also similar to Heilbrun's85
view on male/female readers, which Culler explains as entailing the suggestion that
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reading as a woman is not necessarily what occurs when a woman reads: women,
Heilbrun argues, can, and have, read as men. Townsendians see critics as
previously having solely read children's fiction 'as children', and they want critics
to also read this fiction as 'adults' for the literary purposes which are ultimately
to benefit the (child) reader.
However, this goal involves a self-created paradox: this criticism claims to
remove the 'child reader' from its writings without removing an 'extra-textual'
'real' 'child. But it cannot be done. Relying on a distinction between textual and
non-textual narratives - between 'fact' or 'reality' and 'fiction' seems to allow a
separation of 'child' and 'adult' reader/critic to leave only an 'adult'. But the 'child'
stays, albeit under cover of being a 'real' child outside the 'adult' critic, rather than
the 'adult' critic being the 'child' by 'seeing through the eye / I of the child'.
'Children's' fiction criticism cannot do without some 'child'. We can see this
reflected in attempts, on the part of Townsendian critics, to describe the grounds
for introducing some 'children's fiction' into the literary canon. They try to
formulate this in terms which leave the 'child' aside. We saw earlier some of the
problems this raised in efforts to deal jointly with the !child' and 'literary' qualities,
such as in the Norton critics' works. Townsend and Alice Jordan offer the
suggestion that 'literature' encompasses the books that stand the test of time.
Townsend writes that 'where the works of the past are concerned, I have much
faith in the shifting process of time - "time" being shorthand for the collective
wisdom of a great many people over a long period.' 86 Jordan claims that 'until a
book has weathered at least one generation and is accepted in the next, it can
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hardly be given the rank of a classic and no two people are likely to be in full
agreement as to what should be included in a list of them.' 87 Jordan also attempts
further descriptive and prescriptive criteria (and here we can see 'the child' creep
back in, if we hadn't already suspected it of maintaining a hidden presence within
'time' in the 'test of time' formulations) when she adds that 'some of the books
written for children have a charm of style that insures their acceptance as
literature in the best sense of the word ... simplicity and sincerity are important
factors.'88
The Townsendian critics are giving an affirmative response to Julia Briggs'
question of whether or not children's books should be critically considered by the
same methods as adult books. To do this they follow specific elements of specific
'adult' methods, and, because for their purposes they choose methods which allow
reference to 'real' 'adult' readers, they include references to 'real' 'child' readers.
Ironically, this option is a sword that cuts two ways, for it is this sustained
presence of 'real' 'child' which still forms one of the primary bases for adult
literary criticisms which work with 'literature' and 'literary canons' to exclude
children's fiction. Dutch critics Karel Eykman and Aukje Holtrop use the 'real'
child and its supposed needs to free children's fiction from needing to qualify for
the 'literary canon'. They argue, in discussing children's poetry, that 'there is no
need to involve such things and verses with such weighty issues.' 89* And they
assume that the children's poetry they discuss would not 'pass' the literary
* My translation.
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theoretical 'test' they apply, namely Wellek and Warrens' concepts of 'unity',
'complexity', and 'density', but also that this is not relevant for child-readers
anyway." Another Dutch critic, Jan Blokker, takes much the same view. He claims
that children's fiction has never developed any new or original genres, themes, or
literary points of view, but only used those which had already been developed in
'adult' literature.91 Blokker, however, also sees this as being unimportant to child-
readers: 'objections on literary aesthetic grounds seem to me to be irrelevant - one
of the nice things about kids is that they have no taste in our adult sense of the
word, and do not adopt our somewhat perverted tendency to differentiate
between Kitsch and Art until they are halfway through puberty'.92*
Relying on adult criticism, therefore, which operates around a literary canon,
offers as much danger as opportunity, depending on the 'child' used. But all these
critics - whether their child-readers need 'literature' or not - rely on a 'child' to
validate their argument, even if only to shore up, or create, an 'adult' critical view
to oppose it. In order to preserve 'children's fiction' and 'children's literature', and
'adult fiction' and 'adult literature' as concepts and values there must be 'real'
'adult' and 'child' readers. Townsend himself sets up a 'child' reader who is close
to his 'adult' reader: 'an author can - as I have said elsewhere - expect as much
intelligence, as much imagination, as from the grown-up, and a good deal more
readiness to enter into things and live the story.' 93 Jonathan Cott is another
Townsendian critic, who also reveals an allegiance to an adult literary criticism
* My translation.
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which supports 'literature' as a privileged mode of meaning and experience. In
Pipers at the Gates of Dawn" Cott describes his reaction at what he calls his
'rediscovery' of children's books: 'My turning to children's books as an over-
satiated adult reader induced in me the kind of "intense attention" that, the critic
Helen Vendler has suggested, the greatest literature should induce, making us
enter, in her words, a state of "receptivity and plasticity and innocence", and, in
Shelley's words, purging "from our inward sight the film of familiarity which
obscures from us the wonder of our being".... For children's literature reawakens
in us our sense of remembering, which, in fact, is often stored in, and brought to
new life by, our senses.'95 In Cott's description we find involved all the factors I
have discussed: the reliance on the power of 'literature', the separation between
'child' and 'adult' which is simultaneously sustained and claimed to be overcome
(Cott describes himself as an 'adult' reader, but the power of literature makes him
'child' again), and the designation of qualities and characteristics to the 'child' and
'adult' which direct and ex-plain Cott's interest and purpose as a children's fiction
reader and critic.
In short, even self-proclaimed 'book-centred' critics of children's fiction
retain as their guiding star the 'real child', based on their reliance on a distinct
literary discourse determined by adult readers and critics they select. It is this
determined and determining effort involving children, adults, and literature, which
forms the terms of discussion of children's fiction criticism.
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Concluding Comments
As it has not been the intention of this thesis to achieve solutions to problems acknowledged
within children's fiction criticism as such, but rather to examine the operations of
the terms of discussion, I do not offer a 'conclusion'. I would, however, like to end
my discussion with some comments which may clarify further my own, inevitable,
purpose at having viewed children's fiction criticism in the terms described. As I
have argued, the 'child' as discovery, as 'truth' or 'reality', is fundamental to children's
fiction criticism, and therefore it depends on a distinction between 'fact' and 'fiction'
on a wider scale. I could not have argued this statement without the idea of a resolution
of this opposition as set out by Foucault, Derrida, Spivak, and others, as I indicated
at the beginning of this thesis, and without Jacqueline Rose's partial application
of aspects of these ideas specifically to the discourse of children's fiction. Of the
'world as literature', as Spivak put it, Roland Barthes also wrote:
knowledge of the profound self is illusory: there are only different
ways of articulating it. Racine lends himself to several languages -
psychoanalytic, existential, tragic, psychological ..., none is innocent.
But to acknowledge this incapacity to tell the .truth about Racine is
precisely to acknowledge, at last, the special status of literature.1
In having attempted to discuss children's literature criticisms as expressions of the
incapacity to tell 'the truth' about 'the child' I cannot deny my own non-innocent
perspective: it seems to me that moves away from claiming the existence of a true
child as reader provoke anxiety, and, sometimes, hostility in children's fiction criticism.
The 'child's' involvement with narratives of power, freedom, nature, innocence, and
hope, as I have discussed, and the lack of success of even self-professed critical
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efforts to disengage from it, reveal, to me, depths of feeling and the entrenchment
of the imagery. It is again a comment from Barthes which addresses the roles of
authoritative and dominant ideologies of education and society in relation to reading
and literature which are so explicitly brought to bear around 'children' and 'childhood',
when he argues that 'in precisely this way literature ..., by refusing to assign a "secret",
an ultimate meaning, to the text (and to the world as text), liberates what may be
called an anti-theological activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary, since to refuse
to fix meaning is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases - reason, science,
law.'2 Barthes sees 'refusing God' as 'truly revolutionary', while I see it more as
another 'belief', perhaps because Barthes strives towards not fixing meaning, and
I believe we can never, despite this striving, not fix meaning at some level, as I have
indicated perhaps in my references to Nietzsche in the thesis. As Richard Rorty
writes of Foucault and Habermas:
Michel Foucault is an ironist who is unwilling to be a liberal, whereas
Jurgen Habermas is a liberal who is unwilling to be an ironist. Both
Foucault and Habermas are, like [Isaiah] Berlin, critics of the traditional
Platonic and Kantian attempts to isolate a core component of the
self. Both see Nietzsche as critically important.3
I do not think that considering the child as 'invented' constitutes, as we have
seen some children's literature critics imply, or argue openly, an ignorance of, or
lack of concern for, the needs and suffering of sensing beings. I would argue that,
as much as any effort which sees itself as born out of such interests, exploring purposes
and their effects in inventing narratives can constitute an intense attempt to listen
to this: whether it is a listening to stories of selves - as Barthes put it: 'I am the
story which happens to me' 4 - or to stories others tell of selves is a matter of belief
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or conviction at that given moment. Gayatri Spivak writes, in relation to accusations
of remoteness or distance from urgent issues, that he has at times felt 'obliged
to stress the distinction between my position and the position that, in a world of
massive brutality, exploitation, and sexual oppression, advocates an aesthetization
of life:5 Spivak explains that her interest is not primarily concerned with questions
such as 'what is the nature of the aesthetic?', or 'how indeed are we to understand
life?', but towards thinking about the issues that
1) the formulations of such questions is itself a determined and determining
gesture. 2) Very generally speaking, literary people are still caught
within a position where they must say: life is brute fact and outside
art; the aesthetic is free and transcends life. 3) This declaration is
the condition and effect of 'ideology'.6
If Spivak's defence is necessary, I would take the same line as she does towards
children's literature critics such as Landsberg, Norton or Tucker. My thinking about
children's literature criticism as systems of purpose and hierarchy is neither intended
as a claim to knowledge of a superior truth, or as a claim to transcending criticism
as it stands: it is the expression of my own interest in those purposes and hierarchies,
and of the hope that any readers of this thesis may find that an angle of thought
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